
LAMA ANAGARIKA GOVINDA

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATTITUDE OF EARLY BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

AND ITS SYSTEMATIC REPRESENTATION ACCORDING TO ABHIDHAMMA TRADITION



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NAMO
TASSA
BHAGAVATO
ARAHATO
SAMMA-
SAMBUDDHASSA

Now, if anyone should put the question, whether I admit any view at all, he should be answered thus:

The Perfect One is free from any theory, for the Perfect One has understood what the body is, and how it arises, and passes away. He has understood what feeling is, and how it arises, and passes away. He has understood what perception is, and how it arises, and passes away. He has understood what the mental formations are, and how they arise, and pass away. He has understood what consciousness is, and how it arises, and passes away. Therefore, I say, the Perfect One has won complete deliverance through the extinction, fading away, disappearance, rejection, and getting rid of all opinions and conjectures, of all inclination to the vainglory of 'I' and 'mine'.

(*Majjhima-Nikāya* 72; *transl. by Mahāthera Nyāṇatiloka.*)

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INTRODUCTION

Before speaking about Buddhist philosophy I want to make clear the position of Buddhism as well as what I mean by philosophy. It has become a fashion to call Buddhism a philosophy pure and simple or to identify it with one or the other of its branches: psychology and ethics. But Buddhism is something more, otherwise it would have remained merely a matter of aesthetic pleasure for a few *beaux esprits*, philosophers, and historians, and – in the most favourable case – the rule of conduct for a small group of puritans. Philosophies and scientific systems of psychology have never been able to exercise a dominating influence on the life of humanity – not because there was something wrong with them as systems, nor because they were lacking in truth, but because the truth contained in them was only of theoretical value, born by the brain and not by the heart, thought out by the intellect and not realized in life. Apparently truth alone is not sufficient for exercising a lasting influence on humanity; in order to do that it must be combined with the quality of life. Abstract truth is like tinned food without vitamins. It satisfies our taste and keeps up our body for some time, but we cannot exist on it in the long run. This quality of life is provided for our mind by the religious impulse that urges and guides man towards realization. There is no doubt – the history of Buddhism proves it – that this quality is as strongly present in Buddhism as its philosophical qualities. (The reason why some people hesitate to call Buddhism a religion is that they confound religion with dogma, organized tradition, faith in a divine revelation and similar things, which certainly cannot be found in the Buddha's teaching.)

If, therefore, we speak of Buddhist philosophy we should be conscious that this is only the theoretical side of Buddhism, not the whole of it. And just as it is impossible to speak about Buddhism as a religion without touching upon the philosophical aspect, in the same way it is impossible to understand Buddhist philosophy without seeing its connexion with the religious side. The religious side is the way which has been established by experience (just as a path is formed by the process of walking), the philosophy is the definition of its direction, while the psychology consists in the analysis of the forces and conditions that favour or hinder the progress on that way. But before we consider the direction towards which the way leads, we have to look back from whence it came.

FIRST PART

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND THE EARLY STAGES OF INDIAN THOUGHT

A knower of the dhamma, o Bhikkhus, never quarrels with the world. What the wise ones in the world declare as non-existent, o Bhikkhus, that also I teach as non-existent. And what, o Bhikkhus, the wise ones in the world recognize as existent, that also I teach as existent.

(Saṃyutta-Nikāya III, 138.*)*

THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION AND THE EARLY STAGES OF INDIAN THOUGHT

RELIGIONS are not man-made things. They are the formal expression of collective experience. They take definite shape in the most highly developed, the most sensitive minds which are capable of taking part in the super-individual life of humanity. Religions grow up like plants according to certain laws of nature, which may be called spiritual laws with the same justification. But the universality of a law does not mean the equality of its effects, because the same law is acting under different circumstances. Thus there may be a parallelism in movement (which we call 'development') and similarity in phases, but there is nowhere identity. It is therefore as useless to argue about the differences of religions as to argue about the differences of trees. They are what they are by necessity. Each species has its own standard of perfection, and just those features in which they differ from each other are the elements which form their character, their particular beauty. We may like one type of trees better than the other because its shape pleases our eyes or the taste of its fruit pleases our tongue, but we have no standard of values which would enable us to establish the superiority of one species over the others. Each follows the laws of its own nature and the conditions of its environment.

The same holds good for religions. It is their differences that constitute their character and their beauty. Those who try to explain away the differences by calling them misunderstandings or misinterpretations in order to arrive at some abstract unity are like children who open the petals of flowers in order to get at the 'real' flower. If a number of artists would paint the same subject, each of them would produce a different picture. If a number of ordinary people would take photographs of the same subject (from the same place), each of them would produce the same picture. Here equality is not a sign of superiority but of the deficiency of creative forces, while the differences in the artists' productions are not to be regarded as shortcomings but as that which constitutes the chief value of their work. Uniqueness and originality are the privileges of genius in all

spheres of life. Equality and standardization are the characteristics of mechanization, mediocrity and spiritual stagnation. If religions are to be regarded as the highest achievements of man, we should be ready to concede to them the privileges which we associate with the work of a genius. It is needless to say that differences alone are not yet proofs of creativeness and that we would go to the other extreme if we would deny every possibility of unity. But unity should not be established at the expense of productive variety and true life but by tuning the essential differences into a harmony that is strong enough to tolerate and to hold together the greatest contrasts.

1. *The Age of Magic*

We should be careful not to apply our own religious standards to other religions and still less to the earliest stages of the spiritual life of man. Religion, as we understand it nowadays, is as different from its origins as the present humanity from that of the Stone Age. We are accustomed to identify religion with morality, or with the idea of God, or with a belief in a certain dogma – and yet, all this has nothing to do with the religious attitude of the primitive man. Why? Because he has not yet created or experienced the difference between the inner and the outer world. His religion is not some sort of idealism or 'Sunday morning feeling'; for him religion is a question of life: namely, how to resist and to maintain himself against the unknown powers which surround him, and how to attain security and happiness. These unknown powers are not only the forces of nature but the enigmatic character of even the simplest things and the uncontrolled psychic forces within himself. These forces which in the course of time have been pushed down below the threshold of our so-called normal consciousness by the intellect and which have been artificially confined to the subconscious regions, were formerly an important part of the human world. They not only entered the day-consciousness of man but were projected into the visible world around him, while the material objects were accepted as parts of the psychic world.

In a state of consciousness which puts the projections of our mind and feelings on the same plane as material objects and which experiences both as a reality of equal value and similar laws, in such a state the limit between subjective experience and objective things is not yet established. Whatever exists is animated and takes part in the life of the experiencing subject to which it is related in manifold ways as soon as it enters the field of cognition. Each

contact has its reactions on both sides, thus establishing new relations.[1]

Therefore from the standpoint of self-preservation it is necessary to define, to limit, to direct those relations, and to prevent the tide of phenomena from overpowering and suffocating the awakening human soul which is still open to all impressions like a child and almost as unprotected.

Imagine a shipwrecked man, who after drifting with the wreck on the ocean for a long time, lands at some unknown coast. The first thing for him to do would be to find out the name of the place or the country. The name means salvation to him, because knowing the name he can judge his situation, decide what to do. Without the name he is without direction, drifting as helplessly as if he had never put his foot on solid ground. And if he were in an unexplored corner of the world, he would carefully observe the things and the formations of the landscape around him and would name them before penetrating further. Thus he takes possession mentally of his surroundings which lose their horrors in the same proportion in which he becomes acquainted with them. But how does he find the names for the objects and shapes around him? By comparing them with those forms and things which are familiar to him and by characterizing them in simple words. Those who have ever been alone in the wilderness will understand the importance of this process of assimilation and will be able to imagine the similar but much more intense experience of the primitive man who had to assimilate step by step a whole universe. For him the meaning of a thing or a force, the description of an event, the formulation of a thought or impression was a fundamental extension of his world. Things that could be named had lost their secret power over man, the horror of the unknown. To know the name of a thing meant to exercise power over it. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa XI, 2, 3; 1, ff., says: 'The Brahman, after having created the world, contemplated: "How could I descend again into this world?" He descended with the help of two things, namely with the help of name and form. So far extends this world as name and form. They are the two great forces of Brahman. One who knows these two great forces of Brahman attains great power.'

[1] 'Life dwells even in the tools of man. The warrior worships the god "chariot", the god "arrow", the drum; the peasant worships the plough, the gambler the dice; the performer of the sacrifice – about whom, naturally, we have the best information – worships the stone with which he squeezes the Soma, the bed of straw on which the gods are expected to sit down, the post to which the sacrificial animal will be bound.' (Oldenberg, 'Religion des Veda,' p. 38.) These customs have been preserved up to the present day. The musician worships his instruments, the artisan his tools, and the peasant would not even dare to destroy an old plough which is of no use to anybody.

And in Brihad-Āraṇyaka Upanishad III, 2, 11 ff. we find: 'Yājñavalkya, if a man dies here, what is it that does not leave him?' 'The name. The name has no end, no end has the world which he conquers with its help.'

Everything was conceived as the embodiment of its name (and the creative act from the standpoint of magic consists just as much in naming as in shaping); but 'name' was not only understood as an arbitrary designation but as a cosmic value. The name was identical with its object, the adequate form or the respective force. To know the name of a force, a being or an object was identical with the mastery over it.

But in order to make this force effective, the name and the qualities associated with it had to be uttered in a rhythmical and solemn way, so that the mind was entirely concentrated and tuned upon the desired object.

Thus magic was born with the word, because the word in the hour of its birth was a centre of force, and only habit has sterilized it into a mere conventional form. It is in and through the word that man conceives the world. It was the word that raised man above the animal.

> The essence of all beings is the earth,
> the essence of the earth is water,
> the essence of the water are the plants,
> the essence of the plants is man,
> the essence of man is speech,
> the essence of speech is the Rigveda,
> the essence of the Rigveda the Sāmaveda,
> the essence of the Sāmaveda the Udgīta.
> That Udgīta is the best of all essences,
> the highest, deserving the highest place, the Eighth.

The Udgīta is the sacred word OṂ, the highest and most concentrated form of mantric expression into which the essence of the universe, as realized within the human consciousness, is compressed.

But man could not constantly soar in the heights of universal experiences. Also the feelings, desires and needs of the ordinary human life had to be expressed, directed and satisfied, and thus innumerable mantras, magic formulas or charms were created.

The Atharva Veda contains charms against diseases (bhaishajyāni), prayers for long life and health (āyushyāṇi), imprecations against demons, sorcerers and enemies (ābhicārikāṇi and krityāpratiharaṇāni), love charms or charms pertaining to women (strīkarmāṇi),

charms pertaining to royalty (rājakarmāṇi), charms to secure prosperity in house, field, cattle, business, to secure success in gambling and protection from serpents and other dangers, charms in expiation of sin and defilement, etc.

Here only two examples:

(*VI*, 8.) *Charm to secure the love of a woman.*

(1) As the creeper embraces the tree on all sides, thus do thou embrace me, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me!

(2) As the eagle when he flies forth presses his wings against the earth, thus do I fasten down thy mind, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me!

(3) As the sun day by day goes about this heaven and earth, thus do I go about thy mind, so that thou, woman, shalt love me, so that thou shalt not be averse to me!

(*VI*, 142.) *Blessings during the sowing of seed.*

(1) Raise thyself up, grow thick by thy own might, O grain. Burst every vessel! The lightning in the heavens shall not destroy thee!

(2) When we invoke thee, *god* grain, and thou dost listen, then do thou raise thyself up like the sky, be inexhaustible as the sea!

(3) Inexhaustible shall be those that attend to thee, inexhaustible thy heaps! They who give thee as a present shall be inexhaustible, they who eat thee shall be inexhaustible!

(Hymns of the Atharva-Veda, translated by Maurice Bloomfield.)

As we see, there were charms for almost every situation of life. They were as free from moral or religious considerations as the prescriptions of a physician (and in fact, they were mainly concerned with bodily welfare). And this is only natural, because religion had not yet become an independent value, had not yet separated itself from life in its fullness – just as the individual had not yet separated itself from nature. A child will satisfy his desires with a natural and innocent egotism – innocent, because not yet being conscious of an ego. Morality is based on self-responsibility. But if there is no self, or if the self has not yet become conscious of itself (and it consists only in that faculty of becoming conscious in a reflective way) there cannot be any concept of morality. The individuality of man had not yet been discovered, and for that very reason there could not be any idea to preserve it. Metempsychosis was unknown in Rigvedic times.

But all the more was man conscious of life. And all the more he took part in the life around him. If he was more concerned with

his bodily existence then it must be said that his body extended far more into the universe than we can imagine. He experienced bodily what we conceive theoretically. The forces of nature which in our mind have degenerated to mere abstractions, were to him bodily realities.

2. *Anthropomorphic Universe and Polytheism*

The world had become the enlarged body of man, an anthropomorphic universe.

Consequently the different qualities of man returned to their bigger counterparts or prototypes in nature at his death. The qualities of the eye went into the sun, the qualities of the ear dissolved into space, the breath united itself with the wind.

Thus we may say that man was universalized and the world anthropomorphized.

As an example of the anthropomorphic conception of nature and the profound beauty of expression I may be allowed to quote two Vedic Hymns in Max Müller's translation:

To the Maruts (the Storm Gods):

Come hither, Maruts, on your chariots charged with lightning,
resounding with beautiful songs, stored with spears and winged with horses!
Fly to us like birds, with your best food, you mighty ones!
They come gloriously on their red, or, it may be,
on their tawny horses which hasten their chariots.
He who holds the axe is brilliant like gold;
—with the tyre
of the chariot they have struck the earth.
On your bodies there are daggers for beauty;
may they stir up our minds as they stir up the forests.
For yourselves, O well-born Maruts, the vigorous (among you)
shake the stone (for distilling Soma). etc.
(Max Müller, *Vedik Hymns* I, p. 169. Maṇḍala I, Hymn 88.)

NIGHT (Rigveda X, 127)

1. When night comes on, the goddess shines
In many places with her eyes:
All glorious she has decked herself.
2. Immortal goddess far and wide,
She fills the valleys and the heights:
Darkness she drives away with light.

3. The goddess now, as she comes on,
Is turning out her sister, Dawn:
Far off the darkness hastes away.
4. So, goddess, come today to us:
At thy approach we seek our homes,
As birds their nests upon the tree.
5. The villagers have gone to rest
And footed beasts and winged birds;
The hungry hawk himself is still.
6. Ward off from us she-wolf and wolf,
Ward off the robber, goddess Night;
So take us safe across the gloom.
7. The darkness, thickly painting black,
Has, palpable, come nigh to me:
Like debts, O Dawn, clear it away.
8. I have brought up a hymn like kine,
For thee, as one who wins a fight:
This, Heaven's daughter, Night, accept.

(Hymns from the Rigveda, translated by A. A. Macdonell. The Heritage of India Series.)

In the beginning the anthropomorphized principles of nature in the form of gods and demons were only parts of the magical play of forces and counter-forces and were entirely dependent on the hidden laws of this play. He who was in the possession of the secret knowledge of those laws and who knew how to perform the magic rites with their appropriate mantras could summon the gods to his service and banish those forces which were hostile to his intentions.

With the passage of time the mutual relationship between the deities of nature was discovered and led to the establishment of a regular pantheon presided over by a limited number of chief deities. This process of simplification caused the concentration of power in a few divine exponents and the relegation of minor deities into the background. This had the effect that the attention was diverted from the magic powers of man to those of the gods who were supposed to be the 'magicians' of the universe, and consequently their assistance was implored. Though magical rituals still persisted in the 'age of gods' their position had altered, because the forces which man had discovered and aroused within himself were transferred or projected into an agent outside himself, i.e. beyond his control.

Before we proceed farther, let us summarize the results of our investigation:

The first stage of religious practice is magic, its motive is the

psychic tendency of expansion, assimilation, and stabilization. It is not only the defence against the unknown powers, merely based on fear, as certain materialistic scholars like to say, but the aggressive attitude of conquerors, the bold attempt to master the world, born from the youthful surplus of creative powers. Man was not at all submissive and servile, crawling in the dust before a god, nor did he pretend to have any moral aspirations. Quite on the contrary, it was *he* who created his gods according to his image – but his image, verily, was still that of untamed nature in all her grandeur and unsophisticated selfishness – and when these gods no more represented his image he discarded them. It is only the uncreative minds, the non-thinking masses, who turn religion, which was the product of abundance, into an outcome of fear and spiritual poverty.

Just as the inquisitiveness of modern science with all its daring theories and experiments is not only an outcome of sheer necessity but has something of the sportive spirit of an adventurer who penetrates into unknown regions without caring where he may land or what the results may be, thus primitive man, in his own way, went out to conquer his world. As long as there is a feeling of inferiority, of submission, religion cannot come into existence, because religion which is positive and constructive, can never be caused by a negative state of mind. Herein lies the difference between religion and superstition.

But religion shares the fate of art: the artist creates a work out of the abundance of his visions, but the ordinary man subordinates it to his own trivial purposes, be it for the sake of decoration or entertainment, self-glorification or advertisement, etc. But just as little as one can understand the real nature of art from such inadequate applications, so one cannot expect to understand the real nature of religion from its misuse.

The most ancient Vedas are rhythmic, musical creations, mostly hymns for the glorification of the forces of nature: reflexes of inner experiences. Man liberates himself from a psychic pressure, be it joy, sorrow, or awe in front of the terrible or the incomprehensible. At the moment in which we express a feeling in words we are beginning to master it, thus showing that we are above the situation.

At the moment in which the word 'God' was created, the power expressed in it was no more omnipotent.

3. *The Problem of God*

In the old Vedic religion, which was not yet hampered by dogmatism, we can easily trace this development. The Brāhmaṇas, in the

beginning a living source of inspiration in the form of magic spells and songs, become finally themselves objects of worship. Their immanent power, the Brahman, is turned into a god and separated from the original experience; it becomes a matter of speculation, a mere concept, which, in spite of all the epithets of infinity, means limitation. And when we arrive at the last stage of the development, the power which was sterilized in the concept dissolves itself into doubt.

In the following hymns the first vibrations of this doubt can be felt. Where formerly there were certainties of experience, there are now problems appearing on the spiritual horizon.

'Nor Aught nor Naught existed, your bright sky
Was not, nor heaven's broad roof outstretched above.
What covered all? What sheltered? What concealed?
What is the water's fathomless abyss?

There was not death – yet was there naught immortal,
There was no confine betwixt day and night;
The only One breathed breathless by itself,
Other than IT there nothing since has been.

Darkness there was, and all at first was veiled
In gloom profound – an ocean without light –
The germ that still lay covered in the husk
Burst forth, one nature from the fervent heat.

Who knows the secret? Who proclaims it here?
Whence, whence this manifold creation sprang?
The gods themselves came later into being –
Who knows from whence this great creation sprang?

He from whom all this great creation came,
Whether his will created or was mute,
The Most High Seer that is in highest heaven,
He knows it – *or perchance even He knows not.*'
(Rigveda X, 129, translated by Max Müller.)

'He who gives breath, He who gives strength
Whose command all the bright gods revere,
Whose shadow is immortality, whose shadow is death;
Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

He through whose greatness these snowy mountains are,
And the sea, they say, with the distant river (the Rasā) –
He of whom these regions are the two arms –
Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

He through whom the sky is bright and the earth firm –
He through whom the heaven was established, nay the
highest heaven –
He who measured out the space in the sky –
Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?

He who by his might looked even over the waters
Which held power and generated the sacrificial fire,
He who alone is God above all gods –
Who is the God to whom we shall offer our sacrifice?'
(Rigveda X, 121, translated by Max Müller.)

Finally the old gods are replaced by an overlord, a super-god, in whose shadow they lead a ghostly existence. But this super-god himself is not more than an ultimate abstraction, about which nothing can be said or known and which therefore can have no influence on life.

There is no doubt that this God was a logical necessity once the process of simplification and unification had started. But logical necessities, though they may satisfy the philosopher, do not always satisfy the needs of man, or solve the problems of life. Each of the former gods had his own function and his visible expression in nature. In the magic practices the power of the Brāhmaṇas was a psychological fact and was connected with definite results and actions. But with a power which is beyond experience, with a principle which is beyond description and expression, nothing can be done and nothing can be expected from it.

Thus man has reached the limits of his world exploration and is turning back towards his starting point: towards himself. And now he discovers himself, becomes conscious of his individuality (and with that, of his shortcomings and sufferings – therefore the turn from an optimistic to a more or less pessimistic outlook!). A new exploration begins: that of Man.

'Beside the Brahma, which is enthroned in its everlasting quietude, highly exalted above the destinies of the human world, there is left remaining, as the sole really active person in the great work of deliverance, *man himself*, who possesses inherent in himself the power to turn away from this world, from this hopeless state of sorrow.' (Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 52.)

4. *The Problem of Man*

In the self-exploration of man the first element which draws upon itself the greatest attention is the breath.

Breath is the criterium, the element of life. It is that which links up the individual with the external world. Its rhythm is the rhythm of the universe. It is the waxing and waning, the unfoldment and reabsorption, the accumulation and disintegration of worlds and all other phenomena of life. Already in Rigvedic times the breath was regarded as the main function of life, but only after the decline of the old gods was breath put into the focus of attention. The terms for it were prāṇa and ātman. While the former one was mainly used in the bodily sense and closely associated with the sense-organs whose functions were resolved into prāṇa during sleep, ātman was used in a more general sense, as the breathing power that manifests itself in the body as well as in all other phenomena of the universe. 'The breath powers penetrate the human body and give it life; the ātman is lord over all the breath-powers . . . he is the "innominate breath-power" from which the "nominate" breath-powers derive their being. "A decade of breaths, truly," so says the Brāhmaṇa, "dwells in man; the Ātman is the eleventh, on him are dependent the breath-powers." ' (Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 25.)

The simple but profound experience of the life-giving rhythm of breath as expressed in the term Ātman – which is preserved up to the present day in its original meaning in the German words 'atem' (breath) and 'atmen' (to breathe) very soon developed into philosophical speculations and degenerated into an abstract concept in which the dynamic character of the original experience was reversed into the static condition of an absolute Ego. It was the same logical process of unification and simplification which always takes place when thinking becomes independent of reality and when experience is replaced (deified) by concepts. Just as man had reached the limits of his world explorations in the idea of an ultimate God beyond definition, so in search for the spiritual principle of unity within himself, man reached the limits of his conceptual faculties in the concept of ātman. We have, therefore, to understand ātman and Brahman as boundary values which correspond to each other and finally merge into each other (*les extrêmes se touchent*). But they themselves have no contents: they may be defined equally well as everything or as nothing. They denote the infinity within and without ourselves, but only in terms of concepts – no more in terms of life.

The famous dialogue between Yājñavalkya and his wife Maitreyī may show the last phase of ātman-speculation.

'As a lump of salt, which is thrown into the water, dissolves and cannot be gathered up again, but wherever water is drawn, it is salty, so truly, it is with this great being, the endless, the unlimited, the fullness of knowledge: from these (earthly) beings it came into view and with them it vanishes.

'There is no consciousness after death; hearken, thus I declare unto thee.' Thus spoke Yājñavalkya. Then Maitreyī said: 'This speech of thine, exalted one, perplexes me; there is no consciousness after death!'

Then said Yājñavalkya: 'I tell thee nothing perplexing; it is quite comprehensible; where there is a duality of existence, one can see the other, one can smell the other, one can speak to the other, one can hear the other, one can think of the other, one can apprehend the other. But where for each everything has turned into his ego (the ātman), by whom and whom shall he see, by whom and whom shall he smell, by whom and to whom shall he speak – hear – think – apprehend? By whom shall he apprehend him, through whom he apprehends this universe? Through whom shall he apprehend him, the apprehender?' (Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 35.)

Thus the ātman-speculation ends in a dialectic play, fades away into a mere concept, into a bloodless principle, which is as far from life and religious experience as that Brahman which stands aloof from the actual world.

Yet the battle for the recognition of man and human values was not lost! Man had already become sufficiently conscious of himself to have been discouraged by negative results or stopped in his self-exploration. And if it was not possible to proceed farther from the standpoint of an Ātman, then, why not proceed from the opposite end: from that which is *not* Ātman? This is what the Buddha did. In this way he escaped the jungle of speculation and controversy which had grown up around the ātma-idea. His position was such that he neither was compelled to affirm nor to negate this idea. And in the same way the problem of God had lost its importance to such an extent that the Buddha could leave it entirely to the individual to decide it for himself. 'It is significant that although the speculations of the Upanishads regarding Ātman and Brahma must in Buddha's time, have been long since propounded and must have become part of the acknowledged property of the students of the Vedas, the Buddhist texts never enter into them, not even polemically. The Brahma, as the universal one, is not alluded to by the Buddhists, either as an element of an alien or of their own creed, though they very frequently mention the god Brahmā.' (Oldenberg, *Buddha*, p. 63.)


Also the Buddha is convinced that the highest reality dwells within us – and this is not a theory to him because he himself has experienced it – but he emphasizes that as long as we have not transformed our consciousness into a receptacle of such a reality we shall not be able to take part in it. This reality is super-individual and therefore we have first to overcome the individual limitations of our consciousness if we want to attain it – otherwise we are like a man who has found the elixir of immortality and who has no vessel wherein to keep it.

5. *Summary*

Thus the problems of the human mind are different in each period. In the earliest period everything that leads to the intensification of self-consciousness is a necessary means of self-preservation. This ego-tendency is a natural instinct of protection because, by fixing the limits between self and not-self, man defends himself against a boundless, overflowing world. But after this self-limitation has been achieved, the ego-tendency becomes a danger. It gradually acts like a mental sclerosis. In order to prevent complete separation and seclusion (mental ossification) altruistic tendencies must set in. After individuality has been established, the connexion with the super-individual must be opened again. Thus after self-affirmation has reached its highest point, the development reverses its direction and re-establishes the harmony (the equilibrium) through self-negation. In terms of modern psychology: the tendency of self-affirmation is extravertive, directed towards the external world; the tendency of self-negation is introvertive, i.e. directed towards the inner world, within which the ego-illusion is dissolved (because an ego can only be experienced in contrast to an external world). The extravertive and introvertive movements are as necessary in the life of humanity as inhalation and exhalation in the life of an individual.

In the following diagram I have tried to show the extravertive and introvertive tendencies in the development of Indian thought and religion, which I classify into three main periods: the period of Magic, the period of Gods, and the period of Man. These periods coincide with the discovery of analogy, logic, and relativity.

The transition from one period to the other does not consist in the sudden disappearance of certain elements and the origination of entirely new ones, but in a change of emphasis. This change does not take place abruptly but comes about by a gradual shifting of the centre of gravitation. Thus magic practices did not simply vanish


PERIOD OF MAGIC
Discovery of Analogy
Recognition of Power
Aspiration: Control of Nature
(Conquest of the World)
PERIOD OF GODS
Discovery of Logic
Recognition of Ideas
Aspiration: Unity
(Conquest of Thought)
PERIOD OF MAN
Discovery of Relativity
Recognition of Psychology
Aspiration: Freedom
(Conquest of Consciousness)
HYMNS AND MANTRAS
RITUAL AND SACRIFICE
CONTEMPLATION OF THE DIVINE
METAPHYSICAL SPECULATION
ANALYTIC+SYNTH. MEDITATION
PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
ANTHROPOISM
THEISM
ANIMISM
SPIRITUAL
MENTAL
EMOTIONAL
EXTRAVERTIVE
INTROVERTIVE
+
–
+
–
+ –
–
creative
conservative
creative
conservative
creative
conservative
(emotional expansion)
(ritualistic consolidation)
(mental expansion)
(theological consolidation)
(spiritual expansion)
(philosophical consolidation)
unindividual
collective
individual

in the Age of Gods, but they had become a secondary function, subordinated to the service of the gods, who were now in the centre of interest – nor were the gods abolished in the Age of Man but only left to themselves, deprived of their importance and of their influence on human life.

Similarly one should not think that in the second period logic replaced analogy or that in the third period logic was abolished in favour of a relativistic system of thought, but that in the second period logic was added to analogy, and that in the third period logic was modified by the discovery of relativity.

In the period of magic, man was impressed by the power which manifested itself in the universe around him. His aspiration, therefore, was the control of nature.

In the second period man had discovered the possibilities of thought and instead of trying to control nature he tried to understand and to simplify it by his ideas (gods as exponents of power). His aspiration, therefore, was the discovery of ultimate unity.

In the third period man recognized the possibilities of his own consciousness and psychic forces and his aspiration turned from the unity of the universe to the harmony within himself, i.e. freedom. Each of these three periods has a positive or creative and negative or conservative (reactive) aspect.

The main curve represents the development of Indian thought (which perhaps may serve as an example of spiritual development in general) through the described three periods and through the corresponding three layers of the human psyche which result in emotional, mental, and spiritual activity and the corresponding attitudes of animism, theism, and anthropoism. Mental activity, naturally, does not exclude the emotional, nor is spiritual activity opposed to emotional or mental activities. Quite on the contrary: the spiritual consists in the harmonious combination and co-operation of all psychic faculties in the service of liberation. The secondary curve is to show the medium progress. The points from where the extravertive and introvertive tendencies begin to exercise their decisive influence are marked by small circles.

SECOND PART

PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABHIDHAMMA

Should anyone say that he does not wish to lead the holy life under the Blessed One, unless the Blessed One first tells him, whether the world is eternal or temporal, finite or infinite; whether the life principle is identical with the body, or something different; whether the Perfect One continues after death, etc. – Such an one would die, ere the Perfect One could tell him all this.

It is as if a man were pierced by a poisoned arrow, and his friends, companions, or near relations called in a surgeon, but that man should say: 'I will not have this arrow pulled out until I know, who the man is, that has wounded me: whether he is a noble, a prince, a citizen, or a servant'; or: 'what his name is and to what family he belongs'; or: 'whether he is tall, or short or of medium height.' Verily, such a man would die, ere he could adequately learn all this.

(*Majjhima-Nikāya* 63; *transl. by Mahāthera Nyāṇatiloka.*)

PSYCHOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABHIDHAMMA

1. *The Two Types of Psychology*

PSYCHOLOGY can be studied and dealt with in two ways: either for its own sake alone, i.e. as pure science, which leaves entirely out of account the usefulness or non-usefulness of its results – or else for the sake of some definite object, that is, with a view to practical application which necessitates from the outset certain direct lines of advance. In the former case we get a description of all perceptible and logically deducible ('thinkable') phenomena of the inner life of human beings and their relationship with the outer world. (In this most people see explanation, since they confound description with explanation!) In the latter case it is a question of a selection out of the wealth of inner experiences in view of their application in a given direction. Psychology, as 'pure science', also takes the facts of experience as its starting point but arrives at its results by the path of logical development, thus going beyond the given data and building up a system dependent upon logical operations and abstract principles. Practical psychology remains within the boundary lines of the given, in doing which, logic only has to serve for the shaping and arrangement of the material.

The amplitude of 'the boundary lines of the given' is the determining factor as to the value of any such psychology. In the case of Buddhism, whose psychology belongs to the latter category, these boundary lines are extraordinarily wide-stretching, since they embrace not only the experiences of the average man but also the planes of the highest experiences which no science of the West as yet has ventured to approach.

While the results of purely scientific ('theoretical') psychology, which have been attained mainly upon the path of logic, remain more or less hypothetical and stand in need of proof, it may be said that not only the elements but the very aims of Buddhist psychology are based on experience. The method of this psychology is comparable to that of a man who from a high mountain watch-tower looks out over the landscape at his feet and now proceeds in regular order to extricate from the total picture of the landscape the distinguishing marks of his route, and describes them in their corresponding order. His description lays no claim to be a description

of the whole landscape but only of those portions of the landscape which are of importance for his route. What he explains about the landscape is what is objectively given. The selection of his route, the arrangement of the distinguishing marks (logic), the manner of his description (composition), these are what is subjectively formed. The straight path corresponds to the laws of simple logic. Since, however, there are obstacles which are more easily gone around than climbed over, it may come about that actuality and logic do not always agree with one another. Looked at from above, also, many things will seem harmonious which, seen from below or from the same level, will appear incompatible. 'Hence the rejection of all speculation, hence the declaration that the deepest secrets of the world and of man are inaccessible to abstract, philosophical thinking. It is not logical thinking but only a higher consciousness (bodhi) which resolves the contradictions in which the lower thought, bound up with the life of the senses, is hopelessly involved. Kant demonstrates theoretically where, within the given consciousness, lie the boundary lines of cognition; the Buddha teaches the practice, the way, in which that given form of consciousness may be overpassed. While thus Kant demonstrates how within the confines of thought that is bound up with the life of the senses, pure reason, the cognition of what is real in the higher sense of the word, is unattainable, the Buddha seeks through the surmounting of thought that is bound up with the life of the senses, to rise to the higher cognition. (Dr. Hermann Beckh, *Buddhismus* I, p. 120f.)

From this it is clear that in Buddhism psychology and philosophy, as the process of knowing (cognition) and the formulation of the known, are indivisibly bound up with each other. The training of consciousness is the indispensable antecedent condition of higher knowledge, because consciousness is the vessel upon whose capacity depends the *extent* of what is to be received. Knowledge on the other hand is the antecedent condition required for the *selection* of the material to be received, and for the *direction* of the course to be pursued for its mastery. Without the presence of a tradition, in which the experiences and knowledge of former generations are formulated (philosophy), every individual would be compelled to master the entire domain of the psychic, and only a few favoured ones would attain the goal of knowledge. Just as little adequate, however, would be the mere acceptance or intellectual recognition of the results laid down as philosophy to the pioneer truth-seeker. Every individual must himself tread the path of realization, for only the knowledge that is won by experience has living, i.e. life-giving, value. It is here that the philosophy of Buddhism is distinguished

from the intellectual philosophies of our times, which exhaust themselves in abstract thinking without exercising any influence on man. The same is the case with the purely scientific systems of psychology, especially when they have lost their spiritual background. It is the close interweaving of philosophy and psychology which protects Buddhism from stagnation. The question as to the essential nature of the Abhidhamma can therefore be decided neither in favour of the one nor of the other of these two realms of knowledge.

2. *The Importance of the Abhidhamma*

The Abhidhamma is the totality of the psychological and philosophical teachings of Buddhism, the point of departure of all Buddhist schools and tendencies of thought. Without a knowledge of the Abhidhamma the nature and development of Buddhism must ever remain wanting in clearness.

Although the Discourses of Instruction (Sutta Piṭaka) are the more attractive portion of the Pāli Canon, yet we ought not to forget that they represent just the *front elevation* of the structure of Buddhist teachings, and hence for the greater part are designed for the understanding of the larger body of learners. This does not mean that they do not contain the deepest problems as well, but hereby attention is only drawn to the fact that here we are concerned with a particular form of expression, fashioned from certain definite points of view, so as to suit in each case the needs of a particular situation or a particular audience. Without a knowledge of the general background, therefore, an acquaintance with the Discourses alone, despite all their profundity, must lead to a more or less one-sided understanding of the matter.

In the days of the Buddha, in the times when his teaching was in its prime, no such danger was present, since the Buddha's hearers were in immediate relations with what was set before them, and stood upon a level footing both as regards language and culture. We, however, are not only lacking from the outset in all these antecedent conditions; but, on the contrary, we in addition bring with us false presuppositions, and may congratulate ourselves if we succeed even partially in getting rid of these obstacles.

To achieve this end there is no better means than the study of the Buddhist Psychology and Philosophy of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Though the Discourses appear more original and primitive, it is nevertheless probable that the most essential portions of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka were sketched out at the same time as the former, all the more so in that they represent the quintessence of the Discourses of Instruction. It is even thinkable that the Discourses have been

edited on the basis of the Abhidhamma, in its essential form, for just as long as there was a Sangha, there was also an Abhidhamma, that is, a form in which the teaching of the Exalted One in its deepest meaning, was concentrated, an ideal frame-work which was in a position to hold together the vastness of the spiritual tradition. If one scrutinizes closely the Discourses of the Buddha, one becomes aware of the systematic arrangement even down to the least detail which is carried out with such rigidity that one cannot fit it in with the free form of discourse. And the Abhidhamma Piṭaka again contains in its most important parts precisely that extraordinarily subtle fabric of ideas and mental presuppositions on which the Discourses are built. Much that is necessarily veiled by the lingually step-by-step unfolding and concretizing form of the Discourse, is only solved in the formal unambiguity of the Abhidhamma; and in the greater terseness of the concepts, connexions flash out whose existence else would have remained concealed.

Historical considerations, however, are by no means to be regarded as deciding the issue in question as to the value of the Abhidhamma Texts; for even during the lifetime of the Buddha there was no 'absolute' Buddhism, no dogmatical form of truth, but only an indication of the direction and the method by which truth could be realized individually. As long as the Abhidhamma serves this purpose by showing us the clear outline of Buddhist thought, it is utterly unimportant whether it has come into existence at an earlier or later period.

3. *Metaphysics and Empiricism*

The Abidhamma has been misunderstood for a long time as a kind of secondary law or scholastic elaboration of the Dhamma. It, no doubt, contains scholastic elements, but they can be found in all parts of the Scriptures, and they have never become so prominent as to distort the original ideas. There are others who have classified the Abhidhamma under metaphysics which has only brought about new confusion. Here all depends upon what one wishes to have understood as metaphysics; it depends upon whether one takes it only in the narrower, speculative sense, peculiar to certain philosophies or to the religions of revelation; or whether one takes it in the wider sense in which ultimately all cognition, all deduction, yea, every form of science is metaphysics. 'The simplest process of comparison, of distinguishing and description, and yet more, calculation, concerning two bodies acting upon each other with mechanical force – more particularly, every calculation or anticipation of an effect upon the ground of experience, is com-

pletely metaphysical and symbolical, and only as such, possible. Do we not attribute to Nature the thoroughly metaphysical, fundamental law of the action of forces? The law of cause and effect in which we all believe, yes, *believe*, is metaphysics. And completely so is our insight into the world of the organic.'[1]

In this sense, naturally, the teachings of Buddhism also, that is to say, its formulation as Doctrine, whether in religious, philosophical, epistemological, or psychological fashion, are metaphysics, and as such demand first of all confidence (saddhā), in which word is comprehended faith in the correctness of what is said, in other words, the assuming of hypotheses (sammā diṭṭhi) such as are demanded by every science and in a yet higher degree by every religion. The distinction between religions of revelation and science on one hand, and Buddhism on the other, pertains to the domain of psychology. The former place the centre of gravity outside the individual, inasmuch as they depend upon the authority of tradition or of experiment and its tacit hypothesis, or upon all of them together. In Buddhism the centre of gravity lies within the individual, in his own private experience which must furnish proof of the truth of what is first of all assumed to be worthy of confidence. Here what makes the man blessed is not belief (in the sense of the acceptance of a definite dogma), but the becoming conscious of reality, which latter is metaphysics to us only for as long as we have not experienced it. We therefore arrive at the following definition: Viewed from without (as a system) Buddhism is metaphysics; viewed from within (as a form of reality) it is empiricism. In so far as 'the metaphysical' is disclosed upon the path of inner experience, it was not rejected by the Buddha; it was only rejected when it was thought out upon the path of pure speculation. Metaphysics is an entirely relative concept, whose boundaries depend upon the respective plane of experience, upon the respective form and extent of consciousness. The Buddha overcame metaphysics and its problems, not by merely ignoring them, but in an absolutely positive manner, in that, through training and the extension of consciousness he pushed back the boundary lines of the latter, so that the metaphysical became the empirical.[2]

[1] E. Dacqué: *Urwelt, Sage and Menschheit.*

[2] Rosenberg explains the fact that European authors with such insistence dispute the existence of a metaphysic in primitive Buddhism partly from this: that on one hand Christian missionaries in their works involuntarily, and sometimes perhaps also with intention, emphasized the absence of metaphysics from Buddhism in order to prove its imperfection as a religious system; and that on the other hand, however, the absence of metaphysics, in view of the modern, scientific view of the universe with which it was thought to bring Buddhism into harmony, was regarded as an excellence. 'It must not be forgotten that the beginning of Buddhist research in Europe coincided with the collapse of metaphysical philosophy and the rise of materialistic systems.' (*Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie*, p. 59.)

4. *Truth and Method*

Consequently the Buddha, conscious of this relativity, was not concerned with any abstract truth but the method to attain it. The Buddha does not say 'this is truth' but 'this is the way by which you may attain truth'. Just as health is a condition of our body, so truth is a condition of our mind. And just as we cannot abstract the health from the body, so we cannot abstract the truth from the mind. To speak of 'objective truth' is just as foolish as to speak of 'objective health.' Both are relations which can be experienced *subjectively* only. Nobody can ever explain, what is health as such. But an intelligent man may very well tell us the method how to obtain and to preserve health. Thus it is really the *method* that matters. If anybody would ask me: 'What is the main element that Buddhism contributed to Indian civilization?' I should answer: 'the method.' The Buddha, it seems to me, was the first man who discovered that not the results of our human thinking, not our so-called 'ideas' or opinions (diṭṭhi), beliefs or disbeliefs, in one word our conceptual knowledge – be it in the form of religious dogmas, so-called 'eternal Truths' or in the form of scientific formulas and statements – is what matters, but the *method* behind it. We may lose all our precious results of science and all our inventions, it could not harm us in the long run if we have the method, because with its help we can regain all those results. But if we lose the method, even the greatest knowledge of scientific facts and results cannot help us.

A striking example are the Middle Ages in Europe. Though they inherited the results of Greek and Roman scientists they were not able to use and to develop their achievements because they had lost the method. Therefore mere facts, or the results of other people's thinking, are a great danger to the human mind, and an education which is based on the storing up of 'facts' and ready-made thoughts in the minds of young people can only lead to mental sterilization. Just as food turns into poison, if preserved too long, so also knowledge turns into ignorance or superstition, if it has lost its connexion with life. Instead of cultivating 'matter-of-fact knowledge' we should cultivate the power of concentration, instead of producing 'learnedness' we should preserve our *faculty* to learn and keep our mind open. This is what the Buddha wants, and this is why he refused to bring the world into a system of metaphysical definitions and philosophical speculations. He certainly had very definite ideas about the world and the problems of metaphysics. That he refused to answer certain questions was not due to indifference but was, on the contrary, due to his profound insight into the real nature of things. He did not

attain this insight through philosophical speculations and discussions or by mere reasoning and reflection, but by the transformation of consciousness in meditation, and therefore he knew that his experience could not be expressed, imparted by words, or arrived at by logical conclusions, but only by showing the *way*, how to attain, how to develop and cultivate this higher type of consciousness. To discuss metaphysical problems on the common plane of consciousness is like discussing sexual problems with children who have not yet attained maturity. Such discussions are not only useless but harmful. We can only understand of the world as much as we have developed within ourselves. 'Truth, therefore,' as Plotinus[1] said in his letters to Flaccus, 'is not the agreement of our apprehension of an eternal object with the object itself. It is the agreement of the mind with itself. Consciousness, therefore, is the whole basis of certainty. The mind is its own witness. Reason sees in itself that which is above itself and its source; and again, that which is below itself is still itself once more.

'Knowledge has three degrees – opinion, science, illumination. The means or instrument of the first is sense; of the second, dialectic; of the third, intuition. To the last I subordinate reason. It is absolute knowledge founded on the identity of the mind knowing with the object known.'

5. *The Three Degrees of Knowledge*

The first degree corresponds to that state of mind which, according to Buddhist terminology, is characterized by 'diṭṭhi', namely, opinions which are not guided by reason (paññindriya) but by desires (taṇhā) which are based on sense-impressions. The second stage is based on reasoning and reflection (vitakka-vicāra), i.e. logical operations, and leads, if properly used within the limits of its conceptual realm and its inherent laws, to scientific and philosophical knowledge, which approximately corresponds to the Buddhist term ñāṇa.'

The third degree, the highest state of knowledge, is '*bodhi*' or illumination which is attained with the help of paññindriya, the guiding principle of the mind, and is based on meditation (bhāvanā), the intuitive state of consciousness (jhāna), which means 'the identity of the mind knowing with the object known' (appanā bhāvanā).

Though in a general sense all knowledge is subjective, i.e. based on an individual experience, observation and thought-combination, we may call the first degree of knowledge 'subjective' in a special or

[1] The Alexandrian Philosopher who lived in the third century A.D.

limited sense, namely in so far as the experiencing *subject* is emphasized, and similarly the second degree may be called mainly 'objective', while the third degree represents the union of the subject with the object. 'Limited subjective' knowledge is concerned with the momentary problems of the sensuous (bodily) and emotional side of our existence. The second degree, which stands for intellectual knowledge, is that which emphasizes the objects of our perception, by abstracting them from the perceiving subject (only in this relative sense can we speak of 'objective' knowledge) and is concerned with science and philosophy, the problems of the phenomenal world, represented as 'things' or 'concepts', i.e. either as material or mental units, limited by form or definition.

Intuitive knowledge, which forms the third degree, is free from any partiality or dualism, it has overcome the extremes of emphasizing subject or object, it is the synthetic vision of the world, the experience of cosmic consciousness, in which the Infinite is not only conceptualized but realized. Though in each of the lower degrees or planes of consciousness there is something that leads to and indicates the properties of the next higher one, it is impossible to solve the problem, belonging to a higher order of knowledge from a lower plane of consciousness. Thus scientific problems cannot be solved from an emotional standpoint and metaphysical problems which are beyond the realm of the Finite cannot be solved by the laws of a three-dimensional, i.e. finite logic, nor can they be expressed by concepts which, regardless of their contents, represent limited units, otherwise the law of identity and non-identity could not be applied to them.

'If we desire to escape from the three-dimensional world and go farther, we must first of all work out the fundamental logical principles which would permit us to observe the relations of things in a world of many dimensions – seeing them in a certain reasonableness and not complete absurdity. If we enter there armed only with the principles of the logic of the three-dimensional world, these principles will drag us back, will not give us the chance to rise from the earth.' (Ouspensky.)

Thus each plane has its own laws and its own problems and the method which may help us to find a solution in one case may be a hindrance in another case. For this reason, before we can answer a question, we have to ascertain to what class it belongs. In the nineteenth book of the Abhidharma-Koça four classes are described:

1 Questions which can be answered *directly*, i.e. by Yes or No. Example: Do all living beings die? Yes, they all must die.
2 Questions which can be answered with *reservation* only.

Example: Will all beings be reborn? Yes and No; those who have not yet overcome their passions will be reborn, those who have destroyed them will not be reborn.

3 Questions which need a *counter-question.*
Example: Is man strong or weak?
Counter-question: In relationship to whom? – Compared with animals, man is strong; compared with the forces of higher beings (devas) he is weak.

4 Questions which *cannot be answered.* – These are the famous fourteen questions which the Buddha refused to answer:

(1–4): Is the world constant? – Or not? – Or both? – Or none of both?

(5–8): Is the world limited in time? – Or not? – Or both? – Or none of both?

(9–12): Does the Tathāgata exist after death? – Or not? – Or both? – Or none of both?

(13–14): Are life and body identical or not?

Though the subject-matter of this last type of questions ('world,' 'Tathāgata,' 'life') is infinite in its nature, it has been represented by concepts which, according to the laws of their origin, are limited and subject to the limitations of three-dimensional, i.e. finite logic. Therefore no suitable answer can be given.

But how can we know the Infinite? 'I answer,' says Plotinus, 'not by reason. It is the office of reason to distinguish and define. The infinite, therefore, cannot be ranked among its objects. You can only apprehend the infinite by a faculty superior to reason, by entering into a state in which you are your finite self no longer.'

This is what we described as 'bodhi' or the third degree of knowledge. While the first three types of questions can be solved mainly by the second degree of knowledge, the fourth type can be answered only by the third degree. Properly speaking the questions are not answered in this highest state of consciousness, but they simply disappear, because they are no more possible, they cease to be problems.

In the ordinary course of our life we can observe similar facts: spiritual development does not so much consist in the *solution* of our problems, as in growing *beyond* them. What we solve intellectually are only the minor problems. If we would try to solve all, our development would be stopped already in the very beginning, and most people would be crushed under the weight of insoluble problems.

The Buddha, therefore, instead of blocking the way of his followers

by dogmas, metaphysical facts and problems, and 'eternal' (stagnating) 'truths', insisted that everybody should be his own lamp, should find his own way, realize the Dharma within himself by growing beyond the problems which the ordinary intellect has ever failed to solve, and which can be overcome alone by 'bodhicitta', the highest type of consciousness. At the same time the Buddha shows that in order to develop it, we need not search in the stars or in the worlds beyond nor in any secret books or in the hidden principles of nature – but simply within ourselves. There we find everything required! Even the simplest bodily functions will teach us more than the greatest metaphysical speculations, nay, they *are* metaphysical themselves, transcending by far what could be called merely physical – if we only try to see them 'earnestly, intently, clearly conscious'. In his Four Noble Truths the Buddha has given us the best example, how within the compass of our most ordinary experiences and in the laws of our own innermost nature the greatest discoveries can be made. Only if we understand this properly shall we be able to appreciate the profound meaning of the Buddha's exhortation which he gave to his disciples in the last days of his earthly existence:

'Be a lamp unto yourself, be a refuge unto yourself, without another refuge, the Dhamma as a lamp, the Dhamma as a refuge, without another refuge. But how, Ānanda, is a Bhikkhu a lamp unto himself, a refuge unto himself, without another refuge, the Dhamma as a lamp, the Dhamma as a refuge, without another refuge? There, Ānanda, the disciple, as respects body keeps watch upon the body, earnestly, intently, clearly conscious, having put away all worldly cares and desires. As respects sensation, he keeps watch over the sensations, earnestly, intently, clearly conscious, having put away all worldly cares and desires. As respects mind, he keeps watch over the mind, earnestly, intently, clearly conscious, having put away all worldly cares and desires. As respects phenomena, he keeps watch over the phenomena, earnestly, intently, clearly conscious, having put away all worldly cares and desires. Thus, Ānanda, remains a Bhikkhu a lamp unto himself, a refuge unto himself, without another refuge, the Dhamma as a lamp, the Dhamma as a refuge without another refuge.' (Mahāparinibbāna-Sutta II, Dīgha-Nikāya 16).

THIRD PART

THE FOUR NOBLE TRUTHS AS STARTING POINT AND LOGICAL FRAME OF BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Ye dhammā hetuppabhavā
Tesam hetum tathāgato ahā
Tesañ ca yo nirodho
Evam vādi mahāsamano

Of all things that have
sprung from causes,
The Tathāgata proclaimed
the origin
And also the cessation.
This is the teaching
of the great Samana.

(*Mahāvagga*, 23/24.)

1. THE AXIOMATIC TRUTH OF SUFFERING

i. *The Universality of the Buddha's Axiom*

THE extent of the Buddhist Scriptures is so enormous that a lifetime would be too short for their complete study. Even the Sacred Scriptures of a single School would suffice to keep a scholar busy for all his life. This sounds discouraging, for how can the average man ever expect to know what is Buddhism, and how should it ever be possible to follow a teaching that needs such a long time for its study!

Fortunately the Buddha was not only a great Seer but an equally great teacher. He was able to translate his visions into words and his words into life, namely into the living force of creative thoughts. A thought is creative only if it causes others to think, i.e. if it contains a directive moment which is an incentive to *move* in the indicated direction. In this way the result is achieved by our own effort and becomes our spiritual property, part of our own life. If the very same result had been accepted by us without an effort – without ourselves going the way that led to that result – it would have been without living value, even if it was true. A dead truth, however, is as bad as a lie, because it causes stagnation, the most incurable form of ignorance.

It is a special feature of the Buddha's method of teaching that he never expressed a thought without showing the way to it and that he condensed his fundamental teachings into such a concise system that every thinking man can follow them and work out his salvation by his own effort. The directive moment lies in the logical structure of thoughts and the systematic treatment of facts and experiences, which are accessible in every stage of life or development and yet urge one to go beyond them. In fact, there is hardly any religion or philosophy that can boast of such easily accessible formulations, which neither demand scientific training nor faith in fantastic assumptions or other intellectual sacrifices.

The Buddha was a genuine 'free-thinker' because he not only conceded to everybody the right to think independently, but because he kept his own mind free from theories, thus refusing to base his teaching on mere beliefs or on dogmas As a real thinker he tried to find an axiom, a self-evident formulation of truth, which could be universally accepted. Descartes, the famous French philosopher, started his philosophy with the formula: 'Cogito, ergo sum,' 'I

think, therefore I am.' The Buddha went one step further in starting with an even more universally established principle, based on an experience that is common to all sentient beings: the fact of suffering ('sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā').

Suffering in Buddhism is not the expression of pessimism or of the world-tiredness of an aged civilization: it is the fundamental thesis of a world-embracing thought, because there exists no experience which is equally universal. Not all sentient beings are thinking beings, and not all thinking beings reach the stage in which this faculty conceives its own nature and importance; but all sentient beings endure suffering, because all are subject to old age, decay, and death.

It is this experience that forms the connecting link between beings who otherwise might have little in common, it is the bridge that unites the human and the animal kingdom – it is the foundation of a universal brotherhood. The idea that one should recognize oneself in the pain of others is also expressed in the opening verse of the tenth chapter of Dhammapada:

> 'Sabbe tasanti daṇḍassa, sabbe bhāyanti maccuno,
> Attānaṃ upamaṃ katvā, no haneyya na ghātaye.'

'All beings are afraid of pain, all beings are afraid of death. Recognizing (lit. 'comparing') oneself in others, one should neither kill nor cause to kill.'[1]

It was this experience of common suffering that caused the Bodhisattva to leave his home, his family, his wealth, and to sacrifice his royal position; and consequently he took it later on as the starting point of his ethical and philosophical system.

Without fully understanding this axiomatic truth of suffering one cannot really understand the other parts of his teaching. Therefore the Four Noble Truths, the programmatic formulation of the Buddha's doctine, begin with an analysis of the symptoms of suffering (dukkhaṃ ariya-saccaṃ), followed by an investigation into its causes (dukkha-samudayo ariya-saccaṃ).

As an algebraic formula does not contain fixed values but only symbols which can be replaced by known magnitudes, so suffering and happiness, sorrow and joy, are the symbols for the negative and positive states of life, or better, of consciousness. Suffering and happiness cannot be described by positive terms or as objective contents of consciousness; one can only show their relative causes, and symptoms, and their interdependence. Each individual has its

[1] In comparison to this attitude it is interesting to see that Descartes, in accordance with his comparatively exclusive axiom 'cogito, ergo sum', regarded animals as a sort of living automata.

own standards of joy and sorrow according to the stage of its development. Circumstances, which would mean happiness to one state of consciousness, might be suffering to another state.

ii. *The Three Stages of Suffering*

On the lowest stage suffering is only *bodily*: physical pain, privation, and discomfort. On the next higher stage it is mainly *mental*: the discrepancy between our illusions and reality, the disappointments of life, the impossibility to satisfy our desires. On the third stage suffering is no more concerned with the petty cares of our own person and of our momentary life, it becomes more and more universal and essential. We are taking part in the suffering of others, and instead of regarding our personality as the highest value, we understand that by clinging to it, it has become a hindrance, a bondage, a symbol of limitation and imperfection.

These three stages of suffering do not necessarily exclude each other within one and the same individual, though it may be said that one of these stages generally prevails. In the most primitive form of consciousness (animals, undeveloped human beings) suffering appears mostly as physical pain and bodily want and occasionally only in its mental aspect. One who is on his way to enlightenment will be rather concerned with the essential form of suffering (the third stage), while the average human being will be mainly afflicted with mental suffering (the second stage), though bodily suffering may be frequent and the refined form of the third stage may be attained occasionally.

In the definition of suffering, as found in the Pāli Canon, these three stages are clearly recognizable, though they have not been definitely classified and explained as such. The text (Mahāsatipaṭṭhānasutta, Dīgha-Nikāya XXII) says:

> Jāti pi dukkha, jarā pi dukkhā, maraṇam pi dukkhaṃ (I)
> (soka-parideva-dukkha-domanassa-upāyāsa pi dukkhā)
> yam p'icchaṃ na labhati tam pi dukkhaṃ[1] (II);
> saṃkhittena pañc'upādānakkhandā pi dukkhā (III).

Birth, old age, and death – the first group – are the symptoms of bodily suffering (I).

Not to obtain what one desires characterizes the second stage: mental suffering[1] (II).

[1] In some places this statement is supplemented by the explanation: 'appiyehi sampayogo dukkho, piyehi vippayogo dukkho,' 'to be united with what one dislikes is suffering, to be separated from what one likes is suffering'.

This formula, naturally, can be applied to all the items of the other two groups, which means that each of them can become a subject of mental suffering, – namely, when viewed from the standpoint of one's own (intellectual) likes and dislikes.

The five aggregates of existence (lit. 'clinging'), i.e. our personality, represent the essential form of suffering, its third stage (III).

I have put the second line of the Pāli quotation in brackets, because it is not concerned with the definition but with the terminology of suffering: 'sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, despair.'

The fact that the three stages of suffering do not necessarily exclude each other holds good not only with respect to the individual but also regarding the above-mentioned definition. Its several items are not to be understood in a purely external or one-sided manner. If, for example, one understands the phrase 'birth is suffering' to mean that a mother on the birth of her child is tormented with pain, or that the new-born child thereby is subject to unpleasant experiences, one decidedly misses the real signification of the saying. 'Birth' (jāti) in the Buddhist sense is not merely a particular single moment in each life, not only the physical process of being born (sanjāti) or conception (okkanti) in the physiological sense, but the 'conception', the 'conceiving' that is called forth continually through the senses, which effects the appearance or manifestation of the aggregates of existence (khandhānaṃ pātubhāvo), the seizing of the sense-domains (āyatanānaṃ paṭilābho), the continuous materialization and new karmic entanglement.

In similar wise, 'death' (maraṇaṃ) is not only a certain definite moment, but an element of life. Death is the dissolution, the decay, the continual change of the physical, mental, and psychical elements or aggregates of existence (khandhānaṃ bhedo), namely: of the aggregates of bodily form (rūpakkhandha), of feeling (vedanākkhanda), of perception (saññākkhandha), of subconscious formations (saṇkhārakkhandha), and of consciousness (viññāṇakkhandha).

Buddhagosa in his Visuddhimagga says: 'He, then, that has no clear idea of death and does not master the fact, that death everywhere consists in the dissolution of the groups (khandha) he comes to a variety of conclusions, such as, "A living entity dies and transmigrates into another body."

'He that has no clear idea of rebirth and does not master the fact that the appearance of the groups everywhere constitutes rebirth, he comes to a variety of conclusions, such as, "A living entity is born and has obtained a new body." ' (H. C. Warren *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 241.)

Birth, decay and death, which originally were felt as symptoms of bodily suffering, become objects of mental suffering as well – and finally the symbols of the essential laws of individual life to which we bind ourselves. This is indicated in the third part of the above-cited quotation, where the five Khandas themselves are designated as

objects of suffering and described as aggregates of '*clinging*' (upādānakkhanda).

Such knowledge goes beyond the mere intellectual or mental attitude of an external observation of life – it is born from inward, profound contemplation of the cosmic procession of events. The Sacred Texts describe how the disciple, who is following the Holy Path and has gone through the four stages of 'Internalization' (jhāna), 'directs his mind to the remembering of his previous forms of existence; first one life, then two, three, ten, a hundred, a thousand, a hundred thousand; then to the times of many a world-arising, then to the times of many a world-dissolution, then to the times of many a world-arising and world-dissolution. . . . Thus does he remember his many previous forms of existence with their characteristic marks, with their particular relationships. . . . And with mind made inward, pure, supple, freed from dross, pliable, workable, firm, impregnable, he directs it towards the knowing of the disappearing and reappearing of beings. With the Heavenly Eye, the purified, the supra-human, he sees how beings disappear and reappear, base and noble, beautiful and unbeautiful, fortunate and unfortunate; he perceives how beings return hither according to their deeds.' (Majjhima-Nikāya, VI, 10.)

After the disciple in this manner proceeding forth from himself has drawn the entire happenings of the world within the circle of his contemplation and experience, he arrives at the directly perceived Knowledge of Suffering and the fundamental theses of the healing truth that follow therefrom:

"This is suffering": this he perceives in accordance with the truth.
"This is the arising of suffering": this he perceives in accordance with the truth.
"This is the cessation of suffering": this he perceives in accordance with the truth.
"This is the path that leads to the cessation of suffering"; this he perceives in accordance with the truth.

(Majjh. N. VI, 10.)

This description shows the universal background of the Buddhist conception of suffering, which is as far from a hypochondriac discontentment with the world as from an emotional weariness of life. The Suffering which Buddhism is essentially concerned with is – I might almost say – cosmic suffering, the suffering implicit in the cosmic law which chains us to our deeds, good as well as bad, and drives us incessantly round in a restless circle from form to form. In

short, it is the *suffering of bondage*. The experience of this suffering in its essential form, can only be born of a higher state of consciousness. This, however, is the fruit of the Holy Path; and this again is the consequence of a *primary*, peculiarly original experience of life, such as is presented to us in the Bodhisattva's visions of old age, sickness, and death. This immediately experienced bodily imperfection of man which reveals to him in a flash-like manner the transitoriness of life constitutes the force that impels him to reflection upon himself and to the seeking of higher values. As soon, however, as such are divined, there sets in self-revaluation (the appraisement of self-standards), and therewith the knowledge of inward, and in the truest sense, one's own, imperfection. Suffering is no longer felt as coming from outside, from a hostile world, but as coming from within. It is no longer something foreign or accidental, but a part of one's own self-created being.

2. THE CAUSE OF SUFFERING

i. *The Two Fundamental Tendencies of Life and the Formula of Dependent Origination*

As soon as suffering is known as a part of our self-created being, and not as a quality of the external world or the effects of an arbitrary power outside ourselves (God), we understand that it is in our hands to overcome this suffering, if only we remove its causes. The analysis of the symptoms of suffering shows that in each of them our desire is in conflict with the laws of existence, and as we are not able to change these laws the only thing that remains is to change our desire.

Life has two fundamental tendencies: the one is contraction (centralization), the other expansion. The former one acts in a centripetal way, the latter one in a centrifugal way. The one means unification, the other differentiation or growth. If growth prevails over unity it results in disorganization, disintegration, chaos, decay. In organic life hypertrophy leads to the final destruction of the organism ('cancer'). In mental life growth without unity (centralization) leads to insanity, mental dissolution. If centralization prevails over growth it results in atrophy and finally in the complete stagnation of life, whether physical or mental.

The faculty of growth depends on assimilation, which may be bodily, as in the case of food, respiration, etc., or mental, as in the case of sense perception, ideas, etc.[1] The faculty of centralization depends on discrimination between the things that are similar or can be made similar to an individual organism or centre of activity and those which cannot be assimilated. Centralization is the organizing, directing force which prevents the dissolution of the individual structure by a chaotic inundation of unassimilable elements. It is

[1] According to Buddhist definition there are four kinds of nutrition, as explained in Paccaya-vibhaṅga, the introductory chapter of Paṭṭhāna (the seventh book of the Abhidhamma), on which the following synopsis by Nyāṇatiloka Thera is based:

'There are four nutriments – (1) material food, (2) sense-impression (phassa), (3) mind-volition (mano-sañcetanā), (4) consciousness (viññāna) – which are aiding the corporeal and uncorporeal phenomena in the sense of a support, or prop. Material food is the necessary condition for the support of this body, whilst 2–4 are the nutrient conditions to their concomitant mental phenomena, as well as to the corporeal phenomena (i.e. bodily and verbal intimation) produced thereby (Tika-Paṭṭhāna).

'By the third nutriment "Mind-volition', according to the commentary to Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha VII, we have to understand wholesome and unwholesome Karma; by the fourth nutriment "Consciousness" Rebirth-consciousness, i.e. that state of consciousness that arises at the moment of conception of a being.'

the tendency to create a common centre of relations. Psychologically speaking, it is the 'ahaṃkāra', the 'principium individuationis', that which says 'I' and enables an individual to be conscious of itself.

As long as this 'principium individuationis' is in balance with the principle of assimilation, as long as it is acting as a regulating force, there will be harmony. As soon, however, as this principle outgrows its own function and develops a hypertrophic 'I'-consciousness, which constructs an unchangeable entity, an absolute 'Self' or permanent ego in contrast to the rest of the world, then the inner balance is destroyed and reality appears in a distorted form.

This mental disharmony is called avijjā, ignorance, or 'Self'-delusion. Under its influence everything will be valued from the egocentric standpoint of desire (taṇhā). According to the preconceived idea of a permanent ego-entity there arises the longing for a lasting world with lasting pleasures, and as such a one cannot be found, the result is disappointment, suffering, despair. The saṅkhāras, or mental tendencies which are conditioned by the illusion of self-hood ('Ego'-ism) produce a consciousness (viññāṇa) and a psycho-physical organism (nāma-rūpa) which uses its senses (saḷāyatana) as instruments of craving (taṇhā). As far as this craving is satisfied it results in clinging (upādāna) to the objects of satisfaction. As far as it is not satisfied it results in an intensified longing (lobha) for such objects and in aversion (paṭigha, dosa) against the obstacles on the way towards its fulfilment. Thus lobha and dosa are only the two sides of the same force, i.e. taṇhā; and clinging – whether through greed or through hatred – is binding us ever anew to the circle of existence. It is on account of our clinging to these forms of life that again and again we produce them. This is the law of *Karma*, namely the law of action. It is our will, our ardent desire which creates the world in which we live, and the organism which corresponds to it. Thus taṇhā, in the latent form of upādāna, conditions a continuous process of becoming (bhava) in the direction of the desired forms of existence and in conformity to the individual's state of development and its inherent laws, according to which the incessant change of mental and bodily elements proceeds. This change either appears as birth and growth or as death and decay, though both these aspects are inseparably connected with each other like the two sides of the same coin. Just as the same door may be called entrance or exit according to the standpoint of the observer, so it is the same process which we call birth or death according to our limited perception, our one-sided point of view. By not seeing the unity of these two sides we fail to realize that we cannot desire the one without inviting the other. Clinging to life means clinging

to death. The very essence of life is change, while the essence of clinging is to retain, to stabilize, to prevent change. This is why change appears to us as suffering (sokaparideva-dukkhadomanas-sūpāyāsa).

If we did not regard objects or states of existence from the standpoint of possession or selfish enjoyment, we should not feel in the least troubled by their change or even by their disappearance; on the contrary, we enjoy change in many cases, either because disagreeable states or objects are removed or because it provides us with new experiences or reveals to us a deeper insight into the nature of things and greater possibilities of emancipation. If this world were an absolute, static world and if this our life would remain the same for ever, there would be no possibility of liberation. It is therefore not the 'world' or its transitoriness which is the cause of suffering but our attitude towards it, our clinging to it, our thirst, our ignorance.

Avijjā is not to be regarded as a 'prima causa', a metaphysical cause of existence or a cosmogenic principle, but as a condition under which our present life develops, a condition that is responsible for our present state of consciousness. The paṭiccasamuppāda should therefore not be called a 'causal nexus' (as many scholars do) but rather a 'conditional nexus', a formula of *dependent origination.* It is meant to express a conditional arising, a mutual relationship of dependence which may present itself equally well simultaneously as also as a succession in time, since each phase contains the entire process, be it as seed, be it as fruit. Ignorance is not the 'cause' of consciousness (viññāṇa) and volition (saṅkhārā). Sensation (vedanā) is not the 'cause' of craving (taṇhā) and still less is craving the necessary consequence of sensation. But where there is craving, there must also be sensation. And where there is sensation, there must also be consciousness. Where, however, there is craving-producing consciousness, there must also be ignorance. Literally the formula runs thus:

(1) In dependence upon ignorance (avijjā paccaya) volition (saṅkhārā);
(2) in dependence upon karmic form-energies (saṅkhārā paccaya) [rebirth-] consciousness (viññāṇa);
(3) in dependence upon consciousness, the psycho-physical combination (nāma-rūpa);
(4) in dependence upon the psycho-physical combination, the sixfold sense-activity (lit. 'six bases': – saḷāyatana);
(5) in dependence upon the sixfold sense-activity, contact (impressions) (phassa);

(6) in dependence upon contact (of the senses with their objects), feeling (vedanā);
(7) in dependence upon feeling, craving (lit. 'thirst': taṇhā);
(8) in dependence upon craving, clinging (upādāna);
(9) in dependence upon clinging, the subconscious process of becoming, or the formation of karmic tendencies (bhava);
(10) in dependence upon the process of becoming, rebirth (jāti);
(11) in dependence upon rebirth;
(12) old age (decay) and death (jarā-maraṇa); sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair (sokaparideva-dukkha-domanassūpāyāsa).

ii. *The Dynamic Character of Dependent Origination*

Since the entire series is to be thought of as a circle, every link can be combined with another (as is, in fact, carried out in the Paṭṭhāna) and, indeed, in whichever succession one chooses (whereby only the emphasis, but not the substance, would change). Thus 'viññāṇa paccaya saṅkhārā' is just as correct as 'saṅkhārā paccaya viññāṇa' or 'taṇhā paccaya saṅkhāra', and so on. In this way we have here neither a purely temporal, nor yet a purely logical causality, but a living, organic relationship, a simultaneous correlation, juxtaposition and succession of all the links, in which each, so to say, represents the transverse summation of all the others, and bears in itself its whole past as well as all the possibilities of its future. And precisely on this account the entire chain at every moment and from every phase of it, is removable, and is neither tied to 'causes lying in an unreachable distant past', not yet referred to a future beyond the limits of vision in which perhaps, some time, the effects of these causes will be exhausted. Only thus is the possibility of becoming free conceivable, for how could causes heaped up since beginningless time, and working on with natural necessity ever come to an end? The idea that the consequence of all deeds, whether of a mental or corporeal kind, must be tasted to the very last morsel, and that through every most trivial action, through the slightest motion of the heart, one is further involved in the inextricable net of fate, is assuredly the most frightful spectre that the human heart, or more correctly, the human intellect, has even conjured up; for only the subsequent conceptualization and concretizing of the vital connexions of destiny could, out of the living law of our inmost being, manufacture the blind necessity of a mechanical law. Mechanical laws are applicable only to inert 'things' or to conceptual units, i.e. mental abstractions, but not to living, i.e. growing, organisms which are units only in the sense of

their continuity (santāna) and direction of transformation (kamma-bhava). This does not mean that the law of cause and effect is to be eliminated from the realms of psychology and biology, but only that it is restricted and modified and can operate only under certain conditions. The law of dependent origination (paṭiccasamuppāda) is, in fact, the Middle Way avoiding the extremes of rigid necessity – with which the free will would be incompatible – and blind chance which would make development and progress towards a higher goal impossible.

In this respect the formula of dependent origination shows itself as the necessary counterpart of the anattā-idea, which emphasizes the dynamic character of existence and conceives the individual from the standpoint of life and growth, in contrast to the fossilized concept of an absolute entity which would logically call for similarly absolute (lifeless) laws. A modern German philosopher expresses a similar idea in the following way: 'By thinking of nature as if it were built up from dead, immutable stones, the scholar will only incur the penalty of one who deprives himself of the power to attain any new outlook; but to see Man in this way will bring vengeance on each individual, and in each individual case it becomes injustice, violation, torture, demoralization. No ideal, no work of art, no value, no institution, no tariff of payment, no bargain should be thought of as a mere 'thing', i.e. without relationship to re-establishment and rebirth into the aliveness of a tangible world, i.e. into an individual life.'[1]

Life knows no absolute units but only centres of relation, continuous processes of unification, because reality cannot be broken up into bits; therefore each of its phases is related to the others, thus excluding the extremes of complete identity or non-identity.

'To believe that the doer of the deed is the same as the one who experiences its result (in the next life) this is one extreme. To believe that the doer of the deed, and the one who experiences its result, are two different persons: this is the other extreme. Both these extremes the Perfect One has avoided and taught the truth that lies in the middle of both,'[2] namely the law of dependent origination.

The twelve links of the formula represent in their succession the most obvious form of their dependency (paṭicca) with respect to their origination (uppāda). From the standpoint of time they can be divided into three periods – past, present, and future – usually conceived as three consecutive existences, though they could just as

[1] Translated from Prof. O. Weidenbach's *Weltanschauung aus dem Geiste des Kritizismus*, p. 187.

[2] Nidāna-Saṁyutta No. 46, translated by Nyāṇatiloka Thera.

well be applied to a succession of moments in the incessantly flowing stream of consciousness, or to different periods (past, present, and future) within one and the same life. Thus the paṭiccasamuppāda could be accepted in its general idea even by those who do not share the Buddhist view about rebirth in past and future existences. This view, by the way, can never be proved nor disproved scientifically, like many facts of experience. But it is important to see that the structure of the Buddhadhamma – even if we take it only as a system of thought – does not depend on it and is not affected by the individual attitude towards this problem. Buddhist psychology itself is quite alive to the relativity of terms like 'birth' and 'death.' According to the Abhidhamma birth and death take place simultaneously every moment; and mystics like Milarepa made no difference between this and the other lives – regarding them all as one.

> 'Accustomed as I've been to meditating on this life and
> the future life as one,
> I have forgot the dread of birth and death.'[1]

One might even go one step farther and regard one's own life and the lives of others, including those who lived before as well as those who will live after us, *as one.* In this vision the materialist with his theory of our common ancestry and heredity and the idealist with the most world-embracing views will meet each other.

Another division, from the standpoint of potentiality (or action and reaction) divides the paṭiccasamuppāda in four parts. Avijjā and saṅkhārā represent in this case the potential aspect of karmic force (kamma-bhava) accumulated in the past (I) which conditions the birth-process (uppatti-bhava), the resultant aspect (vipāka) of karma in the present life (group II), consisting of consciousness, the psycho-physical apparatus with its six sense organs, contacts, and feelings. The following links of the present existence – craving, clinging, and becoming – are again karma in the making, i.e. kamma-bhava (group III) (corresponding to the potential aspect in the past), the result of which is rebirth in the future life with the necessary consequences of old age, suffering, and death (group IV) – corresponding to the resultant aspect of karma in the present existence. The parallelism of the first and third group and of the second and fourth respectively is reflected in the close relationship of its constituents which almost amounts to identity: taṇhā and upādāna are forms of avijjā, as already explained: jāti, jarā-maraṇa are only a

[1] *Tibet's Great Yogī Milarepa*, p. 246; translated by Kazi Dawasamdup, edited by Dr. Evans-Wentz.

short expression for viññāṇa, nāma-rūpa, saḷāyatana, phassa, vedanā which constitute the five karma-results in contradistinction to the five karma-causes (avijjā, saṅkhārā, tanhā, upādāna, kamma-bhava); bhava, which here means 'kamma-bhava', is synonymous with saṅkhārā. Buddhaghosa, therefore, says in his Visuddhi-Magga:

'Five causes were there in the past,
Five fruits we find in present life,
Five causes do we now produce,
Five fruits we reap in future life.'[1]

[1] Translated by Nyāṇatiloka who refers to a parallel in Paṭosaṃbhida, Ñāṇakathā No. 4.

THE FORMULA OF DEPENDENT ORIGINATION

	PAST	PRESENT	FUTURE
POTENTIAL KARMA (Active-Process) Kamma-bhava	I (1) ['Self'-] Delusion.... (2) karmic form-energies	III .... { (8) craving / (9) clinging .... (10) becoming	
RESULTANT KARMA (Reaction) Uppatti-bhava		II (3) (rebirth-) consciousness .. (4) psycho-physical combination .. (5) sense organs (six bases) .. (6) contact (sense impressions) .. .. (7) feeling (sensations)	IV (11) birth (12) decay (old age) death suffering

3. THE DESTRUCTION OF SUFFERING

i. *The Truth of Happiness*

In general the Truth of Suffering is represented as the essence or the most characteristic feature of Buddhism. But those who like to emphasize this forget that it is only half the truth. The Buddha, as we have seen, takes the fact of suffering only as the starting point of his doctrine, and after having shown the axiomatic value and the universality of his fundamental thesis of suffering, he proceeds to the antithesis: the Truth of Happiness.

The Buddha philosophically circumscribes this as the 'Truth of the Cessation of Suffering' (dukkha-samudayo ariya-saccaṃ), an expression which has the advantage of avoiding the introduction of a new magnitude into the concise formula (of the Four Noble Truths), which aims at the combination of all factors under one denominator.

But the Sacred Scriptures have never been tired of pointing out that this cessation of suffering is supreme happiness and that every step towards that aim is accompanied by ever-increasing joy.

'Happily, indeed, we live without hatred among those who hate.' – 'Happily, indeed, we live without greed among the greedy.' 'Happily, indeed, we live who call nothing our own. Feeding on joy we live like shining gods.' (Dhammapada, 197–200.)[1]

The more man frees himself from greed, hatred and ignorance the greater will be his happiness. Nibbāna, which is defined by the Buddha as the perfect liberation from these fetters, is therefore called supreme happiness: 'nibbāna paramaṃ sukhaṃ' (Dhammapada, 203–4).

This fact is illustrated by the episode immediately after the Buddha's enlightenment, as described in the Mahāvagga. The Buddha, according to this report, spent several weeks in an ecstasy of happiness. The word 'ecstasy' is not quite correct if we take it in its ordinary sense, as 'being beside oneself' in excitement, because the Buddha's state of mind was extremely calm and serene. But it was a happiness that was ecstatic in the sense that it was free from selfish concerns, beyond the realm of the ego and worldly considerations. From the standpoint of ordinary human psychology it was a state

[1] Susukham vata jīvāma (ussukcsu) verinesu averino . . . (Dh. No. 197–199) Susukham vata jīvāma yesam no natthi kiñcamam Pītibhakkha bhavissāma devā ābhassarā yathā. (No. 200.)

free from all emotions, yet it was not a passive indifference, a negative state of mind, but a very positive and powerful spiritual equilibrium (tatramajjhattatā), the beatitude of perfect harmony. It was not the happiness of personal satisfaction, but rather a happiness of universal character, not subject to individual considerations but to insight into the laws of Reality.

This explains the combinations of the apparently contradictory terms 'equanimity' (upekkhā) and 'happiness' (sukha) in the phrase 'upekkhako satimā sukha viharati,' as well as the presence of happiness even in the fourth stage of meditation (jhāna), in which equanimity is attained and in which joy and sorrow are said to be annihilated.

'Rejecting joy and sorrow, and rejecting former gladness and sadness, entering I dwelled in the fourth jhāna, joy and sorrow perishing, a state of pure lucidity and equanimity. Yet *happiness* which in that way arose in me, could not obsess my mind.' Thus the Buddha himself describes his experience.

During the period of ascetic yoga-training the feelings of joy and happiness had become so unusual to the Buddha that he felt them as a danger which ought to be avoided. But finally, seeing the fruitlessness of this attitude he overcomes this fear by remembering his former experience of meditation in which for the first time he felt that inner happiness, and he decides to strengthen his weakened body, to prepare the ground for the newly discovered remedy. The Brahman ascetics regarded the sufferings of asceticism as the way leading to liberation, the Buddha, however, found, on the contrary, the joy of a concentrated mind as one of the most important means for the attainment of nibbāna. But just as a means (a remedy) joy should agitate or disturb the mind as little as pain is allowed to do. And finally joy merges into that sublime state of serenity which remains, as we see here, even in the highest states of internalization, after overcoming pleasure and pain, and all other emotions. In this sublime state all the contrasts of thinking and feeling, of mind and heart, are compensated. In their place is now that blessed consciousness of oneness which can be described only by negative terms, just as we can say of nibbāna only what it is *not*, without doubting thereby its reality. The absence of all things in a room does not make this room unreal; on the contrary, the characteristic of the concept 'space' is the absence of all space-occupying things. From the standpoint of space the 'things' are the negative principle; from the standpoint of things space is the negative. In the same way this sublime happiness and nibbāna, in which it is experienced in the utmost perfection, appear from the standpoint of the average man

negative, empty, unreal; while, on the contrary, from the point of view of higher experience this 'world' becomes unreal and negative.

ii. *Importance of Joy and Suffering according to the Abhidhamma*

The importance of joy and suffering in Buddhism is a problem which is discussed again and again and which generally is decided from a rather subjective standpoint, though the system of Buddhist psychology, as laid down in the Abhidhamma literature, enables us to judge this matter quite objectively.

The happiness of man stands in inverse proportion to the existence of hatred and aversion (dosa and paṭigha), the products of his illusion (moha); because suffering is nothing but hampered will, fighting in vain against the obstacles which it has created by its own tendency of separation and limitation. Consequently grief or mental suffering (domanassa) appears in the psychological system of Buddhism only in those two classes which are bound up with aversion (paṭigha) – bodily pain only to be understood as the after-effect or karmic result (vipāka) – while joy appears in sixty-three classes of consciousness. Of these only four belong to the group of unwholesome mental states, fourteen belong to the wholesome and neutral classes of sense-consciousness (kāmāvacara), while *forty-four* classes belong to the higher (rūpa-, arūpāvacara-cittāni) and the highest types of consciousness (lokuttara-cittāni). (*See* Appendix, Table V.)

In other words: out of the 121 classes of consciousness which are discussed in Buddhist psychology, sixty-three are accompanied by joy and only three are painful, while the remaining fifty-five classes are indifferent. A stronger refutation of pessimism than this statement is hardly possible. How deluded is man, that he mainly dwells in those three painful states of consciousness, though there are overwhelmingly more possibilities of happiness! But what a perspective this knowledge opens to those who strive earnestly, what an incentive even to the weak! The more man progresses, the more radiant and joyful will be his consciousness. Happiness, indeed, may be called a characteristic of progress. In the course of its development it becomes more and more sublime, until it grows into that serenity which radiates from the face of the Enlightened One with that subtle smile in which wisdom, compassion, and all-embracing love are mingled.

One may object that the statistics of the Abhidhamma are not scientifically demonstrable and that therefore they have no universal validity, no objective value. But this is not what matters here, because we are dealing with products of life-experience, which cannot be

other than subjective if they are genuine. Though these products have been arranged logically and transformed into a spiritual work of art, they have not been inferred by way of logic and, therefore, they cannot be proved by means of logic but only by means of ever renewed experience, by the realization of the same mental states and conditions upon which this psychological system was founded. What appears important to us in these statistics is just that subjective element which gives the most unambiguous expression to the attitude of early Buddhism. From the historical as well as from the purely epistemological and (practical) religious point of view this is most essential.

As in the case of suffering we can distinguish many degrees of joy or happiness and among them three main types. The first is *physical*: bodily welfare and sensual pleasure (kāyika sukha); the next higher type is mental joy (kāmāvacara-somanassa) which consists in the satisfaction of intellectual interests or emotional inclinations which are individually conditioned and limited; the highest type is that pure joy or happiness (cetasika sukha) which is free from selfish interests and individual limitations, a joy which takes part in the happiness of others (muditā) and in which a universal ethos carries the individual beyond the boundaries of worldly experience (lokuttara).

After the Buddha had realized this highest state of happiness, he was confronted with the task to devise a way which led from the ordinary (worldly) state of consciousness (lokiya citta) to the attainment of this supra-mundane bliss. This way forms the fourth and most important part of the Four Noble Truths, the synthesis of the whole formula: it is the Eightfold Path of liberation from the suffering of bondage.

E—EBP

Whether Buddhas appear in the world or whether Buddhas do not appear in the world, it remains a fact, an unalterable condition of existence and an eternal law, that all karmic formations (saṅkhārā) are impermanent (anicca). This fact a Buddha discovers and masters, and when he has discovered and mastered it, he announces, proclaims, preaches, reveals, teaches and explains thoroughly that all saṅkhāras are impermanent.

Whether Buddhas appear in the world, or whether Buddhas do not appear in the world, it remains a fact, an unalterable condition of existence and an eternal law, that all karmic formations are subject to suffering (dukkha). This fact a Buddha discovers and masters, and after having discovered and mastered it, he announces, proclaims, preaches, reveals, teaches and explains thoroughly, that all saṅkhāras are subject to suffering.

Whether Buddhas appear in the world, or whether Buddhas do not appear in the world, it remains a fact, an unalterable condition of existence and an eternal law, that all that exists (sabbe dhammā) is non-absolute (anattā, i.e. without an unchangeable or absolute ego-entity). This fact a Buddha discovers and masters, and after having discovered and mastered it, he announces, proclaims, preaches, reveals, teaches and explains thoroughly, that all that exists is non-absolute (without a permanent ego). (Aṅguttara-Nikāya III, 134.)

4. THE WAY OF LIBERATION

i. *The Eightfold Plan*

We called the third Noble Truth the 'truth of happiness'. The Eightfold Path represents the origin of happiness, i.e. of nibbāna. It is the synthesis of the fourfold formula because the first step of the Path, *right views*, consists in the knowledge or at least in the recognition, of the fact of suffering, of its origin, of the possibility of its destruction, and of the way which leads to the annihilation of suffering. In other words: one who wants to tread the path of liberation must be conscious of the imperfection of his present state of existence and must have the earnest desire to overcome it, as well as a notion concerning the causes of his imperfection and the means how to remove them. Thus the fourth truth sums up the results of the three foregoing truths, before it points out the practical steps towards the realization of the aim in question. This is very characteristic of the Buddha's method. He did not want blind followers on his way who would simply carry out his instructions without knowing their reason and their necessity, because to him the value of human action did not consist in its external effect but in its motive, in the attitude of consciousness from which it sprang. He wanted his disciples to follow him by reason of their own insight into the truth of his teachings and not merely on account of their faith in the superiority of his wisdom. There was only one kind of faith which he expected from those who wanted to realize his path: the faith in their own immanent forces. This does not mean a kind of cold rationalism but the harmonious co-operation of *all* the forces of the human psyche, among which the intellect serves as a discriminating and directive principle (paññindriya). In the beginning the full significance of these Four Noble Truths cannot yet be perceived because of the limited range of individual consciousness (otherwise liberation would be attained immediately and the remaining steps of the path would be unnecessary), but the simple fact of suffering and its immediate causes are so obviously demonstrated in every phase of life that a mere observation and analysis of one's own limited experiences in the direction indicated by the Buddha are sufficient to convince a thinking man of the reasonableness and acceptability of the Buddha's statements. And this automatically arouses the will of man and gives

it a certain direction: it creates in him the *right intentions* (sammā samkappa) in conformity with the aim of liberation.

As greed and hatred (lobha and dosa) are the main obstacles in his way, he will try first of all to keep his mind free from these properties and to replace them gradually by the positive opposites, charity and love (dāna and mettā, corresponding to alobha and adosa).

In the next three steps these right intentions are put into practice by *right speech* (sammā vācā), *right action* (sammā kammanta), and *right livelihood* (sammā ājīva).

Right speech (sammā vācā) is defined as abstaining from lying, tale-bearing, harsh language and vain talk. That this is not to be understood in the negative sense only, may be seen from the following explanations of Aṅguttara-Nikāya X, 176: 'He speaks the truth, is devoted to the truth, reliable, worthy of confidence. . . . He never knowingly speaks a lie, neither for the sake of his own advantage, nor for the sake of another person's advantage, nor for the sake of any advantage whatsoever. What he has heard here, he does not repeat there, so as to cause dissention there. . . . Thus he unites those that are divided, and those that are united he encourages. Concord gladdens him, he delights and rejoices in concord; and it is concord that he spreads by his words. He avoids harsh language and speaks such words as are gentle, soothing to the ear, loving, going to the heart, courteous and dear, and agreeable to many. He avoids vain talk and speaks at the right time, in accordance with facts, speaks what is useful, speaks about the law[1] and the discipline; his speech is like a treasure, at the right moment accompanied by arguments, moderate and full of sense. This is called right speech.'[2]

Right action (sammā kammanta) is defined as the abstaining from killing, stealing, and unlawful sexual intercourse. The positive side of this definition is indicated by the words: 'Without stick or sword, conscientious, full of sympathy, he is anxious for the welfare of all living beings.'

Right livelihood (sammā ājīva) is defined as the abstaining from all such trades and occupations which are injurious to the welfare of other beings, as for instance: trading in arms, in living beings, in flesh, in intoxicating drinks, and in poison. Whatever is connected with deceit, treachery, soothsaying, trickery, usury has to be avoided, but a life of purity, righteousness and usefulness, in short, a life that is to one's own bodily and spiritual welfare as well as to the welfare of one's fellow-beings, this is called right living.

The sixth step of the Eightfold Path is *right effort* (sammā vāyāma)

[1] Dhamma. [2] Translated by Mahāthera Nyāṇatiloka.

which consists of four phases: (1) the effort to destroy the evil which has arisen (in our mind), (2) the effort to prevent the evil which has not yet arisen, (3) the effort to produce the good which has not yet arisen, (4) the effort to cultivate the good which has arisen.

The good qualities which are to be developed and cultivated are the seven factors of enlightenment (satta bojjhaṅgā), namely: mindfulness (sati), discerning the truth (dhamma-vicāya), energy (viriya), rapture (pīti), serenity (passaddhi), concentration (samādhi), and equanimity (upekkhā).

The seventh and eighth step of the Path deal more directly with these factors under the aspects of sati and samādhi.

Mindfulness (sati) is described as a fourfold contemplation, namely, concerning the body (kāya), the sensations (vedanā), the mind (citta) and the phenomena (dhammā). These contemplations are chiefly analytical. They anticipate in many repects the methods and effects of modern psycho-analysis. But the Buddhist system of psychic culture goes one step farther. It does not confine itself to the analysis and control of consciousness as it *is*, but it proceeds to a higher synthesis or intensification of consciousness through samādhi.

Thus *right concentration* (sammā samādhi) is the eighth step of the Path. Its objects are those of the seventh step, its chief factors those of the sixth step. But while there the seven factors of enlightenment exist only as germs, they attain their full maturity in samādhi. And while the objects of the seventh step still remain in the realm of discursive (or conceptual) thought, they are raised to the realm of intuitive consciousness of realization on the eighth step. Concentration, though it does not exhaust the meaning of samādhi, is its chief characteristic, but we have to bear in mind that concentration in this connexion is equal to a transformation of consciousness: it eliminates the tension between subject and object, or rather the creation of such a conceptual discrimination, through the synthesizing force of pure experience. I call this experience pure because it is not reflected or coloured by the medium of thought or preconceived ideas, and therefore free from illusion and its concomitants, attraction and rejection, greed and aversion. If this experience is deep enough to penetrate our whole consciousness, down to its very roots (saṅkhārā) and fundamental motives (hetu), liberation (nibbāna) is attained. But even if such experiences are of lesser intensity and have only a temporal or otherwise limited influence on our mind, yet they will widen our outlook, strengthen our confidence, deepen our views, lessen our preconceptions, and purify our intentions.

Thus right concentration, again, becomes the basis of right views, right aspirations, and the other steps of the Noble Eightfold Path,

which is now experienced on a higher level, and this *spiral-like progression* (see the following diagram) is continued until complete liberation is attained.

If we further analyse the Eightfold Path we shall find that it is based on three fundamental principles: or morality (sīla), concentration (samādhi), and wisdom (paññā). Right speech, right action, and right livelihood represent the principle of *morality* (sīla). Right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration represent the principle of *concentration* (samādhi). Right views and right aspirations represent the principle of *wisdom* (paññā).


Wisdom in its highest form is enlightenment (sammā-sambodhi); in its beginning it is the honest striving after truth, the unbiassed recognition of the laws of life as far as they are in the reach of average human experience. As such it is called right views or right understanding (sammā diṭṭhi), and it is significant for the spiritual attitude of Buddhism that it regards right understanding as the first step on the path of liberation, without which neither morality nor concentration can have any value. Morality is nothing but the practical expression of right understanding. If a man would act according to certain rules, merely because he is afraid of punishment or because he expects a certain reward, his so-called morality would be without value. According to the Buddhist point of view, morality is not the cause but the outcome of our spiritual attitude. The harmony between this attitude and our actions, i.e. our inner truthfulness, this is the real meaning of morality (sīla). And it is on account of this that samādhi is not possible without sīla, because concentration cannot be attained without harmony. Samādhi is harmony in the highest perfection.

In short: Wisdom (paññā) is the harmony between our mind and the laws of reality. Morality (sīla) is the harmony between our convictions and our actions. Samādhi is the harmony between our feeling, our knowledge, and our will, the unity of all our creative forces in the experience of a higher reality.

ii. *The Connexion between the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, and the Twelvefold Formula of Dependent Origination, Paṭiccasamuppāda*

Before closing this chapter it will be useful to see the inseparable connexion between the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, and the twelvefold formula of Dependent Origination, not only in their genetic or temporal succession but also in their simultaneous relationship and the intricate parallelism of their constituents.

The Four Noble Truths contain both, the formula of Dependent



THE THREE TENDENCIES OF THE EIGHTFOLD PATH
AND THE SPIRAL OF PROGRESS


1. sammā diṭṭhi
2. sammā saṁkappa
3. sammā vācā
4. sammā kammanta
5. sammā ājīva
6. sammā vāyāma
7. sammā sati
8. sammā samādhi

Origination and the Eightfold Path. The latter, on the other hand, contains in its first step the Four Noble Truths and therefore necessarily the formula of Dependent Origination as well. The Four Noble Truths are the general frame of the Buddhist system, in which the essential problem is outlined in form of a *thesis* and its *antithesis*, which may be summarized under two headings: *dukkha* and *sukha*. Each of them is analysed (1) as to its *symptoms* and (2) as to its *causes* or conditions. The first part of this analysis is done by the first and the third Noble Truth, the analysis of the conditions under which those symptoms originate is found in the second and the fourth Noble Truth. On the side of *dukkha* the investigation of causes is carried out in form of the twelvefold *paṭiccasamuppāda*. On the side of *sukha* the conditions of happiness and the causes of liberation are shown by the Eightfold Path (aṭṭhaṅgika magga).

These two formulas, into which the philosophical and the practical teachings of Buddhism are compressed, can be represented by two circles, because the constituents of each of these formulas are not limited by an absolute beginning and an absolute end. Each factor depends on the others, thus establishing an unlimited relationship within each circle. The relationship between the circles themselves is demonstrated by their touching each other at one point, namely that which is common to both formulas: the truth of suffering.

The paṭiccasamuppāda shows how the individual under the influence of delusion goes through different experiences and stages of consciousness until arriving at the point where suffering becomes so powerful that the individual begins to contemplate about its origin. At this moment he reverses his attitude: he traces back the origin of suffering (either by his own intellectual effort or with the help of others) and begins to understand the nature of suffering. This is the first step in a new direction: the first step of the Eightfold Path. Thus suffering is the turning-point which leads from the wheel of causation to the path of liberation. And with each step on this path the corresponding opposite factors of the paṭiccasamuppāda are neutralized. This parallelism in the constituents of the two circles, of which the second continues the movement (development) of the first in the opposite direction, may be illustrated by the diagram on page 73.

According to the relative and flowing character of psychological terms and the dynamic nature of the two formulas which represent processes of life (but not the two sides of a mathematical equation) their parallelism is more a matter of corresponding movement (though of opposite direction) than of exactly corresponding pairs of complementary magnitudes or absolute pairs of opposites. It is with



Thesis
DUKKHA
Antithesis
SUKHA
ANALYSIS OF SYMPTOMS
(bodily, mental, universal)
I. Dukkhaṃ ariya-saccaṃ
III. Dukkha-nirodho ariya-saccaṃ (sukkhaṃ ariya-saccaṃ)
ANALYSIS OF CAUSES
II. Dukkha-samudayo ariya-saccaṃ
IV. Dukkha-nirodho gamini patipada ariya-saccaṃ (sukha samudayo ariya-saccaṃ)
1 avijjā
2 saṅkhārā
3 viññāṇa
4 nāma-rūpa
5 saḷāyatana
6 phassa
7 vedanā
8 taṇhā
9 upādāna
10 bhava
11 jāti
12 jarā maraṇa soka paridevi dukkha domanass-upāyāsa
PRESENT
FUTURE
PAST
KAMMA BHAVA
UPPATTI BHAVA
UPPATTI BHAVA
KAMMA BHAVA
I. (13) sammā diṭṭhi (dukkham ariya saccam etc)
14
II. sammā samkappa
15
III sammā vācā
16
IV. sammā kammanta
17
V. sammā ājīva
18
VI. sammā vāyāma
19
VII sammā sati
20
VIII. sammā samādhi
SAMĀDHI
SĪLA
PAÑÑĀ

this reservation that we have demonstrated the complementary relationship between the constituents of the two formulas in the following diagram, which can be explained as follows:

1 Sammā diṭṭhi consists in the right understanding of suffering (dukkha), of its causes, and of the way to its annihilation.

2 Sammā samkappa is the conscious intention, founded upon the knowledge of the previous step, and, therefore, it counteracts the subconscious tendencies (saṅkhāra) which are based on ignorance (avijjā).

3 Sammā vācā is the right formulation of thought (discursive thinking) and its expression (right speech). Thus it implies the control of the conscious mind (viññāṇa; in contradistinction to the subconscious: saṅkhāra).


4 Sammā kammanta, right action, implies the control of the psycho-physical apparatus (nāma-rūpa) and its sense organs (saḷāyatana).

5 Sammā ājīva, right livelihood, concerns our external life and the control of our associations and contacts (phassa).

6 Sammā vayāma is the conscious effort, or energy directed by knowledge, which counteracts uncontrolled emotional impulses (vedanā).

7 Sammā sati, right mindfulness, is opposed to craving (taṇhā) and clinging (upādāna).

8 Sammā samādhi is that state of perfect concentration and unification of all creative forces, which controls the process of becoming (bhava), determines rebirth (jāti) and eventually makes an end of it, together with all the suffering with which it is inseparably connected.



The relations between the constituents of the eightfold path and the paṭiccasamuppāda (showing their intrinsic parallelism)

FOURTH PART

THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The world, O Kaccāna, is accustomed to rely on a duality, on the 'it is' and on the 'it is not'. However, O Kaccāna, he who perceives in accordance with truth and wisdom how the things of this world arise, for him there is no 'it is not' in this world. And he, O Kaccāna, who perceives in accordance with truth and wisdom how the things of this world perish, for him there is no 'it is' in the world.

(*Saṃyutta-Nikāya II,* 17)

1. THE OBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

i. *Relationship between Subject and Object*

In order definitely to determine a point in space, what is required is several geometrical positions, that is, the settling of its relations to other fixed points in a recognized system. In the same way, for the correct characterization of a state of consciousness, which means also, for the analysis of the consciousness, we require various points of observation which correspond in one single system. This follows from the definition of consciousness as the relation between subject (ārammaṇika) and object (ārammaṇa). Such a definition, of course, is not exhaustive, but it is sufficient as a working hypothesis for our present inquiry. According as we here set the centre of gravity in the subject or in the object, there result two fundamental lines of investigation. In the former case there arises the question as to the relation of the *subject* to the external world; in the latter the question as to the nature of the *objects* of consciousness. The behaviour of the subject depends upon the grade of its cognition and has three modes of expression: that of craving (attraction), that of aversion (rejection), and that which is free from both these extremes. Craving as well as aversion belongs to the domain of compelled impulsions, to the realm of the instinctive, and of idiosyncrasies, since neither are subject to free willing. They thus represent a state of bondage, in contradistinction to the third degree of relationship which presents itself as a state of freedom. Bondage presumes a dualism, namely, a force and something which obstructs this force, thus, the relationship of tension between two opposed systems, the 'I' and the 'world'. The attempt to adjust this tension consists, on the one hand, in designs for the satisfaction of desires, that is, in the attempt to incorporate parts of one system in the other; and on the other hand, in aims at annihilating the opposing forces, that is, to drive back the forces of one system with those of the other and in driving them back, make an end of them. The attempt miscarries in both phases. Every blow occasions an equally strong counter-blow, every counter-will again begets willing, every act of obstruction begets resistance. The like takes place in the other phase. Craving increases in the exact degree that it is yielded to. Every deed done for its satsifaction is the germ, the continuously acting cause of new craving. The latter acts like the force of suction of a vacuum, and cannot be removed by anything

but the removal of its cause, namely, the vacuum itself. If, however, this is as boundless as the non-vacuum opposed to it, then a removal of the tension by the method of equilibration is impossible. The 'ego' as a self-existing something, constitutes such a vacuum. As an abstraction from everything perceivable that exists ('objects') it is a pure privation-value, an ideal vacuum, an illusion. The property of suction possessed by this vacuum expresses itself equally well in craving as in its reverse, in resistance to everything that runs counter to the satisfaction of craving. Through every obstacle there arise whirlpools in the sucking stream; and these are all the stronger and more obstructive, the more intense is the force of the suction. Since the illusion consists precisely in the taking of the ego for an absolute, all equilibration is impossible. In this case we can speak of the above-mentioned 'boundless vacuum'. The impossibility of the equilibration of the state of tension, the total discrepancy between subjective willing and objectively given facts, the disharmony between ideation and actuality, is what we call suffering. The conquest of this disharmony, of these idiosyncrasies, the losing of the above-mentioned tie, in short, the release into the state of inner freedom, does not come about through the suppression of the will, but through the removal of the vacuum, that is, through the annihilation of the illusion. All suffering arises from a false attitude. The world is neither good nor bad. It is solely our relationship to it which makes it either the one or the other.

With reference to the goal of deliverance, two main modes of consciousness can be distinguished: the directed and the undirected. Directed consciousness is that which, in recognition of the goal, has entered the stream and is wholly bent upon freedom, which means that the decisive reversal of attitude has ensued. Undirected consciousness, on the contrary, allows itself to be driven hither and thither by instinct-born motives and external impressions. On account of its dependence upon the external world it is designated as *worldly* or mundane (lokiya) consciousness. In contradistinction to this, directed consciousness is held to be *supra-mundane* (lokuttara). The justification of the term 'directed' is clearly discernible from the fact that the transition from worldly to supra-worldly consciousness is called 'entry into the *stream*' (sotāpatti); and one who finds himself in this phase of development is called 'one who has entered the stream' (sotāpanna). Worldly, equally with unworldly, consciousness may function upon the same planes, for here it is not a question of 'this side' and 'further side' (transcendental) experiences, but of experience of the same world in a different direction, under different presuppositions (dependence and independence).

ii. *Objects and Realms of Consciousness*

When we consider consciousness from the point of view of *objects*, we must above all be clear as to their essential character and formal qualities. We distinguish in the first place between the material and the immaterial, the limited and the unlimited, that is to say, between (objects perceivable through the senses and those perceivable by the mind.) In the former, all the senses may participate; in the latter only the 'form'-freed mind, the mind free from all perception of what is individual. Between the two extremes, the domain of the sensuously bounded, or of form bound by craving (kāmadhātu), and the domain for the formless (arūpadhātu), the unlimited that is free from craving, there comes in intermediately a groups of objects which are not perceptible indeed to the lower senses, namely those (of contact, of the non-spatial) of smell, of taste and of touch, but certainly to the higher senses, in so far as these are free from all entanglement with the ego, that is, free from discordance (craving), and therefore able to merge completely into the object, to become one with it, to experience it from within. These objects are designated as pure forms, untarnished by any kind of entanglement with the 'I', or as absolute form (rūpa), since they belong neither to the domain of the formless, (they possess shape), nor yet correspond to the sensuous form bound by craving. The realm of Pure Form (rūpadhātu) is thus not a domain of intellectual abstractions but of intuitive (because 'I'-freed) contemplation of form. Corresponding to these three groups of objects, we get three basic planes of consciousness: the consciousness which dwells in the domain of the sensuous, of forms of craving (kāmāvacara-citta); the consciousness which dwells in the domain of Pure Form (rūpāvacara-citta); and the consciousness which dwells in the domain of the formless, of Non-Form (arūpāvacara-citta).

The Realm of Pure Form is intermediary between the two other realms inasmuch as it has something in common with each of the two – with the sense-domain, the property of form-ness; with the formless domain, the property of abstraction, namely, from the egocentricity of the lower domain of the senses filled with desires. That this is no mere artificial, intellectual abstraction, follows from the intuitive character of these two domains. The properties of each domain are not something added to their particular character, but only modifications of the same. Thus the sense-world is designated as purely the domain of sensuous desires, since its objects are bounded, 'I'-conditioned, in their individualness set in contrast with the subject, incapable of union with the subject, and hence beget that state of tension (dualism) which we call craving. The objects belonging

to the realm of Non-Form possess no limiting boundaries, are beyond all multiplicity and every kind of isolation or 'I'-entanglement. With this is excluded all possibility of tension, of craving. It is the same with pure forms, for their boundaries are only of an ideal, a formal sort, they are not essential to them and can therefore be filled by the experiencing subject.

We must bear in mind, however, that the tension in the realm of sense-perception is not a *necessary* state but only a product of illusion. If the mind is directed towards supra-mundane knowledge, the sense objects are perceived and investigated with proper discrimination, and instead of arresting and binding the forces of consciousness they will reflect them, throw them back upon their source, thus intensifying their power.

The following diagram may help us to understand the conceptual structure and definition of the objects of consciousness and their relations to the three realms and the three functional states of consciousness. Each concept is represented by a circle. Pairs of opposites, i.e. concepts of the same category but of opposite meaning, are symbolized by pairs of circles touching each other at one point only (which is common to both like the category to which they belong) but otherwise exclusive (like the contents of the respective concepts which strictly exclude each other).

Examples: limited / unlimited
material / immaterial


Concepts which have nothing in common correspond to circles which are separated from each other.

Example: material / unlimited

Those concepts which partly coincide with each other are shown by overlapping circles.

Examples: limited / material
unlimited / immaterial
immaterial / limited

The two extreme functions of consciousness, characterized by sense-perception on one side and intuition on the other, are rendered by two groups of concentric circles, of which one lies in the realm of material objects (which are forms, sounds, odours, tastes and bodies) while the other partly covers the circles which denote immaterial, limited, and unlimited objects, in which it partakes. It may be noted that also the reflective consciousness takes part in the material objects, though not through direct perception of sense-objects, but through their images which are reproduced by the remembrance of previous sense-impressions.


THE OBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS:
FORMAL·QUALITIES
ESSENTIAL QUALITIES
I. KĀMA-DHĀTU
II. RŪPA-DHĀTU
III. ARŪPA-DHĀTU
SENSE-OBJECTS
MENTAL OBJECTS
MATERIAL OBJECTS
LIMITED OBJECTS
IMMATERIAL OBJECTS
UNLIMITED OBJECTS
INTUITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
REFLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS
RECEPTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS



iii. *The Realm of Pure Form*

As the objects of the sense-world – though being the most differentiated – are familiar to us as contents of our daily experience, we may first explain the characteristics of the other two realms in order to get an idea of the general structure of consciousness and its psychocosmic significance. Only if we understand the underlying plan of this psychological system can we see the viewpoint from which the analysis and classification of the factors and functions of consciousness has been undertaken. It is this spiritual ground-plan which represents the lasting value of Buddhist psychology and which gives a meaning to its details. If these are studied without a proper knowledge of the ground-plan and without being conscious of it at every point, nothing but an accumulation of meaningless details will be achieved.

In the realm of Pure Form (rūpa-dhātu) five factors are of deciding importance; thinking (vitakka), reflecting or sustained thought (vicāra), rapture (pīti), happiness (sukha), and one-pointedness (ekaggatā). The last factor is said to exist in every act of consciousness as a kind of immanent tendency of direction, but in the case of meditation and especially in the higher states of absorption (jhāna) this factor is raised to a definite state of concentration. The predominance of this factor together with the other four properties causes the elimination of the five hindrances (nīvaraṇāni) which bind the worldly-minded (puthujjanā):

Thinking (in its initial state) destroys sloth and torpor (thīnamiddha).
Reflecting (or sustaining thought) destroys doubt (vicikicchā).
Joy (or rapture) destroys hatred (dosa or byāpāda).
Happiness destroys restlessness and mental worry (uddhacca-kukkucca).
Concentration destroys greed (lobha).

With the entrance into the realm of Pure Form thinking (vitakka), sustained thought (vicāra), rapture (pīti), happiness (sukha), and one-pointedness (ekaggatā) are present, and thus none of the hindrances are taken over into this state of consciousness. In their place the opposite favourable factors become free. In the further course of meditation ekaggatā is more and more intensified by the successive elimination of the other four factors. In other words: the energy invested in those four factors is gradually absorbed by ekaggatā.

Thus five classes of consciousness can be distinguished in the consciousness of Pure Form: In the first jhāna all the above-mentioned factors are present, in the second jhāna vitakka disappears, in

the third jhāna vicāra disappears, in the fourth jhāna pīti disappears, and in the fifth sukha disappears, whereby a hedonically neutral state (upekkhā) of pure concentration is created. The consciousness in the realm of Pure Form, (rūpāvacara-citta), therefore, can be represented in the following way:

vitakka – vicāra – pīti – sukha – ekaggatā
vicāra – pīti – sukha – ekaggatā
pīti – sukha – ekaggatā
sukha – ekaggatā
ekaggatā
(up.)

The process of concentration could not be symbolized more obviously than by this triangle of decreasing factors.

The consciousness in the realm of Non-Form (arūpāvacara-citta) corresponds with regard to its factors to the fifth stage of the consciousness of Pure Form (fifth jhāna). Its classification, therefore, cannot start from the (subjective) factors, but only from the *objects* of consciousness (ārammaṇa or ālambaṇa).

The discrimination 'subject-object' is justified, naturally, only from an external point of view. In reality one cannot separate the consciousness from its contents. There are different moments of consciousness, different with regard to time and contents, but each of them represents an inseparable unity. Only for the sake of verbal expression and mental (logical) simplification we abstract from the incessant processes of '*becoming* conscious' the more or less static idea of 'a consciousness', and after having created a concept for the unity and stability of this process, we are compelled to create a complementary concept which accounts for the change in it: the contents of representation of the *object* of consciousness. If, in connexion with this concept, we speak of a *subject* of consciousness too, then we refer to that higher unity of karmically conditioned forces which we call the 'individual' – 'that which cannot be divided' – because it is not the mechanical unity of a constant or limited 'thing' but an ever-flowing process of re-adjustment and unification of living forces which have their focus in consciousness. But just as a focus is not something different from the rays that meet in it, so consciousness is not different from the forces which in visible and invisible forms build up the individual. We have become so much accustomed to identifying concepts with reality, that it cannot be emphasized often enough that in Buddhism expressions like 'individual', 'subject', 'I', and 'mine' can only be used in a relative sense, and even there still with reservation. The Buddha calls such expressions 'vohāra vacana',

expressions of 'common speech', which the knowing one may use without harm, because he perceives their relativity and does not take them at their face-value. 'The Tathāgata . . . may well say: *I* say or *I* am told. Knowing the (conventional) speech of the world, the wise one only says so in common speech.' (Saṃyutta-Nikāya, 25.)

iv. *The Realm of Non-Form*

While thus continuing to use these conventional expressions, we shall see how the consciousness of Non-Form can be divided.

Two kinds of objects can be discerned here: direct or intuitive objects (paññattālambaṇāni) and indirect or developed objects (mahaggatālambaṇāni).

After the elimination of all thing- and form-ideas or representations, space is the direct and intuitive object of consciousness. It has two properties: that of infinity and that of non-materiality (no-thing-ness). They condition each other like 'above' and 'below', 'right' and 'left', 'positive' and 'negative'; each of these two properties contains the germ of the other, can originate from the other one; each of the two poles can be the basis or the starting point. Without them there would be no experience of space, because 'space as such' cannot be the object of consciousness. The 'infinity of space' (ākasānañcāyatana) and 'no-thing-ness' (ākiñcaññāyatana) are thus, as space-expressions of equal value, objects of intuitive consciousness. If, however, that consciousness of the infinity of space itself becomes an object of meditation, the experience of the infinity of consciousness arises. If infinity becomes conscious it reveals the infinity of consciousness. During an intuitive experience consciousness entirely identifies itself with and merges into the object: if it is an infinite one, also the consciousness becomes unlimited. But only retrospectively does the consciousness becomes aware of its own boundlessness. In an analogous way the consciousness of emptiness, of the absence of all material or imagined 'things', of 'no-thing-ness', becomes the object of the consecutive stage of absorption which consists just in the awareness of that 'emptiness of consciousness', called 'neither perception nor non-perception' or 'ultimate limit of perception'. But even this state has still its positive side and cannot be characterized exhaustively as the awareness of non-perception: in it perfect freedom, peace and serenity are realized in a way which makes every description and discussion impossible. Here any further definition becomes paradoxical.

The relationship between the two groups of unlimited objects can be shown in the following way:

(Direct, intuitional) (Indirect, developed)
Group I: 'Infinity of space' and 'infinity of consciousness'.
Group II: 'No-thing-ness' and 'ultimate limit of perception.'


These two groups are not only in correlation through the common concept 'space', but they are able to develop the one from the other in the course of one and the same process of consciousness in such a fashion that conceptually, i.e. seen from outside, there is a movement from a positive to a negative state, while in reality meditation is a process of progressive unification: from the differentiation of surface-consciousness to the unity of depth-consciousness. The consciousness of the 'infinity of space' represents the positive, that of 'no-thing-ness' the negative aspect of space-experience. Consequently the first one precedes the latter in the course of meditation, while the latter on account of its inner relationship to the first can be developed on the way through the 'infinity of consciousness'. Because in the infinity of space as in that of consciousness all separateness and limitation are annihilated, so that the experience of 'no-thing-ness' appears as the immediate consequence of these states.

Consciousness in the realm of Non-Form (arūpaloka-citta) thus appears in the following order of jhānas:

1 The realm of the infinity of space (ākasānañcāyatana).
2 The realm of the infinity of consciousness (viññāṇañcāyatana).
3 The realm of 'no-thing-ness' (ākiñcaññāyatana).
4 The realm of the ultimate limit of perception (nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana).

2 THE STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

THE factors of consciousness decrease with the progress of absorption; from the broad basis, or rather surface, of the ordinary state of mind, the consciousness becomes more and more centred until the point of complete unification is reached. Thus consciousness oscillates between the boundary states of *Differentiation* and *Uniformity*. According to the Buddhist point of view uniformity is the primary state of mind, while surface-consciousness, or consciousness in the ordinary sense of the word, can be defined as a phenomenon of resistance – an obstruction of the stream of being, comparable to the arising of heat and light as phenomena of resistance of the electric current. The 'surface-consciousness' is the most differentiated. In the same measure in which we become absorbed,




Planes of existence (bhūmi) and their corresponding states of conciousness (cittāni). (*See* appendix, Table VIII)

differentiation decreases and unification increases. We, therefore, call the uniform consciousness, or that which approaches it, the consciousness of the depth or the 'fundamental consciousness'. The amplitude of oscillation between surface and depth corresponds to the *intensity* of consciousness. The ego-conception is only a product of the surface-consciousness, because an ego can exist only where there are differences and hence a discrimination between ego and non-ego. The ego-idea disappears in the same proportion in which consciousness approaches its foundations. It is for this reason that the ego is perceived as an illusion in the process of meditation.

According to the degree of differentiation we can speak of different stages of consciousness. Though for each kind of living beings a certain stage may be said to be characteristic, yet the single individual is not necessarily bound to this one type of consciousness. The higher an individual is developed, the greater is the capacity of variation of his consciousness. Perhaps one should have expected me to say that the level of development depends on the differentiation of consciousness. But as it is said that the consciousness of higher beings corresponds to the consciousness of the higher degrees of absorption, this definition could not be applied in general. But how do these beings differ from those whose state of mind is still on the primitive level of an undeveloped consciousness, namely, one which is not yet differentiated? We have already mentioned one reason – namely the capacity of variation which is lacking in the undeveloped mind – however, this is not the only reason, but the problem consists in the fundamental question: What is the difference between the unity of a concentrated mind and the unity of an undeveloped consciousness; in what differs a higher consciousness from the subconsciousness, mundane consciousness from a state of supramundane absorption (lokuttara-jhāna), the simplicity of the wise from the simplicity of the child, the elimination of perception in the state of concentration from the similar effect of deep sleep or of hypnosis? We shall try to solve this problem, or at least to find a working hypothesis, with the help of a diagram, which, I hope, will not be taken as a final definition but merely as a tentative approach to this difficult subject.

The diagram symbolizes the development of successive states of consciousness, as they may occur in a number of causally connected existences (or individuals: from the psychological standpoint it does not matter whether we speak of causally connected existences of one and the same individual or of the consecutive existences of causally connected individuals). The diagram is composed of a great number of narrow triangles, the bases of which are connected in such a way



Structure and Development of Consciousness.

as to form a circle, while their points meet in the centre of the circle. The triangle corresponds to the decreasing structure of consciousness (decreasing in the direction from the surface towards the depth down to the point of complete unification). The periphery of the circle represents the zone of utmost differentiation, while the centre forms the common point of unity, in which there is no differentiation of consciousness. The more emphasized radial lines mark the incisions of birth and death (which are only the two sides of the same process). Their distance from each other is not meant, however, to mean the duration of life (which is of no importance here), but the *experience-value* of an individual existence at a particular stage of its development, indicated by its position in the general scheme of psychogenetic possibilities. This value may be called the mental horizon or the medium range of consciousness within one existence, formed by the accumulated and mentally digested experience. The *width of the sector* corresponds to the mental *range of activity*. The longer the way which individual consciousness has covered, the more experience-values are accumulated in it, and the greater is the sector which it occupies in our system. In the *mental radius* of activity differentiation and intensity are combined. The *intensity* of consciousness, the *tension* between surface and depth, is the difference between the highest and the lowest point of the curve of consciousness within one existence. The curve marks the way of individually centred consciousness, of causally connected moments of individual consciousness.

In order to get a few important points as to the main states of consciousness we divide consciousness into three great groups: *peripherical*, *subperipherical*, and *subliminal* consciousness. The peripherical consciousness is that of the surface, the most differentiated, the normal day-consciousness of man. It extends as far as the *volitional* faculty of reproduction of former (past) contents of consciousness, namely the control of our *memory*. The *subperipherical* consciousness is that which lies *below* the threshold of the volitional faculty of memory. Its contents are the source from which a great part of the 'day-consciousness' is fed, without, however, being capable of volitional reproduction. The consciousness of this sphere is far more voluminous than that of the previous one, yet it is *less individually differentiated* on account of the partial exclusion of the factors of volition. Differentiation means an intensification of the ego-tendency. The lower limit of subperipherical consciousness is formed by the (circular) line of *death-consciousness*. At death a retrogression of consciousness takes place. The lowest point of it is what we call death-consciousness. What lies beyond of it (namely towards the centre) is the *subliminal*

consciousness. It is beyond the possibilities of individual intentions and formations and has no room for accidental or momentary influences, while the extreme periphery contains only momentary consciousness because all its contents (perceptions) sink below the surface and are absorbed by the lower strata according to their 'weight' or intensity. If, therefore, we want to reproduce former contents of consciousness, i.e. if we want to call up a remembrance, we must concentrate ourselves, turn within ourselves, get absorbed. Those contents of consciousness, which are no more within the peripherical zone, can be reproduced only if the functions of peripherical consciousness are excluded, i.e. if the process of consciousness is concentrated upon the subperipherical zone, as in the progressive states of deep absorption (meditation, jhāna) in which by the elimination of individual volition (being one of the phenomena of differentiation) the subperipherical contents are raised to the 'surface', thus taking, so to say, the place of the peripherical consciousness. The *faculty* (*possibility*) *of reproduction* is all the greater, the more the curve of active consciousness approaches the centre. In this case the range of memory covers as much within the space of a sector (i.e. within one individual existence) as can be found between the lowest and the highest point of the curve of consciousness. The latter would correspond to the periphery in the case of a normal human being. All points within that sector which have the *same distance* from the centre are in a particular mutual relationship and are easily recollected or associated in memory if the curve of active consciousness goes through their plane.

If the circle which marks the line of *death-consciousness* is passed over in meditation, there appears the possibility to become conscious of the connexion of two (or more) existences. In the measure of progress of this meditative consciousness in the subliminal zone an ever-increasing number of existences will come into the range of memory. If the introspective consciousness reaches the centre, the point of unity which is common to the consciousness of all forms of existence, there is no more any limitation to the retrospective faculty which here becomes equal to the intuitive perception of all the possibilities of existence (or forms of consciousness) whether past, present, or future (a division which loses its meaning in this super-individual state of mind). But as long as the individual is not yet free from karmic fetters (saṅkhārā) and their root-causes (hetu) the retrospective faculty is bound to individual limitations, it is capable of reproducing only such contents of consciousness which, on account of causal connexions with past existences, are more closely related to the individual in question.

The subliminal consciousness becomes *supramundane* (lokuttara-citta) only by the neutralization of the saṅkhāras, whereby unlimited relations would become possible. Already in the periphery the neutralization of saṅkhāras must begin. The higher states of consciousness are conditioned by the *previous experience of the periphery*. The periphery is the necessary state of transition to their attainment.

The curve of consciousness, before attaining the state of utmost differentiation in the periphery, runs through all the stages of the subliminal and the subperipherical zone. In this case the subliminal consciousness is a 'not yet being fully conscious', a latent consciousness, the tendency to become conscious, while the consciousness of the subperipherical zone is an imperfect, or rather dreamlike consciousness. Only in the peripherical zone does consciousness become reflective and the will individually decisive. In the same measure in which the will becomes conscious of itself, it is felt as *free will*. But hand in hand with the experience of free will goes the consciousness of independence, uniqueness, and separateness, which grows into a state of psychic non-relationship; the surface separates itself from the depth, individualization proceeds to *intellectualization*. It is a strange paradox (at least in terms) that differentiation represents itself as individualization. But an individual becomes what it is, only by differing from others. If, however, this differing is misunderstood as the most essential property and is raised to the idea of absolute egohood, on account of lacking knowledge or insight, then disharmony and suffering are sure to follow. Under the influence of this suffering the selfish will (kāmacchanda) turns into the will of liberation (dhammacchanda). The experience of suffering leads to the understanding of life (sammā diṭṭhi) and thus the will of liberation becomes the *turning point of the will*, the beginning of a new *direction* (sotāpatti) in the psychological development of man. Before the attainment of the periphery the progress was in the direction *towards the periphery*, after the attainment of it, however, it is in the direction *towards the centre* (see curve of progress). Thus in the peripherical zone a transformation takes place, a reversal of the spiritual process, a progression with reversed prefix. We have seen (in the First Part) the same phenomenon with regard to the development of religion, in which we could discern similar phases of self-affirmation and self-negation, the inhalation and exhalation in the spiritual life of peoples.

The re-establishment of harmony is achieved by the connexion of the surface with the depth, by diving into the depth of consciousness, by absorption, by internalization, by bringing the light of discrimination into the depth and by bringing the treasures of the

depth up to the surface. If the curve of consciousness (now represented by a dotted line) now runs through the same zones as before attaining the periphery, yet there happens something entirely different and new. The uniformity of consciousness has changed into a *conscious* unity. The amorphous and almost indifferent (and unrelated) self-centred consciousness has been replaced by the accumulated values of experience, condensed as *subconscious memory* and related to all forms and forces of life. In this way consciousness becomes superindividual.

Every state, process, or happening receives its meaning by its causal connexions, especially by that which preceded it – just as a thing is conditioned by its relationship to the surroundings. We, therefore, have not only to discern between pre-peripherical subliminal consciousness and post-peripherical subliminal consciousness in general, but we have to make similar discriminations even within one sector. Subperipherical states can occur in two ways: volitional (sasaṅkhārika) or non-volitional (asaṅkhārika). The first case happens in meditation (jhāna), the latter in dream. In the state of dream the level of consciousness is lowered on account of the absence of tendencies of unity or concentration, and therefore it breaks up into its various factors, while in meditation, even after the elimination of surface-volitions, the tendency of unification, the one-pointedness (ekaggatā), remains in existence on account of the directive attitude (intention) exercised during the initial moments in the peripherical zone. Thus a positively directed state of mind is produced, and a passive 'sinking' into a semi-conscious state is prevented. This shows again the *importance of the periphery* as a necessary transitional and preparatory stage which is the sine qua non of every meditation. It is not sufficient to start from any point of the peripherical zone, but first the utmost differentiation in the periphery itself must have been attained, before the reversal into the direction towards the centre can take place with success. Somnambulistic and hypnotic states of mind, for instance, have no progressive value: they lack the determining moment in the periphery (whose attainment already presupposes a certain level of development and maturity of the individual).

For this reason the first part of all essential meditations consists in a profound and extremely differentiated *analysis*, and only after this careful preparation begins the great *synthesis* of direct experience or intuitive knowledge. With the importance of the periphery, also that of human existence with regard to the way of liberation becomes obvious, because in the consciousness of man the periphery can be attained, and with it the turning point, which forms the first step of

the supramundane path. The Buddha calls human birth 'the good way' for which even the devas must strive, if they want to attain the highest goal. What other religion has granted to man such a position! Man is the centre of the Buddhist teaching which was born from the deepest experience of humanity. It is for this reason that the Buddhist conception of the world is a psycho-cosmical one and that man as a microcosmos embraces the whole world within himself and is thus able to overcome it finally.

It remains to show how the three realms, kāmaloka, rūpaloka, and arūpaloka are related to our diagram. All the stages of consciousness before the attainment of the turning point in the periphery (the sectors A–K) belong to *kāmaloka*. The five stages of absorption in rūpaloka belong to the subperipherical zone; but this does not mean that the subperipherical zone is identical with rūpaloka; on the contrary the jhānas represent a special case of this zone, taking place only under certain conditions, as we have seen. The lower limit of the subperipherical consciousness was identified with the line of death-consciousness, and we mentioned that when crossing this boundary in meditation, there was the possibility of remembering former existences. According to the canonical texts this kind of remembrance starts with the fourth stage of jhāna, which corresponds to the fifth in our system which follows the more logical arrangement of the Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha. In the Sutta-Piṭaka the fivefold division of jhānas was not yet in use. The second and third stage of the Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha were counted there as *one*, so that altogether only four rūpa-jhānas were counted. (Both kinds of enumeration have been shown in the right part of the pyramidal diagram, by Roman and Arabic figures.)

It is significant that in the Mahāparinibbāna-Sutta (Dīgha-Nikāya XVI, 6) the Buddha is said to have gone through all the stages of the rūpa- and arūpa-jhānas, and after returning from the highest jhāna to the first and again up to the fourth (our fifth) jhāna, he departed from life. This confirms our assumption that the death-consciousness coincides with the fifth jhāna from where two ways are open to the meditator: that of the remembrance of former lives or that which leads to the four arūpaloka-jhānas. From the standpoint of consciousness (cetasika) the arūpa-jhānas can be classified under the fifth stage, with which they agree in the elimination of the first four factors (vitakka, vicāra, pīti, sukha). With regard to their contents, however, a further progress of unification takes place, though expressions like 'infinity of space' or 'infinity of consciousness' seem to indicate the contrary. Infinity, however, is nothing but the negation of separation, limitation, or differentiation. 'Infinity of

space' is the overcoming of the form principle (which still existed in the previous state), the infinity or rather boundlessness of consciousness is the overcoming of objective space by becoming perfectly conscious of it. As soon as its complete union with consciousness is attained, the difference of subject and object disappears and 'nothingness' (no-*thing*-ness) is experienced. With the fading away of this experience, the meditator enters the realm of 'neither perception nor non-perception', a state which cannot be expressed by words; because where all differentiations have ceased to exist, there also all designations have come to an end.

3. CLASSIFICATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

THE consciousness of the three planes, lying above one another in an ascending degree of sublimation in accord with its epistemological antecedent condition, is designated as 'conditioned by root-causes' (sahetuka), or 'not conditioned by root-causes' (ahetuka). Every act of consciousness which is motivated by the degree of knowledge of the individual – that is to say, by the mental attitude, which is related to all other causes, as the root to the other parts of a plant – is thus conditioned by *root-causes* and morally determinant; while all predominating passively receptive states of consciousness which result from mere impressions of the senses, are not conditioned by root-causes and therefore, are morally neutral. The word 'moral', however, is here to be understood not in the conventional way, but as a tendency of *direction* in the sense indicated at the beginning of this chapter, and in fact, with the exclusion of its applicability to the variations of the worldly conditions which tend towards change. Every approach in the direction of the goal, which is to be compared to the harmonizing, healing action of a process of cure, is designated as wholesome or favourable (kusala); and every departure from it as unwholesome or unfavourable (akusala). Unwholesome root-causes are craving (lobha), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha), the three phenomenal forms of ignorance, of non-knowing (avijjā), that is, of that state of mind which is not in agreement with actuality, and therefore of necessity leads to disharmony, in other words, to painful conditions. The wholesome or favourable root-causes are the qualities that are opposed to these phenomenal forms of avijjā; they are born of knowledge and consist of freedom from craving (alobha), freedom from hatred (adosa), and freedom from delusion (amoha). Thus there obtain for the worldly consciousness not only states conditioned by root-causes, and states not conditioned by root-causes, but within the conditioned states again, wholesome (favourable) and unwholesome (unfavourable) ones, so that we can arrange them in groups as follows:

Unwholesome, conditioned.
Neutral, non-conditioned.
Wholesome, conditioned.

In the realm of sense-perceived form each one of these conditions is represented; in the so-called 'exalted' domains, namely, in those of Pure Form and of Non-Form, only the last of these three.

1 DIRECTION	2 REALMS (concerning FORM)	3 PRECONDITION	4 POTENTIAL VALUE	
Mundane (LOKIYA)	I. In the Realm of Sensorial Form (KĀMĀVACARA)	A. conditioned by unwholesome (akusala) Root-causes (sahetuka)	a. b. c. active	(akusala)
		B. not conditioned by Root-causes (ahetuka)	a. unwholesome } reactive b. wholesome } reactive c. non-active	(akusalavipāka) (kusalavipāka) (kriyā)
		C. conditioned by wholesome (kusala) Root-causes (sahetuka)	a. active b. re-active c. non-active	(kusala) (vipāka) (kriyā)
	II. In the Realm of Pure Form (RŪPĀVACARA)	A. .... B. .... C.	.. active .. re-active .. non-active	(kusala) (vipāka) (kriyā)
	III. In the Realm of Non-Form (ARŪPĀVACARA)	A. .... B. .... C.	.. active .. re-active .. non-active	(kusala) (vipāka) (kriyā)
Supramundane (LOKUTTARA)	IV. In all the Realms	A. .... B.	.. active .. re-active	(magga) (phala)

To the points of view of direction, of the realm of form (or of the formation of objects), and of the antecendent conditions of consciousness, there remains to be added as fourth, that of *potential value.* A state of consciousness is either karmically active, re-active (resultant), or karmically non-active. Active it exhibits itself as wholesome (kusala) or unwholesome (akusala), re-active (vipāka) as outcome of former karma, non-active (kriyā) as exhausting itself in its present function. In the supramundane consciousness which, by the way, is tied to no definite plane or form of consciousness, but may dwell in all domains, the active aspect is designated as Path-consciousness (magga-citta), and what results, as Fruit-consciousness (phala-citta).

Besides the leading principles of classification, concerning direction, realm (form), precondition, and potential value, a number of secondary principles can be found. The root-conditioned consciousness of the sense-world (sahetuka kāmāvacara-citta), for instance, is again divided under the viewpoints of

(a) feeling (vedanā),
(b) knoweldge (ñāṇa),
(c) volition (saṅkhāra).

(a) Feeling is either agreeable (somanassa, sukha) or disagreeable (domanassa, dukkha) or none of both, i.e. neutral (upekkhā).

(b) A state of consciousness is either connected with knowledge (ñāṇa-sampayutta) concerning the nature of its object and the consequences of its acceptance or its rejection, or consciousness is not connected with knowledge (ñāṇa-vippayutta), or it is directly bound up with erroneous views (diṭṭhi).

(c) Furthermore consciousness is either volitional (sasaṅkhārika) or automatic (asaṅkhārika). Saṅkhāra, which is rendered here with volition, must not be confused with saṅkhārakkhandha, the aggregate of saṅkhāra.

If we take, for instance, the first subsection of the kāmaloka-consciousness, namely, that which is conditioned by unwholesome root-causes (akusala-hetū), we can divide it from the standpoint of root-causes into three groups:

(a) one group conditioned by greed (lobha-sahagata).
(b) one conditioned by hatred or aversion (paṭigha-sahagata), and
(c) one rooted in delusion (momūha).

(a) Under group (a) unpleasant feelings cannot exist, because they would neutralize greed, respectively, greed would not be able to manifest itself in their presence. In this way we obtain in the greed-conditioned consciousness under the points of view of feeling, knowledge, and volition the following classes:

	Feeling	Knowledge	Volition
1	joyful	erroneous	automatic consciousness
2			volitional consciousness
3		non-erroneous (but not 'knowing')	automatic consciousness
4			volitional consciousness
5	indifferent	erroneous	automatic consciousness
6			volitional consciousness
7		non-erroneous	automatic consciousness
8			volitional consciousness

(b) In the consciousness which is conditioned by aversion, naturally, neither joyful nor indifferent feelings can arise, nor is the discrimination 'erroneous' or 'non-erroneous' applicable to it or determinative for its character. There are, therefore, only:

9 Sorrowful, aversive, automatic consciousness;

10 Sorrowful, aversive, volitional consciousness.

(c) Consciousness which is rooted in delusion is a state of doubt (vicikicchā) and restlessness (uddhacca) and can therefore neither be defined under the point of view of volition nor in positive (or negative) terms of feeling, because there is no decision towards either side, i.e. indifference. Thus we get the following two classes:

11 Indifferent consciousness, connected with doubt.

12 Indifferent consciousness, connected with restlessness.

Much more regular is the classification of the wholesome (kusala) types of the root-conditioned consciousness of the sense-world, in which suffering cannot appear any more on account of the favourable preconditions (kusala-hetū):

	Feeling	Knowledge	Volition
1	joyful	connected with knowledge	automatic
2			volitional
3		disconnected from knowledge	automatic
4			volitional
5	indifferent	connected with knowledge	automatic
6			volitional
7		disconnected from knowledge	automatic
8			volitional

9–16: the same in the karmically reactive and
17–24: in the karmically non-active consciousness.

Those classes which are not connected with knowledge are conditioned by the absence of greed and hatred (alobha and adosa), those which are connected with knowledge are conditioned by all the three wholesome root-causes (alobha, adosa, amoha).

Between these two opposite groups of root-conditioned consciousness mediate the eighteen classes without root-causes (ahetuka-cittāni). The first seven classes of them are the reaction of former unwholesome states of consciousness (akusala vipāka), namely consciousness by way of (1) seeing, (2) hearing, (3) smell, (4) taste, or (5) touch (cakkhu-sota-ghāna-jivhā-kāya-viññāṇa) as well as (6) the receiving (sampaṭicchana) and (7) investigating (santīraṇa) states of mind. All these classes are hedonically indifferent with the exception of body consciousness (touch) which is accompanied by pain (dukkha). The following eight classes (8–15) which are the reaction of former wholesome states of mind, are the same as the preceding ones with the exception that the body-consciousness is accompanied by joy (sukha) and that there are two classes of investigating consciousness of which one is accompanied by joy. Finally there are three karmically inactive classes, namely (16) consciousness which just turns towards one of the five sense-impressions,[1] (17) consciousness which turns towards a mental impression[2] and (18) the joyful consciousness of the genesis of aesthetic pleasure.[3] The previous two classes are hedonically neutral, because in them the mind is merely aware of an impression approaching either through the 'five doors' (pañca-dvāra) of the senses or through the 'mind door' (mano-dvāra), without being able to define the nature of the impression. It is the moment before the formation of a concept or a representation. The stimulus which enters through the 'mind-door' may be either the remembrance of a former sense-impression or of former representations or reflections.

The consciousness of the genesis of aesthetic pleasure is accompanied by joy and free from evil root-causes and karma-creating effects because, as Bhikkhu Sīlācāra once said: 'in the contemplation of the beautiful, if it is really pure, there are no selfish motives and man is completely free from the 'ego'. The complete absence of the 'ego', if maintained, is nibbāna. And the man who is enabled temporarily to be freed from the 'ego' in the contemplation of the beautiful, has thus temporarily experienced nibbāna in a way which might lead him finally to the complete, real, perfect nibbāna. Therefore I maintain that beauty will help many to find nibbāna.'

The concept of the beautiful (subha, sobhaṇa) in Buddhism is closely related to the idea of purity and of the Good, similar to Plato's teaching of the identity of the Good, the Beautiful, and the True in

[1] Pañcadvārāvajjana [2] manodvārāvajjana [3] hasituppāda

their highest aspects. It hardly needs to be said that in Buddhism, too, the Good is not to be separated from the True, i.e. from that which is in accordance with the laws of Reality (the Dhamma in the highest sense). Therefore the twenty-nine above-mentioned classes of consciousness, conditioned by wholesome root-causes, as well as those of th erealm of Pure Form, of Non-Form and of supramundane consciousness are called 'beautiful states of mind' (sobhaṇa-cittāni).

Among the classes of reactive consciousness without root-causes (vipāka-ahetuka-cittāni) we mentioned eight hedonically neutral classes of 'sense-consciousness' arising by way of sight, hearing, smell, or taste, while the consciousness arising by bodily contact under the same circumstances is not hedonically neutral but results in a definite feeling of either pain or pleasure. The reason for this distinction has its origin in the Buddhist theory of the properties and functions of matter and the sensitive material qualities (pasāda-rūpa) of sense-organs (vatthu).

The four essential qualities of matter (mahābhūta) or, more correctly, the four elementary qualities which give rise to the experience or concept of matter, are:

(1) the solid state of aggregation or the principle of three-dimensional extension (negatively expressed: resistance or inertia), symbolized by the concept 'earth' (paṭhavī);

(2) the fluid state of aggregation or the elementary principle of cohesion, symbolized by the concept 'water' (āpo);

(3) the heating state of aggregation or the elementary principle of radiation, symbolized by the concept 'fire' (tejo);

(4) the gaseous state of aggregation, or the elementary principle of vibration (oscillation), namely motion, symbolized by the concept 'air' (pressure) (vāyo).

From these four essential qualities of matter ten secondary material qualities are derived, namely those of (1) sense-organs, (2) sense-objects, (3) sex, (4) basis (heart), (5) vital force, (6) nutrition, (7) limitation (space), (8) intimation (by speech or body), (9) plasticity, and (10) integration and disintegration.

For the solution of our present question we need not go into the details of these secondary qualities, with the exception of the first two groups. The first of them refers to the sensitive material qualities (pasāda-rūpa) of the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the body. The second group contains the visible object, as well as sound, odour, sapids, and the tangible object. Only the latter contains the essential qualities of matter with the exception of the element of cohesion (āpo-dhātu). Shwe Zan Aung remarks in connexion with this theory:

'Particles of matter are held together by āpo (cohesion), which cannot be felt by the sense of touch – e.g. when one puts one's hand into cold water, the softness of water felt is not āpo but paṭhavī; the cold felt is not āpo but tejo; the pressure felt is not āpo but vāyo. Hence Buddhists take only the three essentials or primaries to constitute the tangible. From this one can easily see that Buddhists are not dealing with Thales' water, Anaximenes' air, Heracleitus' fire, or the Peripatetics' matter of Greek philosophy.' (*Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 155, n. 6.)

While thus, in the impact between the sensitive qualities of the body and the tangible objects, one or more essential qualities of matter are involved, in the contact between the material qualities (pasāda-rūpa) of the other four sense-organs and their objects only secondary material qualities are present which are not strong enough to produce physical pain or pleasure. Buddhaghosa compares these secondary material qualities of sense-objects and the corresponding organs of perception with cotton-wool, the primary qualities of the perceiving body with an anvil, an object, possessing the essential (primary) qualities of matter, with a hammer. Just as the impact between cotton-wool and cotton-wool on an anvil has no effect upon the latter, whereas a blow of the hammer upon the cotton-wool will affect the anvil below as well, so the primary material qualities of a tangible object are communicated through the sensitive nerve-cells (pasāda-rūpa), the organs of touch, to the primary material qualities of the body – while the stimuli of the other four sense-objects cannot produce such an effect on account of the absence of those three qualities.

We are now in a position to survey the whole classification of consciousness:

I. In the realm of sensuous form (kāmāvacara) there are:

A.	12	classes	conditioned by unwholesome root-causes (akusala-hetu).
B.	18	,,	without root-causes (ahetuka).
C.	24	,,	conditioned by wholesome root-causes (kusala-hetu).
	—		
Sum:	54		sense-consciousness (kāmāvacara-cittāni).

The five stages in the consciousness of Pure Form (rūpāvacara), if seen from the standpoint of their potential value, are either karmically active, i.e. wholesome (kusala), or the result of previous kamma, i.e. reactive (vipāka), or karmically inactive, i.e. exhausting themselves in their own present functions (kriyā). Thus the consciousness of Pure Form is divided into 15 classes.

Similarly the four stages in the consciousness of Non-Form are increased to 12 classes (4 kusala + 4 vipāka + 4 kriyā). If these 27 classes of higher consciousness are added to the 54 classes of sense- (kāmāvacara) consciousness we get 81 classes of undirected or mundane consciousness (lokiya-cittāni).

Corresponding to the four pairs of men whose minds are directed towards the Aim, eight classes of supramundane or directed consciousness can be distinguished. As we have mentioned already, this consciousness can move in all classes of consciousness, except those which are conditioned by unwholesome root-causes. Thus each of these eight supramundane classes is able to appear in any of the five stages of absorption (jhāna). Therefore the supramundane consciousness can also be represented by 40 classes (5 × 8) so that the complete number of conscious states known to Buddhist psychology is increased from 89 (81 lokiya + 8 lokuttara-cittāni) to 121 (81 + 40).

4. THE FOUR TYPES OF 'HIGHER MAN' AND THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING

THE four types of individuals, directed towards the Aim, or, as the Canon calls them, 'noble individuals' (ariya-puggalā), are:

(1) 'he who has entered the stream' (sotāpanna),
(2) the 'once-returner' (sakadāgāmi),
(3) the 'non-returner' (anāgāmi),
(4) the 'Holy One' (arahā), who has realized the Aim.

A definition of these four types is found in the fourth book of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka (*Puggala-Paññatti* 48–50):

'He who is just on the way to get rid of the three fetters, to realize the aim of the "stream-entrance", or he who has overcome the three fetters: such a man is called "one who has entered the stream" (sotāpanna).

'He who is just on the way to reduce utterly sensual desire and anger and to realize the aim of "once-returning", or in whom sensual desire and anger are utterly reduced: such a man is called "once-returner" (sakadāgāmi).

'He who is just on the way to get rid completely of sensual desire and anger, and to realize the aim of "never-returning", or he who has completely overcome sensual desire and anger; such a man is called "non-returner" (anāgāmi).

'He who is just on the way completely to get rid of the craving for the world of Pure Form, of the craving for the world of Non-Form, of pride, restlessness and ignorance, and to realize the aim of perfect holiness, or he who has completely overcome the craving for the world of Pure Form or of Non-Form as well as pride, restlessness, and ignorance: such a man is called a "Holy One" (arahā).'

Of the ten fetters (saṃyojanāni) by which the ordinary human being (puthujjana) is bound to the world, of these the 'stream-enterer' has overcome the first three:

(1) sakkāyadiṭṭhi: the belief in a permanent personality;
(2) vicikicchā: doubt (or scepticism);
(3) sīlabbataparāmāsa: clinging to rules and rituals.

The remaining seven fetters, which are overcome, as we have seen, on the path to holiness, are:

(4) kāmarāga: sensual desire;
(5) paṭigha: aversion (anger);
(6) rūparāga: craving for existence in the world of Pure Form;
(7) arūparāga: craving for existence in the world of Non-Form;
(8) māna: pride;
(9) uddhacca: restlessness;
(10) avijjā: ignorance, delusion.

The first five are called the lower fetters (oram-bhāgiyāni saṃyojanāni(because they still bind the striving one to the sensuous world. The five higher fetters (uddhambhāgiyāni) are only overcome by the Arahā. Here is a short summary:

ARIYA-PUGGALĀ	SAṂYOJANĀNI
I. sotāpanna	1–3
II. sakadāgāmi	1–3; 4 and 5 partly
III. anāgāmi	1–5
IV. arahā	1–10

Even the undirected, worldly mind can become free from one or more fetters, but on account of its being dependent on uncontrolled motives and external influences, in short, on account of mental restlessness and lacking orientation this partial freedom from fetters is only temporary. In the directed consciousness, on the other hand, a relapse is impossible (aparihānadhamma), because a relapse would mean a change of direction. Here again we see, why the supramundane consciousness can be defined as 'directed': constant progress is the common feature of all its stages. The terms 'Once-Returner' and 'Non-Returner' mean that the former one returns into this world, i.e. to human existence, only once before attaining the goal of final liberation (nibbāna), while the latter one, as explained in the Puggala-Paññatti, after having destroyed the five lower fetters, reappears among the mind-born beings in order to attain nibbāna from there, without returning into this world.

In the Dīgha-Nikāya Commentary (Mahāparinibbānasutta) the Sakadāgāmi is described as one 'in whom greed, hatred, and delusion do not arise frequently as in worldly people, but only now and then. And if they arise, they do not arise violently and strong as in worldly people: only very thin, like scales, they arise.' (Quoted by Nyāṇatiloka in his German version of *Puggala-Paññatti.*)

In the consciousness of the four types of 'noble individuals' (ariya-puggalā) active and reactive classes can be discerned, which in this case are called Path-(magga) and Fruit-(phala) consciousness:

1	sotāpatti-magga-citta and	5	sotāpatti-phala-citta
2	sakadāgāmi " " "	6	sakadāgāmi " "
3	anāgāmi " " "	7	anāgāmi " "
4	arahatta " " "	8	arahatta " "

That is: (1) the consciousness of one who is entering the stream and (5) one who enjoys the fruit of 'stream-entrance', etc. The left group is related to the right one like cause to effect. Inactive classes, naturally, cannot be found in the *directed* mind, because direction implies movement, either in form of action or reaction. Similarly grief and pain (domanassa-dukkha) cannot find entrance into these classes of consciousness, because in them only the three wholesome root-causes are present.

'But,' it may be objected, 'how was it possible that the Buddha, shortly before his Parinibbāna, was subject to suffering?' At this point there is this to be said, that even the highest types of the human mind are not always and exclusively bound to the one type of consciousness corresponding to their nature, but that they may be subject temporarily to the after-effects of lower states of consciousness, especially so in the domain of the corporeal, for the body by its nature is just materialized karma, the consciousness of past moments of existence made visible. Karma is nothing else but the acting principle of consciousness which, as effect (vipāka), also steps into visible appearance. The appearing form is thus essentially 'past' and, therefore, for him who has mentally developed out of and beyond it, is felt as something alien. The whole misunderstanding of the matter, the dualistic mode of envisaging body and soul, mind and matter, and so on, is based upon this feeling, and precisely on this account, is proclaimed in the leading ranks of mentally elevated men. For as regards the masses of men (even if they agree with the letter of this proclamation, so far as its wording goes) whose consciousness has not yet grown beyond that of the visible *form*, the body with equal right is to be called the present, in so far as it corresponds to the present mental state. With the karma of the saint who still remains bound to corporeal form, it is as with a heavy pendulum which after the ceasing of the original impulse, still continues to swing for a long time. The longer and the heavier the pendulum, all the slower is the swinging. The shorter and the lighter the pendulum, all the quicker the swinging. Matter corresponds to the heavy pendulum with slower, more persisting swinging; the mental, to the light pendulum with quicker and correspondingly less lasting swinging. The Buddha himself said once that with more justification one might look upon the body as persisting (in the sense of a constant ego (attā)) than upon the mind. The former holds out for at least some years of time,

while the consciousness does not remain the same for even two consecutive moments. Thus does it come about that the body is not in a position to follow so quickly the changes of the mind. It adapts itself only slowly and within certain well-defined limits which depend upon the conditions of organic growth and the laws of elementary vibration in the construction of matter.

This hybrid position of the body as a product of a long past consciousness and the basis of a present one, finds expression also in the fact that a part of its functions are conscious and subject to the will, as, for example, the movements of our limbs, while another part runs its course unconsciously, or at least subconsciously (subliminal), and is not subject to the will, that is, to the present, as, for example, the circulation of the blood, digestion, internal secretions, the integration and disintegration of cells, and the like. Breathing holds a middle place which out of an unconscious, can be raised to a conscious, function, and can proceed just as well by deliberate volition as automatically. Thus it is breathing that combines the present with the past, the mental with the corporeal, the consciousness with the unconscious. It is the mediator, the point of departure from which we lay hold of what has become and what is becoming, and can become master of the past and the future; it is therefore the starting point of creative meditation.

Still, in most cases, a last unresolved remainder will be left over, for even if the mind has already come to a state of peace and harmony, that is, if the karmic after-effects are equilibrated, or, removed through a change of attitude, the karma that is bound in corporeal form may still for a long time go on vibrating before complete harmonizing within the same (in form or corporeal perfection, as far as this is possible), or complete emancipation takes place. To the saint it is naturally given to withdraw himself from bodily pains with the aid of concentration; but, generally speaking, so long as the body exists, so long exists also the possibility of the sensation of pain, not so much on account of organic disturbances (illnesses) which hardly come into consideration – for mental well-being (saintliness)signifies also bodily well-being (health) – as rather on the ground of external influences, such as, in the case of the Buddha, was the partaking of unwholesome food, or in the case of Aṅgulimāla, wounding through stone-throwing and the like. That, however, here also the external influence, the apparently external happening, does not dispense with the inner, fate-like connexion, is clearly evident from the story of Aṅgulimāla. The robber (converted by the Buddha) who, in consequence of the knowledge that suddenly dawned within him, had become a saint, one day on his round for alms of food is recog-

nized by the crowd and ill-treated so that he comes to the Buddha, all streaming with blood.

The Exalted One points out to him that it is the consequences of his own deeds (kammavipāka) that he is enduring, and encourages him to bear it patiently and quietly, so as to become free from the last bonds of karma.[1] (*Majjhima-Nikāya* 86.)

Also in the Milinda-Pañha the question is raised if the saint can still experience pain:

'Venerable Nāgasena, may one who is no more to be reborn (i.e. an arahā or perfect saint), still experience any kind of painful feeling?'

'One kind of painful feeling he may well experience, but another kind not.'

'Which are these?'

'Bodily feeling of pain, O Mahārāja, he may well still experience; but no longer mental feeling of pain.'

'How so, O Lord?'

'Since the ground and the condition for the arising of feelings of bodily pain are not yet removed (for the arising of bodily pain is dependent upon the body, not upon the will), therefore he may yet experience the feeling of bodily pain. Since, however, the ground and condition for the arising of the feeling of mental pain are removed, therefore he can no longer experience the feeling of mental pain.' (*Milinda-Pañha II.* 2.)

On this Bhikkhu Nyāṇatiloka remarks in his German translation of the Milinda-Pañha: 'The arising of mental pains is conditioned by the constitution of the will of the individual. The mental feeling of pain (sorrow, grief, misery, melancholy, and despair) is always bound up with an impulsion of self-opposition, of resistance, ill-will or hatred (dosa, paṭigha, vyāpāda) and is therefore in Buddhism looked upon as immoral. How then can one call Buddhism a pessimistic doctrine when already every *mental gloomy mood* is rejected as immoral, and one of the main meditations is that of universal *joy* (muditābhāvanā)?'

[1] The Sanskrit term 'karma' has been incorporated in nearly all modern languages. I, therefore, use it instead of the less known Pāli-equivalent 'kamma'.

FIFTH PART

THE FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

' "I am" is a vain thought; "I am not" is a vain thought; "I shall be" is a vain thought; "I shall not be" is a vain thought. Vain thoughts are a sickness, an ulcer, a thorn. But after overcoming all vain thoughts one is called a silent thinker. And the thinker, the Silent One, does no more arise, no more pass away, no more tremble, no more desire.'

(*Majjhima-Nikāya* 140; *Transl. by Mahāthera Nyāṇatiloka.*

THE FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. *The Primary or Constant-Neutral Factors*

THE 121 classes of consciousness have provided us with a complete system of co-ordination into which all the further details of Buddhist psychology can be entered and by which every phenomenon of consciousness can be located. The classification is like a steel-skeleton of a building into which the various materials are to be filled, each at its place according to its nature.

The chief material of our mental building are the fifty-two cetasikas or *factors* of consciousness. They are divided from the same point of view as the root-causes' (hetu) into three groups: wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral factors. The first two groups contain those properties of the mind or the character which are conditioned by wholesome or unwholesome root-causes. The third group, however, is morally neutral and can combine with either of the before-mentioned groups, for which reason it is called aññasamānā 'the one or the other', because its factors produce wholesome or unwholesome states according to their combination with other factors. Though these neutral factors of consciousness (cetasika) cannot decide the direction of the human mind, they are as important as the other factors. They even contain those elements which are the sine qua non of consciousness and which therefore are present in every state of mind. These elements form the group of *constant* or *primary factors* (sabba-citta-sādhāraṇā) while the remaining ones constitute the group of *secondary neutral factors* (pakiṇṇakā) which are not constantly present in consciousness.

The constant or primary neutral factors are:

(1) phassa: mental contact (or sense-impression),
(2) vedanā: feeling,
(3) saññā: perception,
(4) cetanā: volition,
(5) ekaggatā: one-pointedness,
(6) jīvitindriya: psychic vitality,
(7) manasikāra: spontaneous attention.

If these factors are not combined with any other factors, as for instance in the ten reactive classes of sense-consciousness without

root-causes (ahetuka-cittāni 1–5 and 8–12), they remain in a kind of embryonic state, while in combination with other neutral and moral factors, as for instance in the case of jhāna's, where one-pointedness (ekaggatā) is intensified to a high degree of concentration (samādhi), they may unfold all their latent forces.

Phassa is the mere awareness of the presence of an object, saññā its first recognition, as belonging to the one or the other sense-field. Cetanā is not the reaction of a clear perception or discrimination but of the root-conditioned feeling which accompanies that initial perception. Thus cetanā as a primary factor is not to be regarded as an expression of free will, but as an instinctive volition bound by previous causes (hetu: character) and, therefore, without a deciding ethical value. Ekaggatā may be called the limiting and manasikāra the directing principle among the primary factors, while cetanā is the motive force, the active principle behind them. Ekaggatā is the faculty which distinguishes one object from the other and prevents its dissolution and merging into other objects. I call manasikāra 'spontaneous' attention because it is not forced by will but rather aroused by the immanent qualities of the object itself which 'attracted' the attention (or the preliminary state of this faculty). Ekaggatā and manasikāra can be defined as the negative and the positive side of the same function: the former one eliminates (or turns away from) everything that does not belong to the object, the latter directs itself towards the object which has been isolated in this way. Jīvitindriya, psychic energy or vitality, is the basis and the uniting principle of the other six factors.

We have mentioned already the three aspects of *feeling* (vedanā), being positive, negative, or neutral, according to the sensation being accepted as agreeable, or rejected as disagreeable, or tolerated with indifference. If this division is related to sense-impressions only, it is called anubhāvāna or division according to physical sensibility, if it is related to psychic feelings or mental reactions too, like joy and sorrow, then it is called 'indriyabheda', or division according to regulative forces or directive principles, in so far as joy and sorrow (or grief) are of deciding ethical influence.

In this division upekkhā means the absence of emotions like joy and sorrow, i.e., mental indifference or, more positively, neither-joy-nor-sorrow-feeling.

Joy (somanassa) and sorrow (domanassa) are discerned from bodily feelings of (well-being) pleasure and pain by their capacity to 'move' our heart in the one or the other direction and to 'excite' our mind.

Where sukha and dukkha are found side by side with somanassa and domanassa, the character of the first-mentioned termini may be said to be related to bodily feelings, as we saw in the case of the ahetuka-cittāni, just as adukkhamasukha, as neither-pain-nor-pleasure-feeling, results from sense-impressions. Bodily contact, however, makes an exception here, as we have seen: it always reacts in a hedonically positive or negative way, thus never producing a state of hedonic indifference. Shwe Zan Aung (*Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 233) explains this in the following way:

'We speak of a luke-warm state between heat and cold in ordinary parlance, but not in scientific speech. In strict logic, as in point of fact, there is *no room for mental indifference* (*upekkhā*) in touch. Upekkhā is purely a *mental* feeling, according to our classification of vedanā, and is therefore subjective. Objective pleasure or pain may be *mentally* regarded as indifferent according to the degree of *physical* affection. – (*Vedanā covers only the hedonic aspect of feeling and emotion.*) I tabulate the different aspects of vedanā thus:

ANUBHĀVĀNA VEDANĀ INDRIYABHEDA

ANUBHĀVĀNA	VEDANĀ	INDRIYABHEDA
1 Dukkha	kāyika	1 Dukkha
	cetasika	2 Domanassa
2 Adukkhamd-asukha	cetasika	3 Upekkhā
3 Sukha	kāyika	4 Sukha
	cetasika	5 Somanassa.'

The meaning of dukkha and sukha, thus, depends on the respective classification, or on the context in which these expressions occur; and besides the purely hedonic meaning which from the psychological point of view stands in the foreground, they can also be used in the ethical sense as happiness and misery. But this does not mean that hedonic and ethical meaning exclude each other but rather that the hedonic and the ethical aspect include sensuous and mental feelings (of which the latter, again, can be understood in the ethical sense).

Finally we have to mention the spiritual aspect of upekkhā, namely, tatramajjhattatā, the perfect balance of mind which appears in connexion with the highest objects or states of consciousness and which, therefore, is to be distinguished from the negative state of hedonic indifference (which in fact may appear in one and the same class of consciousness).

Reaction	CLASSIFICATION OF FEELING		
	BODILY	MENTAL	SPIRITUAL
positive	bodily pleasure (kāyika sukha)	mental pleasure (cetasika sukha)	spiritual happiness (sukha)
		mental pleasure+excitement=joy (somanassa)	
negative	bodily pain (kāyika dukkha)	mental pain (cetasika dukkha)	spiritual suffering (dukkha)
		mental pain+excitement=grief (domanassa)	
neutral	neither pain nor pleasure (adukkhamasukha)	mental indifference (upekkhā)	spiritual equanimity (tatramajjhattatā)
	sometimes ethical h e d o n i c		ethical a h e d o n i c

2. *The Secondary Neutral Factors*

The *secondary neutral factors* are:

(1) vitakka: thinking in its initial state,
(2) vicāra: reflecting, or sustained thought,
(3) adhimokkha: decision,
(4) viriya: energy, effort,
(5) pīti: interest, pleasure, rapture (according to the degree of its intensity),
(6) chanda: the desire to act, the wish to accomplish, the will to realization.

We have already become acquainted with three of these factors in our analysis of the stages of absorption in the consciousness of Pure Form (rūpa-jhāna), in which thought (vitakka), sustained thought (vicāra) and interest or pleasure (pīti) are gradually eliminated. It is significant for the positive character of absorption that the most active factors of this group, namely decision (adhimokkha, effort (viriya), and will to realization (chanda) remain present in all the jhānas, in the rūpadhātu as well as in the arūpadhātu. The logical connexion between the factors of this group, from the first thought-impetus up to the 'desire to act', is obvious in its continuity. It hardly needs to be said, that if the impetus (in vitakka) is not strong enough, or if doubt cannot be overcome in the reflective state of thought (vicāra), decision (adhimokkha, which literally means 'liberation', namely liberation from doubt or uncertainty [adhi + muc; muñcati = to liberate]) cannot be attained and the process comes to a premature end. Otherwise adhimokkha is the source of energy (viriya) which – intensified by interest or pleasure (pīti), or in its highest degree by happiness (sukha) – leads to the will of realization (chanda).

Chanda, according to Shwe Zan Aung, has been explained by the Commentators as 'kattukamyatā' or 'desire to act'. According to the level of knowledge or insight, chanda either turns into kāmacchanda (a synonym of taṇhā), sensuous desire, or into dhammacchanda, the desire or rather striving for liberation. On the sensuous plane chanda mainly results in action, on the spiritual plane, as in the case of meditation it results in the progressive movement towards the aim. In both cases it is the will to *realize* the result of our mental activities. The protean nature of chanda is very similar to that of the word 'desire', though this term has lost its neutral character (in the moral sense) in the European translations of Buddhist literature, in which 'desire' has become an equivalent for taṇhā.

The following beautiful quotation from George Sand's *Lélia*, together with Mrs. Rhys-David's commentary, may elucidate the similarity between chanda and 'desire' in its wider and more original sense.

Prométhée, Prométhée, est-ce toi, toi, qui voulais affranchir l'homme des liens de la fatalité? . . . Les hommes t'ont donné mille noms symboliques: audace, désespoir, délire, rébellion, malédiction. Ceux-ci t'ont appelé, Satan, ceux-lá, crime; moi je t'appelle Désir! Vérité! Vérité! tu ne t'es pas révélée; depuis dix mille ans que je te cherche. . . . Depuis dix mille ans l'infini me répond: désir, désir!

'Now we cannot afford to impoverish our ethical (and aesthetical) concepts by squandering this term outright on taṇhā, and thereby, so to speak, making the devil a present of all desire – even of that dhammacchanda that drove Prometheus to fight Zeus, that drove the Buddha from home to the Bo-tree, that drove Christ to bring down heaven to earth. Much harm hereby has been wrought by translators, whose cheapening of the word "desire" has justified the superficial criticism which perennially speaks of Buddhist ethics as the "negation" or "extinction of all desire".' (*'Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 244 f.)

3. *The Morally Decisive Factors and their Mutual Relations*

The *unwholesome* factors of consciousness form five groups. The first three are characterized by one principal concept in each of them which conditions the subsequently enumerated factors. These leading concepts are the three unwholesome root-causes: moha, lobha, dosa. Delusion (moha) is followed by shamelessness (ahirika), unscrupulousness (anottappa), and restlessness (uddhacca).[1] A deluded man knows no shame because he is not able to see the unworthiness of this thoughts and deeds, and he is unscrupulous because he is unable to perceive the consequences of his actions. The subconscious insecurity and lack of balance which result from these states of mind lead to restlessness and distraction.

Greed (lobha) prevents an unbiassed judgment and leads to erroneous views (diṭṭhi) and self-conceit (māna); the latter is all the more dangerous as it is combined with a certain amount of knowledge which, on account of lobha, is directed towards the self-aggrandizement of the individual.

Hatred (dosa) is followed by envy (issā), egotism (macchariya) and worry (kukkucca).

[1] These four factors are present in all classes of unwholesome consciousness (sabbā-kusala-sādhāraṇā).

The fourth group, sloth (thīna) and torpor (middha), are not conditioned by any particular root-cause (hetu). They are the negative side of volition and can, therefore, only occur in those classes of consciousness which are designated as 'volitional'.

Doubt (vicikicchā), according to its inner nature, would belong to the first group, but it differs from its factors in so far as it does not appear in all classes of unwholesome consciousness but only in one. It is therefore classified separately.

The *wholesome* factors of consciousness are divided as follows:—

I. Those which are present in all classes of wholesome consciousness (sobhaṇa-sādhāraṇā), namely:

saddhā: faith, confidence,
sati: mindfulness,
hiri: shame,
ottappa: scrupulousness,
alobha: greedlessness, detachment, selflessness,
adosa: hatelessness, sympathy,
tatramajjhattatā: balance of mind, equanimity,
kāyapassaddhi: tranquillity of psychic elements,
cittapassaddhi: tranquillity of consciousness,
kāyalahutā: buoyancy of psychic elements,
cittalahutā: buoyancy of consciousness,
kāyamudutā: elasticity of psychic elements,
cittamudutā: elasticity of consciousness,
kāyakammaññatā: adaptability of psychic elements,
cittakammaññatā: adaptability of consciousness,
kāyapāguññatā: proficiency of psychic elements,
cittapāguññatā: proficiency of consciousness,
kāyujjukatā: rectitude of psychic elements,
cittujjukatā: rectitude of consciousness.

II. The three 'Abstinences' (viratiyo), namely: right speech, right action, right livelihood.

III. The two 'boundless states' or 'illimitables' (appamaññāyo), namely: compassion (karuṇā) and sympathetic joy (muditā), in other words, the faculty to share others' joy and sorrow.

IV. Paññindriya: reason, the directive principle of our mind.

The first nineteen of these factors, namely, those which are common to all classes of wholesome consciousness, represent the opposites of the unwholesome factors and are therefore arranged in a parallel way as far as possible. A complete parallelism, naturally, is only thinkable between mathematical units but not between psychological terms. A factor of one category may correspond to two or three factors of the other category.

Thus faith (saddhā) is not only opposed to doubt (vicikicchā) but also to delusion (moha). The balance of mind (tatramajjhattatā), the tranquillity of psychic elements and of consciousness (passaddhi) are equally opposed to worry and doubt (kukkucca + vicikicchā). Buoyancy (lahutā), elasticity (mudutā), adaptability (kammaññatā) and proficiency (pāguññatā) of psychic elements and of consciousness are equally in opposition to sloth and torpor (thīna-middha). The relations between the other factors are plain:

Insight or mindfulness (sati) eliminates delusion (moha), shame (hiri) eliminates shamelessness (ahirika), scrupulousness (ottappa) eliminates unscrupulousness (anottappa), selflessness (alobha) eliminates greed (lobha), sympathy (adosa) eliminates hatred (dosa). Rectitude (ujjukatā) of psychic elements (kāya) and of consciousness (citta) is opposed to doubt. The term kāya, naturally, does not mean 'body' in this connexion but it refers to nāmakāya, the group of psychic elements in contrast to rūpakāya, the bodily aggregates. As the latter are not under consideration here, the terms kāya and citta express the difference between the psychic elements or *factors* of consciousness and consciousness as such: or actual consciousness in contrast to its potential elements.

The three Abstinences, the two Boundless States, and reason (paññindriya) are of a more general nature. They are not opposed to any particular unwholesome factor but to the unwholesome consciousness in general. It may appear strange that 'right speech, right action, and right livelihood' are classified under the factors of consciousness. But the fact that it has been done, shows that these terms are not to be understood in the ordinary (external) sense, but rather as mental attitudes or as those psychic preconditions out of which right speech, right action, and right livelihood arise.

In the following group out of the four 'illimitables' – i.e. those factors which overcome the barriers of egohood and of limited objects: mettā (sympathy), karuṇā (compassion), muditā (sympathetic joy) and upekkhā (equanimity) – only karuṇā and muditā are present. The reason for it is that sympathy is already represented by adosa in the first group, while equanimity is represented by tatramajjhattatā in the same group.

It is significant that the 'Abstinences' and the 'Illimitables' are those factors which distinguish the so-called 'exalted' consciousness of the jhānas from the supramundane mind (lokuttara-c.). The rūpa- and arūpa-consciousness, as a mediator between mundane and supramundane states, is in a certain way a neutral type of consciousness: though it presupposes the absence of the fourteen unwholesome factors, it is not directed towards any definite aim. The

'Abstinences', however, mean a positive attitude already, which does not only aim at the avoidance of what has been understood as unwholesome (akusala), but which is bent on the realization of Buddhahood or Arahantship. This is the fundamental motive of supramundane consciousness, and consequently we find the Abstinences in all its classes.

The position of compassion (karuṇā) and sympathetic joy (muditā) is just the contrary. Though these two factors appear in the first four classes of the consciousness of Pure Form, they are not present in the supramundane jhānas, because compassion and sympathetic joy have still (mundane) objects, while the supramundane consciousness is solely bent upon the ultimate aim, nibbāna. Also the fifth jhāna, and with it the four arūpa-jhānas, which are free from emotional and concrete objects, can, therefore, not be connected with karuṇā and muditā.


The last of the fifty-two factors of wholesome consciousness is paññindriya, which we have rendered with 'reason'. It appears in *all* realms of consciousness and has therefore to adapt itself to the particular level of consciousness corresponding to the class with which it is connected. Similar to the will to realization (chanda) which, according to circumstances, manifests itself either as kāmacchanda or as dhammacchanda, so paññā can be understanding, correct perception, knowledge (in a limited sense), or profound insight, wisdom, enlightenment. In the sense-world consciousness it may be concerned, for instance, with the understanding of the consequences of momentary actions, recognizing them in this way as wholesome (kusala) or unwholesome (akusala), while in the supramundane mind paññā is concerned with the knowledge of the ultimate things, namely with that knowledge which at the same time means liberation and fulfilment. Thus paññindriya is the principle by virtue of which mental and spiritual development becomes possible, just as jīvitindriya represents the principle by virtue of which our vital forces unfold themselves: both are the regulating principles (indriya) of important energies.

The following table will show the fifty-two factors of consciousness in their logical arrangement and their mutual relations. Factors, which by their nature are opposed to each other and which consequently tend to eliminate each other, have been connected by straight lines. The left side shows how the factors, which are characteristic for the first stage of absorption (jhāna), exclude the 'five hindrances' which are enumerated (as 7 factors) under the unwholesome group of cetasikas. The right side shows the parallelism between the unwholesome (akusala) factors and those which are

common to all classes of wholesome or 'beautiful' consciousness (sobhaṇa-sādhāraṇā). With the help of this table we are not only able to see how one factor excludes the other, but also how, by the elimination of one factor, another factor (or several of them) may arise in its place. For instance thinking (vitakka) eliminates sloth and torpor (thīna-middha) and makes in this way room for buoyancy of psychic elements and of consciousness (kāyalahutā, cittalahutā), k + c.-mudutā, k + c. – kammaññatā, and k + c. – pāguññatā, or to take a simpler case: rapture (pīti) overcomes hatred (dosa) and creates in its place a sympathetic disposition of mind (adosa), etc.

The numbers show the traditional order of sequence.

THE FIFTY-TWO FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS (CETASIKĀ)



Note :—Terms connected by straight lines are opposed to each other and, as a rule, mutually exclusive.

SIXTH PART

THE FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PROCESS OF PERCEPTION

'Strictly speaking, the duration of the life of a living being is exceedingly brief, lasting only while a thought lasts. Just as a chariot-wheel in rolling rolls only at one point of the tyre and in resting rests only at one point; exactly in the same way, the life of a living being lasts only for the period of one thought. As soon as that thought has ceased the being is said to have ceased. As it has been said: "The being of a past moment of thought has lived, but does not live, nor will it live. The being of a future moment of thought will live, but has not lived, nor does it live. The being of the present moment of thought does live, but has not lived, nor will it live."'

(Visuddhi-Magga VIII; transl. by H. C. Warren.)

THE FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE PROCESS OF PERCEPTION

1. *The Dynamic Nature of Consciousness and the Theory of Vibration*

According to the knowledge of the transitory character of all phenomena of life that is represented internally in the fleeting processes of consciousness, externally in the slow but continuous change of the body, the Buddhist compares existence to a river, having its source in birth and its mouth in death. Since birth and death are merely communicating doors from one life to another, the stream of causally connected processes of existence – that is, continuous processes of consciousness (in which alone existence is represented) – is the medium uniting the different lives of an individual (as well as the different moments and phases within one life).

In fact every moment is the transition to a new form of life, since in every moment something becomes past and dies, while something new appears or is born. The expression for birth, respectively rebirth, is *paṭisandhi*, which literally means 'reunion', and, in this case, is not to be understood in the physiological but in the psychological sense. The term for death is *cuti*, literally, 'falling', decay.

Also, in the following respect, the simile of the river, concerning the stream of consciousness, holds good: both appear constant as a whole, though their elements are ever changing. The river, which I saw yesterday, is not the same river I see today, because not a single drop of yesterday's water has remained in the same place. Also, the river is a different one at its source, in its middle, and at its mouth. Thus there is identity neither in its spatial appearance, nor in its duration in time. Nevertheless, there can be no question about the river's existence, and doubtless one can speak of its reality in a certain sense. But this is not objective in a material sense. It is the *relations* of material, temporal, and spatial kind, existing among the changing components, that form the constant element. In the same way, the constancy of relations in the ever renewing process of becoming conscious (*being* conscious does not exist in reality, but is only a constant *becoming*-conscious), creates the illusion of an 'ego-entity' or an unchangeable personality.

Schopenhauer uses the fact, that we are able to perceive the transitoriness of things, as an argument for the eternity of the inner

being – just as one is aware of the movement of a boat only in relation to the non-moving shore. The Buddhist's interpretation is exactly the contrary. If the subject be self-same, it should always regard an admittedly changing object as different at different times, but never as the same for two consecutive moments. But the fact that we can regard a changing object as identical at different times, even after a lapse of a long interval, shows to the Buddhist that the subject cannot possibly remain the identical self for any two consecutive moments throughout that interval. (Shwe Zan Aung: *Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 11.) The relation between subject and object is that of two moving systems: if their movement is exactly of the same kind, it creates the impression of non-movement; if their movement is of different kinds, that system which is the object of perception appears to move, while the system of the perceiving subject seems to be stationary. Man generally makes the external world the object of his observations, and the more he becomes aware of the transitoriness of the world, the more he believes himself to be constant. If he would make *himself* the object of his analysis, soon the opportunity would arise to see his own impermanence. This does not contradict the possibility of resting within oneself. Let us return to the simile of the river – where do we observe the greatest motion of the water? Most probably along the banks, because they do not visibly change, while the middle of the river is the quietest part which – if one does not bring the banks into observation – seems to be quite immovable, provided the stream is disturbed neither by tributary rivers, nor by any internal or external hindrances. That which is moved cannot distinguish its own movements, except in relationship to something else. In the very same way we are only able to find tranquillity within ourselves, if we do not regard the external world and its effects. But as soon as an inner resistance manifests itself, or this tranquillity is disturbed by external influences (sense impressions), the quiet stream is cut off – its continuity is interrupted – and the balanced motion is transformed into a greater or smaller vibration according to the intensity of the resistance – a vibration which becomes conscious in the form of arising perceptions, thoughts and representations.

Consciousness, as we have mentioned already, can be defined as a phenomenon of resistance – an obstruction of the stream of being, comparable to the arising of heat and light as phenomena of resistance of the electric current. We can go even farther, and maintain that every kind of action is a phenomenon of resistance. Only the *resistance* of the boiler makes steam an effective power. Because 'power as such' is just as impossible as 'resistance as such'. Resistance

is inertia in relationship to a moving power. Thus consciousness proves to be the resultant of two components – namely, movement and inertia. Figuratively expressed, this resultant appears as vibration, or rhythmic movement; probably the most profound symbol of activity. If vibration is strong enough, the stream of being is interrupted, because its movement is turned into another direction and stopped by the vibration. The longer the vibration continues the more intensive is consciousness. From these presuppositions we might be able to explain the desire for duration in conscious beings – particularly the idea of the persisting self in man. Because consciousness itself, as a phenomenon of resistance, is a constantly renewed effort to persist, and in this respect, in every phase identical with the previous ones. Hence the experience 'I am I'. One could define furthermore: if consciousness is a phenomenon of resistance it must appear the most intensive in those forms of existence which are exposed to the greatest obstacles.

As far as our observations reach, nature proves this theory; the plant is more conscious than the mineral, the animal more conscious than the plant, and man more conscious than the animal. And if we like to accept the Buddhist version of the conditions of celestial, that is happier, beings, we reach the conclusion, which is in exact accordance with the thoughts here outlined, that the beings of higher planes, whose existence is exposed to much less resistance and whose state of being is accordingly of much longer duration, possess correspondingly a less differentiated (and therefore less 'I' – emphasized), consciousness.

Differently defined (and only as an outline of the idea, which I express with due reserve): the more persisting the form, the less intense the consciousness (the inner moment of persevering inertia). The more changing, the more moving, the more oscillating the form, the stronger is the inner principle of persistency (in thinking beings the 'I-consciousness'). Consciousness is a phenomenon of equalization, or the faculty of persistency, transformed into the inner being. Material form is the faculty of persistency which has become both visible and external. In other words, it is a visible form of consciousness.

Therefore, he who strives for self-maintenance remains in the extreme, the unreal; he who strives for annihilation tries to escape reality through another extreme. Reality is the continual oscillation between movement (non-being) and stability (being), the synthesis of both principles represented in the process of becoming, according to inherent laws. This process, expressed in the terms of individual existence, is characterized by the three above-mentioned phases:

birth (paṭisandhi), being (bhavaṅga), death (cuti). The most prominent of them is bhavaṅga. In Sumaṅgala's 'Abhidhammattha-Vibhāvani', a medieval Ceylonese commentary, bhavaṅga is explained as 'cause, reason, indispensable condition of our being regarded subjectively as continuous: the "sine qua non" of our existence, that without which one cannot subsist or exist.' (p. 104) – Ledi Sadaw defines bhavaṅga as 'the function of being, by reason of which the passive side of existence (uppatti-bhava) continuously exists so long as the janakakamma (reproductive karma) of the past, which caused that existence, lasts.' (*Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 266.) This is the general aspect of bhavaṅga; but it can also mean a functional state of the subperipheric consciousness, which occurs when an external object through the 'five doors' of the senses (pañca-dvāra) or an internal object through the mind (mano-dvāra) enters the stream of being (bhavaṅga-sota) and sets it into vibration (bhavaṅga-calana). As soon as the vibration has reached its climax, the stream, which runs below the limit of the actual or peripherical consciousness, is interrupted (bhavaṅguppaccheda) and now being dammed up, rises above its former limitations, changing from a potential state into a state of activity. In other words the stream (sota) has ceased to flow, is 'cut off' (uppaccheda), and just as we cannot speak of a 'stream' (if that of which it is composed no longer flows), so we cannot speak of bhavaṅga-sota if the continuity of its movement is interrupted by vibration, though it is the same energy which is transformed from the one type of movement into another – as a horizontally moving force stopped by an obstacle, may be converted into a vertical movement.

2. *The Functions of Consciousness and the Problem of Matter*

With the interruption of the stream of being (bhavaṅga-sota) eleven functions are liable to come into activity:

(1)	āvajjana:	to become aware,
(2)	dassana:	seeing,
(3)	savana:	hearing,
(4)	ghāyana:	smelling,
(5)	sāyana:	tasting,
(6)	phusana:	touching,
(7)	sampaṭicchana:	receiving,
(8)	santīraṇa:	investigating,
(9)	voṭṭhappana:	determining,
(10)	javana:	full cognition, apperception,
(11)	tadārammaṇa:	identifying, registering, retention.

Together with the three subperipherical functions (paṭisandhi, bhavaṅga, cuti) their number increases to fourteen. If we regard them under the point of view of the state (ṭhāna) of consciousness, we get ten, because the five sense-perceptions are only modifications of the same kind of consciousness, which as such can be represented by one class within the same process of perception.

The unit of measure for the duration of those states of consciousness is the 'thought moment' (cittakkhaṇa) which, the commentators say, lasts less than a billionth part of the time necessary for an eye wink or a flash.

But even in this inconceivably minute fraction of time, one still discerns three stages, similar to the three main phases of individual existence: arising (uppāda), the fully developed, or stage of relative permanence (ṭhiti), and the dissolution (bhaṅga). Just as one takes the atom to be the smallest indivisible unit of material, just so is the khaṇa the ultimate time-unit.

Seventeen thought moments (cittakkhaṇa) [each of them containing three simple khaṇas] form the longest process of consciousness, as effected by sense perceptions, and in accordance with this theory, seventeen thought moments are accepted as the duration of material phenomena, in Buddhist Philosophy.

This is of great interest in so far as the connexion between the physical and the psychical – the fundamental unity of mental and material law – is proclaimed herewith. Therefore it follows that the material, also, becomes only a special case of psychic experience and accordingly, is admitted to the group of the elements of consciousness. Even there, where the Buddhist speaks about the material or bodily form (rūpa-dhamma) this cannot be understood in the sense of an essential contrast to the physical – still less, as the concept of substance is foreign to his vision of the world – but much more in the sense of an internal and external phenomenon of the same process, which is of interest to him only in so far as it relates to the realm of immediate experience, and touches upon the living individual and its consciousness. In consequence of this psychological attitude, the Buddhist does not inquire into the essence of matter, but only into the essence of the sense-perceptions and experiences which create in us the representation or the idea of matter.

'The question regarding the essence of the so-called external phenomena is not decided beforehand; the possibility remains that the sensuous (rūpa) and the mental, though correlatives, cannot be dissolved into each other, but may have nevertheless, the same source. In any case, the Old Scholastics also took the external world, according to the theory of karma, to be a constituent of personality'

(Rosenberg). In this way Buddhism escapes the dilemma of dualism, according to which mind and matter remain accidentally combined units, the relationship of which has to be specially motivated. Only from this standpoint is it conceivable that among the eleven qualities or principles of form (rūpa), material as well as immaterial elements are enumerated, as we have seen in the third chapter of Part Four (p. 104 f.). In this respect we must agree with Rosenberg when he emphasizes that the Dharma categories are correlatives which complement each other, that is, together forming the consciousness and its contents.

'The Rūpa-Dharma are not to be separated from the other Dharma categories, the consciousness, the emotions, etc. But they arise and disappear, momentarily, as the others, and enter as independent correlatives into the forms of impermanent combinations from which the stream of consciousness is composed.'

3. *The Process of Perception*

As an example of the process of perception, on account of a visible object, the Buddhist tradition uses the following simile, popularized by Buddhaghosa:

'A certain man with his head covered went to sleep at the foot of a fruiting mango tree. Then a ripe mango loosened from the stalk, fell to the ground, grazing his ear. Awakened by that sound, he opened his eyes and looked; then stretching out his hand he took the fruit, squeezed it, smelled it, and ate it. Herein, the time of his sleeping at the foot of the mango tree is as when we are subconsciously alive (bhavaṅga-sota); the instant of the ripe mango falling from its stalk and grazing his ear is like the instant of the object striking the sentient organism (bhavaṅga-calana); the time of awaking through the sound is like that of adverting by the five (sense-) doors agitating the subconscious life continuum (pañca-dvārāvajjana); the time of the man's opening his eyes and looking is like that of accomplishing the function of seeing through visual cognition (cakkhu-viññāṇa); the time of stretching out his hand and taking the mango is as that of the resultant mind-element receiving the object (sampaṭicchana); the time of taking it and squeezing it is as that of the resultant element of mind-cognition examining the object (santīraṇa); the time of smelling it is as that of the inoperative element of mind-cognition determining the object (voṭṭhappana); the time of eating is as that of apperception (javana) enjoying the taste of the object.' (*Atthasālinī*, p. 271, in Maung Tin's translation, p. 359 f.)

Shwe Zan Aung uses this simile with some alterations. The mango

is falling on account of the wind stirring the branches, and the man sleeps with his head covered. 'The striking of the wind against the tree' he explains, 'is like the "past" life moment, during which the object enters the stream and passes down with it, without perturbing it. The swaying of the branches in that wind represents the vibration of the stream of being. The falling of the fruit corresponds to the arrest or interruption of being, the moment at which the stream is "cut off" by thought; . . . etc. Finally, the swallowing of the last morsels that are left in the mouth[1] corresponds to the operation of retention after which the mind subsides into mere vital process, even as the man once more falls asleep.' (*Compendium of Philosophy*, p. 30.)

Buddhaghosa's version seems to me better in so far as it preserves the unity of the simile, while Shwe Zan Aung, or the tradition he follows, wavers between two points of relation, making first the tree and then the awaking man the object of comparison.

The process of perception, which is explained in this simile, contains seventeen thought moments. When a sense-object enters the stream of being, it takes one moment until vibration sets in (bhavaṅgacalana) and two moments more until the flow is stopped (bhavaṅguppaccheda) by the increasing intensity of these vibrations. The following functions arise in due order for one moment each:

awareness (āvajjana)	(in the fourth moment)
seeing (dassana) respectively hearing (savana) smelling (ghāyana) tasting (sāyana) touching (phusana)	(in the fifth moment)
receiving (sampaṭicchana)	(in the sixth moment)
investigating (santīraṇa)	(in the seventh moment)
determining (voṭṭhappana)	(in the eighth moment)

The culmination of the whole process is *javana*, the full perception (apperception) or knowledge of the object which lasts for seven moments (from the ninth to the fifteenth inclusive). Finally, the process terminates in two moments of identification or registration (tadārammaṇa) after which the consciousness is again absorbed in the quiet flow of the stream of being.

This complete process of seventeen moments takes place only if the intensity of the sense-object is very great (atimahanta); if it is merely great (mahanta) the function of registration (tad-ārammaṇa) does not occur, so that the duration of the whole process is not more than fifteen moments. If the intensity of sense impression is small

[1] 'The after-taste had perhaps been an apter simile,' says Mrs. Rhys Davids.

THE PROCESS OF PERCEPTION IN DEPENDENCE OF AN EXTERNAL SENSE-STIMULUS*

PAÑCADVĀRE VITHI-CITTA-PPAVATTI-NAYO

1 pubbevātītakaṃ eka-citta-kkhaṇaṃ
(*one moment of consciousness having passed*)

2, 3 dve bhavaṅga calaṇāni
(*two moments of subconscious vibration*)

4 (1) rūpārammaṇaṃ āvajjantaṃ pañca-dvārāvajjaṇa-cittaṃ (*awareness*)

5 (2) rūpaṃ passantaṃ cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ
(*visual consciousness*)

6 (3) sampaṭicchantaṃ sampaṭicchana-cittaṃ
(*recipient consciousness*)

7 (4) santīraṇamānaṃ santīraṇa-cittaṃ
(*investigating consciousness*)

8 (5) vavatthapentaṃ votthappana-cittaṃ
(*determining consciousness*)

9–15 (6–12) Tato paraṃ ekūnatiṃsa-kāmâvacara-javanesu yaṃkiñci laddha-paccayaṃ yebhuyyena sattakkhattuṃ javanaṃ javati.
(*7 moments of perception*)

16, 17 (13, 14) dve tadālambaṇa-pākāṇi
(*two resultant moments of registration*)

cuddasa vīthi-cituppādā (*14 moments in the process of the genesis of perception*) [1–14, moments 4–17]

satta vīthi cittāni (*7 classes of consciousness in the process of perception*) [moments 2–15]

* of a visible object (rūpārammaṇa) in this case.

(paritta) [or 'very small' (atiparitta)] the process works merely functionally, i.e. no full cognition, no apperception (javana) takes place and, therefore, no mental incorporation, no decision or mental action (kamma) in the sense of affirmation or negation (whereby for future cases a positive or negative tendency (saṅkhāra) would be created. Thus javana is the karmic decisive function which forms the future: it is the *active* aspect of karma, indicating the free will, while all preceding functions (which alone work in the 'small' process of perception) are determined by previous perception- (javana) moments either from the present or a past life (predispositions, character, saṅkhāra) and form the *passive* aspect of consciousness which is causally bound and not accessible to the free will.

The problem of the free will is therefore not to be answered by a simple yes or no. In a certain respect we are free, in another we are not, and where the boundary line separates these two conditions is not an objective but a subjective problem. Also, concerning the bodily functions, we can observe the correlation of volitional and automatic functions, as Dahlke has shown very beautifully in one of his last books: 'Up to a certain degree I have power over my limbs. I can move my hands and legs as I like, but I cannot "add an inch to the length of my body". I can breathe as I like, but I cannot cause my heart to beat as I like, except in an indirect way by a certain method of breathing. I can eat what I like, but I cannot determine the manner in which the food is to be digested. Here too exists only the freedom of binding oneself. The decision to take food is free, but the digestion of it follows the fixed direction in which all nourishment proceeds.' (*Heilkunde u. Weltanschauung*, p. 66.)

It goes without saying that the process of perception, as shown here, represents only an ideal section through the complicated texture of factors and functions connected with the genesis of consciousness. In reality, at least four different processes of consciousness, each of them appearing in innumerable repetitions and variations, are necessary for the full perception of a sense-object:


(1) pañca-dvāra-vīthi, the process of perception in dependence of one of five external senses as described above. This process may occur several hundred thousand times, alternating with

(2) tad-anuvattaka-mano-dvāra-vīthi, the reproductive process which links together the different aspects of perception until a complete synthesis of the object is attained. Then follows:

(3) nāma-paññatti-vīthi, the process of grasping the name of the object, and finally:

(4) attha-paññatti-vīthi, the process of grasping the meaning.

GRADES OF INTENSITY OF OBJECTS



Shwe Zan Aung illustrates the traditional definition of this fourfold process in the following way: 'In order to enable a man to say "I see a rose" . . . he must first of all perceive a rose, presented in one or other of the forms of external intuition already described. Each process is followed, with a brief moment or two of the subconscious continuum intervening, by the process called "grasping-the-past" (atītaggahaṇa), in which there is necessarily a depicting to the imagination of the past object which he has just perceived, the images alone of the different parts of the rose being present in mind. These two processes may alternate with each other several hundred thousand times before the synthetic process (samūhaggahaṇa) takes place. In the third process, also repeated several times, he forms the entire composite image of the rose into a *synthesis* out of the different, component parts which he has just depicted alternately. In the next stage, called "grasping-the-meaning" (atthaggahaṇa), also repeated several times, he forms an idea of the object corresponding to that image which is representative of the original. Lastly, in the stage called "grasping-the-name" (nāmaggahaṇa), he invents a name to represent that idea. But if the name happens to be already known to him, three more processes may intervene between this stage and the last. That is to say, in the process, called "convention" (sanketa), he thinks of the conventional sign by which such an idea is usually signified; in the process called "comparison" (sambandha), he compares the idea in question with the former ideas signified by that sign. If, in this comparison, he discriminates certain resemblances between the common attributes, he forms a judgment: "This is a rose", called "the process of judgment" (vinicchaya). And, finally, in the process of "name-grasping", he applies the class-name to the object. In other words, he brings the concept under a known class.

'These complicated processes of imagination, reproductive and constructive, memory, conception, discrimination, judgment, classification, all follow one another so rapidly in succession that the percipient considers that he "sees" the rose almost instantaneously. Such is the complexity of processes distinguishable in an act of external perception.' (p. 32 f.)

The process of perception in dependence of an 'inner' or mental object (entering through the 'mind-door': mano-dvāravīthi) is similar to that on occasion of an external sense-object. Its greater or lesser intensity is described as vibhūta or avibhūta, 'clear' or 'not clear'.

In meditative cognition (appanā javana) there is neither a difference in the intensity or clearness of an object, nor does the retentive function of registering (tadārammaṇa) come into activity, because

in this state the mind is not only directed and concentrated upon the surface of the object, but penetrates it, absorbs it, becomes one with it. This state of mind is called samādhi.

If we should try to describe exhaustively the process of perception or the intricate nature of a single state of consciousness, it would go far beyond the frame of our present task, because each moment of consciousness reflects the whole system of which it is a part, and its complete analysis would be equal to a detailed description of the entire psychology and philosophy of Buddhism. For our purpose it was sufficient to make visible the general structure and its directive principles.

Consciousness, seen from the hedonical point of view, showed the origin of suffering and the way to its annihilation, as well as the positive side of this problem, namely, the origin and the importance of joy. Herewith the *ethical* foundations of Buddhism were laid bare.

And when we saw how the seemingly simplest process of consciousness proves to be a most complicated collaboration of innumerable elements, forces and counter-forces which cannot be regarded as the expression of an ego-substratum, but in which, on the contrary, the ego-idea arises as a product of certain functions – then a further cornerstone of the Buddhist doctrine was revealed: the anattā-idea.

And when the measure of time was applied to the phenomena of consciousness, then even the last, apparently constant elements dissolved into vibrations, the duration of which appeared to be infinitesimal units of time. It revealed the law of anicca: that there is nothing permanent, that everything is in flux.

'In the interests of experience, and in order to grasp perceptions, the intellect breaks up experience, which is in reality a continuous stream, an incessant process of change and response with no separate parts, into purely conventional "moments", "periods", or psychic "states". It picks out from the flow of reality those bits which are significant for human life; which "interest" it, catch its attention. From these it makes up a mechanical world in which it dwells, and which seems quite real until it is subjected to criticism. It does, says Bergson, in an apt and already celebrated simile, the work of a cinematograph: takes snapshots of something which is always moving, and by means of these successive static representations – none of which are real, because Life, the object photographed, never was at rest – it recreates a picture of life, of motion. This picture, this rather jerky representation of divine harmony, from which innumerable moments are left out, is very useful for practical purposes; but it is not reality, because it is not alive.

'This "real world", then, is the result of your selective activity,

and the nature of your selection is largely outside your control. Your cinematographic machine goes at a certain pace, takes its snapshots at certain intervals. Anything which goes too quickly for those intervals, it either fails to catch, or merges with preceding or succeeding movements to form a picture with which it can deal. Thus we treat, for instance, the storm of vibrations which we convert into "sound" and "light". Slacken or accelerate the clock-time, change its rhythmic activity, and at once you take a different series of snapshots, and have as a result a different picture of the world. Thanks to the time at which the normal human machine is set, it registers for us what we call, in our simple way, "the natural world". A slight accession of humility or common sense might teach us that a better title would be "*our* natural world".

'Now let human consciousness change or transcend its rhythm, and any other aspect of any other world may be ours as a result. Hence the mystics' claim that in their ecstasies they change the conditions of consciousness, and apprehend a deeper reality which cannot be dismissed as unreasonable.'[1]

To change and to transcend the rhythm of human consciousness is the aim of the spiritual training of Buddhism in the higher stages of meditation (absorption), which correspond to the experience of higher world-planes. Though these experiences are not the ultimate aim of the Buddhist Path, they show that our human world is just one among innumerable others and that the worlds of Buddhist cosmology are not to be searched for in the mysteries of space but in the mysteries of our own mind in which all worlds exist as possibilities of experience. Once man has recognized the relativity of his own world and the latent faculties of consciousness, in other words, if he has understood that he is not bound to this particular world (the world of his senses), but that he lives in exactly that world which corresponds to the 'rhythm' of his mind, he has made the first step towards liberation. The highest aim, however, is to change the rhythm of our entire life and to transform it into that supreme harmony which the Buddha has explained as the absence of greed, hatred, and ignorance: as Nibbāna.

It is obvious that Buddhism represents a complete revolution of all conventional views and that the negative character of its formulations contributes to the difficulties which frighten the average man. To him the anattā-idea means the destruction of his personality, the anicca-idea the dissolution of his world.

But the anicca-idea does not deny the 'existence' of things, but only their permanence, and in the same way the anattā-idea does

[1] Evelyn Underhill: *Mysticism*, p. 36 f.

not proclaim that there is no 'self' but only that there is no permanent 'self'. In reality it is just the anattā-idea which guarantees the possibility of development and growth of the individual by demonstrating that the 'I' or 'self' is not an absolute magnitude but a designation for the relative limitation which the individual creates itself according to the standard of its knowledge. The primitive man feels the body as his 'self', the more developed one, his feelings or his mental functions. But the Buddha regards neither the body nor the mind as his 'self', knowing their relativity and dependence.

With regard to this dependence it may be said that it is just the element which contains the principle of relative individual persistence or continuity. The mental and bodily materials of construction may change at the greatest speed, they will nevertheless always build (fill) the *particular* form which corresponds (by reason of the law of *dependent* origination) to the level of development of the individual in question.

Thus the anicca-idea does not make the world less real, but it shows, on the contrary, that the world exclusively consists in action. Nowhere is stagnation, nowhere limitation. Nothing exists for itself or separately in itself. There is nothing constant; but instead of a world filled with dead things, there is a *living* cosmos which finds its counterpart in the consciousness of each individual and its focus in each atom, just as every moment from the standpoint of infinitesimal divisibility contains the boundlessness of time. Thus we find present *within* ourselves the eternity and abundance which are denied to us as long as we are seeking them in the phantasmagoria of an eternal world or of a separate little ego.

He who wants to follow the Path of the Buddha must give up all thoughts of 'I' and 'mine'. But this giving up does not make us poorer; it actually makes us richer, because what we renounce and destroy are the walls that kept us imprisoned; and what we gain is that supreme freedom, which is not to be understood simply as a merging into the whole or a feeling of identity with others, but as the experience of an infinite relationship, according to which every individual is essentially connected with all that exists, thus embracing all living beings in his own mind, taking part in their deepest experience, and sharing their sorrow and joy.

APPENDIX

And I discovered that profound truth, so difficult to perceive, difficult to understand, tranquillizing and sublime, which is not to be gained by mere reasoning, and is visible only to the wise.

The world, however, is given to pleasure, delighted with pleasure, enchanted with pleasure. Verily, such beings will hardly understand the law of conditionality, the dependent origination of everything; incomprehensible will also be to them the end of all formations, the forsaking of every substratum of rebirth, the fading away of craving, detachment, extinction, Nibbāna.

Yet there are beings whose eyes are only a little covered with dust: they will understand the truth.

(*Majjhima-Nikāva* 26; *transl. by Mahāthera Nyāṇatiloka.*)

1. SYSTEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF ABHIDHAMMA PSYCHOLOGY

In order to see the general structure of consciousness as derived from the systematic representation of the Abhidhamma, we have to deal briefly with the more scholastic classifications and their terminology. Their genetic connexion with the earliest stages of Buddhist thought is so strong and logically justified that it is hardly possible to exclude them, even in a short study like this which confines itself to a general survey of the psychological tendencies of early Buddhist philosophy. I am using the expression *early* in contradistinction to the later forms of Buddhist philosophy as preserved in Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan. I might have spoken of the philosophy and psychology of Pāli-Buddhism, but its fundamental ideas which occupy the central place in this book and form its main subject, as for instance the Law of Dependent Origination, the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, the momentariness of all phenomena, the problem of joy and suffering, the negation of egohood, the psycho-physical aggregates and the forms and constituents of consciousness on which the theory and practice of meditation are founded: – all these things are not the exclusive property of Pāli-Buddhism or of any particular school, but they are the characteristics of the earliest philosophical and psychological formulations of Buddhism. It is Buddhism 'kat exochēn', and has been preserved and elaborated by the Theravādins with very few additions, and therefore even comparatively late works of this school, like Thera Anuruddha's Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha, represent an earlier stage of Buddhist philosophy than works of other schools which from the purely historical standpoint belong to much more ancient periods. But quite apart from this: just as we had to consider the circumstances under which Buddhism came into existence, the direction from which the path came (Part I), so we have to be conscious of the direction into which it developed, because only this will enable us to see the actual position and tendency of the central portion of the path and the organic unity of its different phases. It is in this sense that our excursion into the more scholastic details of Abhidhamma literature is to be understood.

In using the classifications of the Abhidhammatta-Saṅgaha,[1] on which our Pāli Tables are based, I have confined myself to those features which either can be regarded as parts of the original system of Buddhist psychology or which serve to elucidate it in important details.

[1] Published in Pāli in the Journal of the Pāli Text Society of 1884. Shwe Zan Aung's translation as well as my own (published in German by the Benares-Verlag, München-Neubiberg, under the title 'Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha') are based on this publication. Shwe Zan Aung's translation, which is profusely annotated and accompanied by a most valuable introductory essay, has been revised and edited by Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids and published by the Pāli Text Society under the title *Compendium of Philosophy*.

The Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha, in fact, is a summary of the subject matter of the seven books of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka which, with the exception of the later-added Kathā-Vatthu, belong to the earliest works of Buddhist philosophy and psychology and can be said to be nothing but a systematic arrangement of the ideas contained in the Discourses of the Buddha.

The seven books of the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka are:

1. *Dhamma-Saṅgaṇi.* – Enumeration of psychic and material properties, i.e., the elements and objects of consciousness.

2. *Vibhaṅga.* – Eighteen treatises upon various themes of a philosophical, psychological, and ethical character.

3. *Kathā-Vatthu.* – Book of disputed questions, with regard to the (heretical) views of other Buddhist sects.

4. *Puggala-Paññatti.* – Book of qualities of character, or types of individuals.

5. *Dhātu-Kathā.* – Expositions of the functions of the senses in their eighteen fundamental elements; the six organs, the six classes of objects corresponding to them, and the six classes of consciousness resulting from the mutual relationship of the two.

6. *Yamaka.* – Book of the pairs of opposites.

7. *Paṭṭhāna.* – Book of the arising of psychic and material states: Causal connexions and mutual dependence.

2. CLASSES, FACTORS, AND FUNCTIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

MAIN PRINCIPLES OF CLASSIFICATION UNDERLYING THE TABLES I—VI

The following Pali Tables are based upon the systematic division which is derived from the classification of consciousness according to the principles of Direction, Realm of Form, Pre-condition, and Potential Value, as described in the third chapter of Part Four (cfr. Table on page 100).

DIRECTION:	*l o k i y a*													*lokuttara*	
REALM: (FORM)	I KĀMĀVACARA-CITTĀNI							II RŪPĀVACARA-CITTĀNI			III ARŪPĀVACARA-CITTĀNI			IV (LOKU-TTARA)	
PRE-CONDITION:	A. AKUSALA (SAHETUKA)	B. AHETUKA			C. SAHETUKA										
	a b c	a	b	c	a	b	c	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B
POTENTIAL VALUE:	akusala	kusala	akus.	kriyā	kus.	vipāka	kriyā	kus.	vip.	kriyā	kus.	vip.	kriyā	magga	phala

EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS IN TABLES I - IV

Symbols :

+	presence } of a factor or a group of factors of consciousness
—	absence } of a factor or a group of factors of consciousness
±	temporarily and separately present
+)	temporarily present
( )	according to other theories not present

Abbreviations :

do.	=	domanassa
du.	=	dukkha
ek.	=	ekaggatā
ha.	=	hasituppāda
ma.	=	manodvārāvajjana
pa.	=	(in Table I. A. b.) = paṭigha
pa.		(in Table I. B. c.) = pañcadvārāvajjana
pī	=	pīti
so.	=	somanassa
sp.	=	sampaṭicchana
st.	=	santīraṇa
su.	=	sukha
ud.	=	uddhacca
up.	=	upekkhā
vi.	=	vicikicchā
vic.	=	vicāra
vit.	=	vitakka

Figures :

The figures on the left side of the tables represent the enumeration of the classes of consciousness discussed in the third chapter of Part IV.

The figures on the right side show the number of factors present [+] or absent [—] in each class of consciousness.

The upper row of figures serves to enumerate the fifty-two factors of consciousness, described in Part V.

The lower row of figures shows how many times each factor is present or absent in each main group of classes of consciousness.

CLASSES OF CONSCIOUSNESS									FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS																					FUNCTIONS (KICCA)											
KĀMĀVACARA-CITTĀNI									A.	B. Pakinnakā						C. Akusala cetasikā								D.	E.	F.	G.														
			sahagatam	sampayuttam	vippayuttam	cittam	sankhārikam		sādhāraṇā	vitakka	vicāra	adhimokkha	viriya	pīti	chanda	moha ahirika anottappa uddhacca	lobha	diṭṭhi	māna	dosa issā macchariya kukkucca	thīna	middha	vicikicchā	sobhana-sādhāraṇā	viratiyo	karuṇā muditā	paññindriya	+ +) ±	—	paṭisandhi bhavaṅga, cuti	āvajjana	dassana	savana	ghāyana	sāyana	phusana	sampaṭicchana	santīraṇa	voṭṭhappana	javana	tadārammaṇa
									1—7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14—17	18	19	20	21—24	25	26	27	28—46	47—49	50—51	52														
A. AKUSALA-CITTĀNI	a. lobha	1	so.	diṭ.			a-		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	19	33											O	
		2	so.	diṭ.				sa-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	+)	+)	—	—	—	—	—	21	31											O	
		3	so.		diṭ.		a-		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	+)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	19	33											O	
		4	so.		diṭ.			sa-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	+)	—	+)	+)	—	—	—	—	—	21	31											O	
		5	up.	diṭ.			a-		+	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	34											O	
		6	up.	diṭ.				sa-	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	+	+	—	—	+)	+)	—	—	—	—	—	20	32											O	
		7	up.		diṭ.		a-		+	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	+	—	+)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	18	34											O	
		8	up.		diṭ.			sa-	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	+	—	+)	—	+)	+)	—	—	—	—	—	20	32											O	
	b. paṭigha	9	do.	pa.			a-		+	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	—	—	+ ± ± ±	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	32											O	
		10	do.	pa.				sa-	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	—	—	+ ± ± ±	+)	+)	—	—	—	—	—	22	30											O	
	c. momūha	11'	up.	vi.					+	+	+	—	+	—	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	—	15	37											O	
		12	up.	ud.					+	+	+	+	+	—	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	37											O	
B. AHETUKA-CITTĀNI	a. akusala	1	up.			pañca-viññāṇ.			+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45			O									
		2	up.						+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45				O								
		3	up.						+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45					O							
		4	up.						+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45						O						
		5	du.						+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45							O					
		6	up.			sp.			+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	42								O				
		7	up.			st.			+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	42	O								O			O
	b. kusala	8	up.			pañca-viññāṇ.			+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45			O									
		9	up.						+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45				O								
		10	up.						+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45					O							
		11	up.						+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45						O						
		12	su						+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	45							O					
		13	up.			sp			+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	42								O				
		14	so.			st.			+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	41									O			O
		15	up			st.			+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	42	O								O			O
	c. kriyā	16	up.			pa.			+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	42		O										
		17	up.			ma.			+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11	41		O										
		18	so			ha.			+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	40											O	
TABLE I							+		30	20	20	19	14	6	10	12	8	4	4	2	5	5	1	0	0	0	0	+													
							—		0	10	10	11	16	24	20	18	22	26	28	28	25	25	29	30	30	30	30		—												

CLASSES OF CONSCIOUSNESS								FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS																					KICCA		
KĀMĀVACARA-CITTĀNI								A.	B. Pakiṇṇakā						C. Akusala cetasikā								D.	E.	F.	G.					
			sahagatam	sampayuttam	vippayuttam	saṅkhārikam		sādhāraṇā	vitakka	vicāra	adhimokkha	viriya	pīti	chanda	moha ahirika anottappa uddhacca	lobha	diṭṭhi	māna	dosa issā macchariya kukkucca	thīna	middha	vicikicchā	sobhana-sādhāraṇā	viratiyo	karuṇā muditā	paññindriya	+ ±(+)	—	paṭisandhi bhavaṅga, cuti	javana	tadārammaṇa
								1—7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14—17	18	19	20	21—24	25	26	27	28—46	47—49	50—51	52					
C. SAHETUKA-CITTĀNI	a. kusala	1	so.	ñāṇa		a-		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	±	±	+	38	14		O	
		2	so.	ñāṇa			sa-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	±	±	+	38	14		O	
		3	so.		ñāṇa	a-		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	±	±	—	37	15		O	
		4	so.		ñāṇa		sa-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	±	±	—	37	15		O	
		5	up.	ñāṇa		a-		+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	±	(±)	+	37	15		O	
		6	up.	ñāṇa			sa-	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	±	(±)	+	37	15		O	
		7	up.		ñāṇa	a-		+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	±	(±)	—	36	16		O	
		8	up.		ñāṇa		sa-	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	±	(±)	—	36	16		O	
	b. vipāka	9	so.	ñāṇa		a-		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	+	33	19	O		O
		10	so.	ñāṇa			sa-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	+	33	19	O		O
		11	so.		ñāṇa	a-		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	32	20	O		O
		12	so.		ñāṇa		sa-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	32	20	O		O
		13	up.	ñāṇa		a-		+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	+	32	20	O		O
		14	up.	ñāṇa			sa-	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	+	32	20	O		O
		15	up.		ñāṇa	a-		+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	31	21	O		O
		16	up.		ñāṇa		sa-	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	—	—	31	21	O		O
	c. kriyā	17	so.	ñāṇa		a-		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	±	+	35	17		O	
		18	so.	ñāṇa			sa-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	±	+	35	17		O	
		19	so.		ñāṇa	a-		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	±	—	34	18		O	
		20	so.		ñāṇa		sa-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	±	—	34	18		O	
		21	up.	ñāṇa		a-		+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	(±)	+	34	18		O	
		22	up.	ñāṇa			sa-	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	(±)	+	34	18		O	
		23	up.		ñāṇa	a-		+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	(±)	—	33	19		O	
		24	up.		ñāṇa		sa-	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	+	—	(±)	—	33	19		O	
TABLE II							+	24	24	24	24	24	12	24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	±8	±16	12	+				
							—	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	0	16	8	12		—			

CLASSES OF CONSCN — MAHAGGATA-CITTĀNI					FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS															KICCA	
					A.	B. Pakiṇṇakā						C.	D.	E.	F	G.					
				jhāna	sādhāranā	vitakka	vicāra	adhimokkha	viriya	pīti	chanda	akusala-cetasikā	sobhana-sādhāranā	viratiyo	karunā muditā	paññindriya	+	—	paṭisandhi bhavaṅga, cuti	javana
					1—7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14—27	28—46	47—49	50—51	52	+			
II. Rūpāvacara-cittāni	A. kusala	1	vit-vic-pi-su-ek	I	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	±	+	35	17		O
		2	vic-pi-su-ek	II	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	±	+	34	18		O
		3	pi-su-ek	III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	±	+	33	19		O
		4	su-ek	IV	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	±	+	32	20		O
		5	up ek	V	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
	B. vipāka	6	vit-vic-pi-su-ek	I	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	±	+	35	17	O	
		7	vic-pi-su-ek	II	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	±	+	34	18	O	
		8	pi-su-ek	III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	±	+	33	19	O	
		9	su-ek	IV	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	±	+	32	20	O	
		10	up ek	V	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22	O	
II.	C. kriyā	11	vit-vic-pi-su-ek	I	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	±	+	35	17		O
		12	vic-pi-su-ek	II	+	—	+	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	±	+	34	18		O
		13	pi-su-ek	III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	—	±	+	33	19		O
		14	su-ek	IV	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	±	+	32	20		O
		15	up ek	V	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
			āyatana	V																
III. Arūpāvacara-cittāni	A. kusala	1	ākāsānañca-	(VI)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
		2	viññānañca-	(VII)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
		3	ākiñcañña-	(VIII)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
		4	nevasaññānāsaññā	(IX)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
	B. vipāka	5	ākāsānañca-	(VI)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22	O	
		6	viññānañca-	(VII)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22	O	
		7	ākiñcañña-	(VIII)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22	O	
		8	nevasaññānāsaññā	(IX)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22	O	
III.	C. kriyā	9	ākāsānañca-	(VI)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
		10	viññānañca-	(VIII)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
		11	ākiñcañña-	(VIII)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
		12	nevasaññānāsaññā	(IX)	+	—	—	+	+	—	+	—	+	—	—	+	30	22		O
TABLE III				+	27	3	6	27	27	9	27	0	27	0	±12	27	+			
				—	0	24	21	0	0	18	0	27	0	27	15	0		—		

CLASSES					FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS														KICCA
IV. LOKUTTARA-CITTANI					A.	B. Pakiṇṇakā						C.	D.	E.	F.	G.			
			cittaṃ	jhāna	sādhāraṇā	vitakka	vicāra	adhimokkha	viriya	piti	chanda	akusala-cetasikā	sobhana-sādhāraṇā	viratiyo	karuṇā muditā	paññindriya			javana
					1—7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14—27	28—46	47—49	50—51	52	+	—	
A. MAGGA (kusala)	(1)	1	sotāpatti	I	+	+	+			+		—			—		36	16	
		2		II	+	—	+			+		—			—		35	17	
		3		III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	+	34	18	o
		4		IV	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
		5		V	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
	(2)	6	sakadāgāmi	I	+	+	+			+		—			—		36	16	
		7		II	+	—	+			+		—			—		35	17	
		8		III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	+	34	18	o
		9		IV	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
		10		V	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
	(3)	11	anāgāmi	I	+	+	+			+		—			—		36	16	
		12		II	+	—	+			+		—			—		35	17	
		13		III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	+	34	18	o
		14		IV	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
		15		V	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
	(4)	16	arahatta	I	+	+	+			+		—			—		36	16	
		17		II	+	—	+			+		—			—		35	17	
		18		III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	+	34	18	o
		19		IV	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
		20		V	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
B. PHALA (vipāka)	(5)	21	sotāpatti	I	+	+	+			+		—			—		36	16	
		22		II	+	—	+			+		—			—		35	17	
		23		III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	+	34	18	o
		24		IV	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
		25		V	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
	(6)	26	sakadāgāmi	I	+	+	+			+		—			—		36	16	
		27		II	+	—	+			+		—			—		35	17	
		28		III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	+	34	18	o
		29		IV	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
		30		V	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
	(7)	31	anāgāmi	I	+	+	+			+		—			—		36	16	
		32		II	+	—	+			+		—			—		35	17	
		33		III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	+	34	18	o
		34		IV	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
		35		V	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
	(8)	36	arahatta	I	+	+	+			+		—			—		36	16	
		37		II	+	—	+			+		—			—		35	17	
		38		III	+	—	—	+	+	+	+	—	+	+	—	+	34	18	o
		39		IV	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
		40		V	+	—	—			—		—			—		33	19	
TAB. IV				+	40	8	16	8	8	24	8	0	8	8	0	8	+		
				—	0	32	24	0	0	16	0	40	0	0	40	0		—	

TABLE V

VEDANĀ

I KĀMĀVACARA A	I KĀMĀVACARA B	I KĀMĀVACARA C	II RŪPĀVACARA A	II RŪPĀVACARA B	II RŪPĀVACARA C	III ARŪPA A–C	IV LOKUTTARA A	IV LOKUTTARA B			SUKHA	DUKKHA	UPE-KKHĀ	VEDANĀ	
	5											1		dukkha (KĀYIKA)	BODILY
	12										1			sukha (KĀYIKA)	BODILY
	1—4 *8—11*								4 4				8	adukkham-asukha (KĀYIKA)	BODILY
9—10												2		DOMANASSA	MENTAL
1—4									4	18	62			kāmāvacara-somanassa	MENTAL
		1—4 *9—12* *17—20*							4 4 4						
	14, 18								2					SOMANASSA	
			1—4	*6—9*	*11—14*				12	44					
							1—4 *11—14* *21—24* *31—34*	*6—9* *16—19* *26—29* *36—39*	8 8 8 8					[cetasika-] sukha	
5—8 *11, 12*									4 2	24			47	kāmāvacara-upekkhā	
	6, 7, 13 *15—17*								3 3						
		5—8 *13—16* *21—24*							4 4 4					UPEKKHĀ (negative)	
			5	*10*	*15*				3	23					
						1—12			12					upekkhā-ekaggatā	
							5, 10 *15, 20*	*25, 30* *35, 40*	4 4						
		1—24							24				[59]	TATRA-MAJJHATTATĀ (positive)	SPIRITUAL
			1 — 15						15						
						1—12			12						
							(1)—(8)		8						

TABLE V

63 + 3 + 55 = 121 cittāni.

3. VEDANĀ

(TABLE V)

SUKHA in the sense of physical well-being and dukkha in the sense of physical pain appear only in one class of consciousness each (Table V; I. B. 5 and 12), namely on account of bodily contact. Domanassa (grief) arises in the two classes of unwholesome consciousness in the realm of sensorial form (kāmāvacara) accompanied by aversion (paṭigha), while somanassa (joy) occurs in eighteen classes of the same realm: in the first four classes of unwholesome kāmaloka consciousness, accompanied by greed (lobha) (Table V; I. A. 1–4); in the twelve classes conditioned by wholesome root-causes (I. C. 1–4, 9–12, 17–20); in two classes, not conditioned by root-causes, namely, in one type of investigating consciousness (I. B. 14) and in that of the genesis of aesthetic pleasure (I. B. 18). Sukha, in the sense of happiness – which, in this case, is to be understood as a purely psychological value, not as an ethical one (whether it becomes ethical or not, depends entirely on the attitude of the meditator – is present in each of the first four stages of absorption, i.e. in twelve classes of the consciousness of Pure Form (II. A. 1–4, B. 6–9, C. 11–14) and in the thirty-two corresponding classes of supramundane consciousness: thus, in forty-four classes altogether.

Upekkhā, in the sense of 'neither-painful-nor-pleasurable' sensation (adukkhamasukha), results from all sense-impressions with the exception of bodily contact, i.e. from the corresponding eight (2 × 4) classes of sense-consciousness, not conditioned by root-casuse (ahetuka; I. B. 1–4, 8–11). As a psychically negative factor, indicating the absence of emotions, upekkhā appears in twenty-four classes of sense-world consciousness, and, in combination with one-pointedness (ekaggatā), in twenty-three classes of jhāna-consciousness – in the realms of Pure Form and Non-Form as well as in the supramundane domain – thus, altogether in forty-seven classes.

As a *positive*, spiritual factor, upekkhā appears under the term tatramajjhattatā in fifty-nine classes of consciousness, namely: in the twenty-four classes of 'beautiful' consciousness, conditioned by wholesome root-causes in the realm of sensorial form; in the fifteen classes of the realm of Pure Form; in the twelve classes of the realm of Non-Form; and in the eight 'great' classes of supramundane consciousness. Thus the realm of negative upekkhā partly overlaps that of the positive tatramajjhattatā, as in the case of classes 5–8, 13–16, 21–24 of the sense-world consciousness conditioned by wholesome root-causes (I. C.), of classes 5, 10 and 15 in the consciousness of Pure Form, of all the classes in the realm of Non-Form, and of classes 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 in the supramundane consciousness.

Thus we arrive at the fact that out of the 121 classes of consciousness, described in the Buddhist system of psychology, fifty-five are hedonically indifferent, sixty-three accompanied by joy, and only three accompanied by suffering. The fundamental importance of this fact with regard to the general attitude of Buddhism has already been mentioned in the third chapter of Part III (p. 63).

4. ASSOCIATIVE, REFLECTIVE AND INTUITIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

THE fact that volition (cetanā), one-pointedness (ekaggatā) and attention (manasikāra) are inherent in all the 121 classes of consciousness proves that Buddhist psychology does not intend to give an exhaustive description of all possible states and combinations of consciousness but confines itself to those types which are essential to our knowledge and the control of our mind. All those purely associative or so-called subconscious states in which these three factors (or even one of them) are absent, are excluded from this systematic description.

If, however, on account of this, one would arrive at the conclusion that Buddhist psychology only deals with the purely discursive type of intellectual thought-operations, then again the inclusion of the stages of absorption (in the realms of Pure Form and Non-Form and in the Supramundane consciousness) shows that also this view is not correct. After the elimination of thinking and reflecting, the characterisitcs of discursive thought (vitakka-vicāra) there remains only the pure and direct experience of intuitive vision.

The prevalent idea that the consciousness of absorption (jhāna) is a purely passive state of mind, on account of the absence of these factors of intellectual activity, will be refuted if we consult the tables III and IV. We find in all stages of absorption, apart from the general positive factors which are present in every class of consciousness, decision (adhimokkha), energy (viriya) and the intention to act – in this case, to realize the goal – (chanda).

It is very instructive to compare with the help of our tables the positive and negative character of certain classes of consciousness according to the presence or absence of certain factors. Thus it is obvious, for instance, that the classes of consciousness with a predominantly negative or passive character, which many erroneously might have searched for among the states of absorption, are to be found just within the average consciousness of the sense-world (kāmaloka), namely in the group resulting from sense-impressions (I. B.). Apart from the fact that none but neutral factors are present in this group, it is significant that (of the latter) the desire to act (chanda) appears in none of these classes, energy (viriya) only in two (17 and 18), and decision (adhimokkha), accompanied by discursive thought (vitakka-vicāra) only in eight (out of 18 classes). In ten classes, namely those of direct sense-consciousness, also the secondary factors are absent, so that only the primary ones remain. This direct sense-consciousness and the intuitive consciousness of absorption (jhāna) are the two extremes of the scale of consciousness under observation – they meet each other in the fact that both are free from discursive or reflective thought:

the first-mentioned group, because it has not yet reached, the last-mentioned one, because it has already overcome that stage. Thus the reflective or discursive consciousness stands in the middle.

While the two extreme groups exclude each other, except for the one point in which they meet, the reflective consciousness partly penetrates the other two groups: that of sense-consciousness in the already mentioned eight classes (Table I, B: 6, 7, and 13–18), that of jhāna-consciousness in the first two stages of each group (i.e. in 22 classes: 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 12, of Table III; and 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16, 17, 21, 22, 26, 27, 31, 32, 36, 37 of Table IV). These initial jhāna-stages, though they are not yet purely intuitive, possess nevertheless intuitive elements by which they are discerned from the reflective states of the average kāmaloka-consciousness.

The purely reflective and discursive consciousness is either wholesome or unwholesome – here the ways part, for the good or the bad – while the intuitive consciousness excludes the unwholesome factors. The pure sense-consciousness, on the other hand, is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, but entirely neutral in this respect, for which reason animals as well as children in the earliest stage of life are 'beyond good and bad'.

Thus it is the faculty of thinking which contains both: salvation and destruction. Thinking means decision. With the faculty of thinking we reach the periphery of our being, where our fate is decided, where the ways part. Therefore thinking, though it does not form the climax of meditation, yet is its foundation, namely, that without which the Aim cannot be attained, the 'conditio sine qua non' of internalization or absorption (jhāna), in so far as it is its directive principle. (The periphery, therefore, is a *necessary* stage of transition!) This principle is of the greatest importance because it determines the three forms of consciousness: the sense-consciousness through the sense-object (the external stimulus), the reflective or mental consciousness through the thought-object (representation, concept, idea), the intuitive consciousness through its introvertive concentration.

It may be mentioned that the purely associative consciousness does not only prevail in the more primitive stages of conscious life (as in the case of animals and earliest childhood) but that it plays an important part even in the case of grown-up and normally developed human beings. But this kind of vague and practically undefinable consciousness could not be the subject of Buddhist psychology as it is neither necessary for the understanding nor for the practice of the spiritual training which is the main motive of this system. Buddhist psychology can be appreciated and understood only from the point of view of this motive. Logic is here only an organizing element, but neither a leading nor an argumentative one. Therefore theories play hardly any role and can find a place only as far as the *form* of the description or the interpretation of difficult concepts is concerned. The starting point, however, is always the experience, and its results are only discussed in so far as they are related to the religious practice. If, therefore, now and then we find in the Buddhist system of psychology statements which appear to us unintelligible or not sufficiently

established in our opinion, the reason generally is that we lack the necessary experience (provided that we have not been led astray by linguistic misinterpretations).

Correlations and Means of Representation

The thoroughly empirical standpoint of Buddhist psychology and philosophy becomes obvious by the particular kind of definition (kattusādhana) which it prefers to use and in which the objects of definition are circumscribed by the functions and relations connected with them.

We are, therefore, justified in calling Buddhism a philosophy of relations, for which such fundamental ideas like anicca and anattā are the most typical examples. The anicca-idea reveals the dynamic character of the world, the anattā-idea, that there are no unchangeable and separate individualities, neither 'things-in-themselves' nor 'souls-in-themselves'; positively expressed: that there is an infinite relationship between all that lives.

This dynamic-relativistic attitude which Western civilization has acquired only in the very last stage of its spiritual and scientific development – without, however, drawing the same conclusions as the Buddha – can only think in functions and relations, and cannot content itself with a speculative combination of abstract ideas which would only lead to a kind of sterile idealism. For this reason a tabular representation of the whole system is necessary to bring out the totality and simultaneousness of the manifold mutual relations between its constituents. The language, according to its logical structure is bound to a succession in time and, therefore, always lags far behind reality, which knows, in addition to this sequence in time, a spatial co-ordination as well as a non-spatial ('essential') penetration, a synchronizing of manifold relations.

In the earliest times of Buddhism there was no need for such tabular representations (neither was there an opportunity, as people were not in the habit of writing) because the whole subject-matter was sufficiently known and mentally digested, so that the systematic arrangement sufficed as a mnemonic support. As all important teachings were committed to memory (along with the corresponding practice), not only the inner meaning but also the external form became the spiritual property of the student. He, however, in whose mind the whole system was present, experienced all the intrinsic connexions and correlations simultaneously.

Tantric Buddhism, by the way, knows a method, in some respect similar to our tables, of concretizing and visualizing spiritual things: the geometrical *yantra*. The diagrams of these yantras are composed of triangles, squares, circles and similar geometrical forms which demonstrate the relations of a spiritual system (ideas, experiences, psychic realities). The position of each compartment formed by these geometrical figures corresponds to the position of a certain idea or inner experience within the frame of the general system – just as the different compartments of our tables indicate the relative position, the meaning and the

psychological value of each concept. In pictorial yantras or plastic maṇḍalas the abstract geometrical symbols are replaced by pictorial ones which are the characteristics of certain visions which occur in the course of meditation (either automatically or as intentional mental projections). Only those who have gone through the experiences of meditation can penetrate the real nature of these symbols. In a similar way one may say that the psychological and philosophical concepts are nothing but symbols connected with experiences of a certain mental attitude or psychic direction. Meditation is the Alpha and Omega for the real understanding of this matter.

TABLE VI

HETU

I. KĀMĀVACARA CITTĀNI						II. RUPĀVACARA-C.	III. ARŪPĀVACARA-C.	IV. LOKUTTARA CITT.	CLASSES		HETU	
A. AKUSALA-CITTĀNI			B. AHETUKA	C. SAHETUKA								
a. lobha	b. paṭigha	c. moha		ñāṇa-vippayut.	ñāṇa-sampayut							
			1—18						18		a-hetuka	
		11, 12							2		eka-hetuka	moha
1—8									8	22	dvi-hetuka	lobha moha
	9, 10								2			dosa moha
				3, 4, 7, 8 *11, 12* *15, 16* *19, 20* *23, 24*					12			alobha adosa
					1, 2, 5, 6 *9, 10* *13, 14* *17, 18* *21, 22*				12	47	ti-hetuka	alobha, adosa, amoha
TABLE VI						*1—15*	*1—12*	*(1)—(8)*	15 12 8			

71 + 18 = 89 cittāni

5. THE SIX ROOT-CAUSES (HETU)

i. *General Observations*

HETU has been rendered with 'root-cause' because this term characterizes that psychic attitude which is the root of all morally decisive acts of consciousness. But as the root of a plant is dependent on the seed from which it sprang, so hetu is dependent on karma. The term 'root-cause', therefore, is to be understood only in this relative sense but not as an ultimate cause, and if karma and hetu were to be confronted, the latter would have to be designated as 'condition' or 'motive' in contrast to karma, the general predisposition of character.

The three 'positive' root-causes, *greed* (lobha), *hatred* (dosa), and *delusion* (moha) – 'positive' with justification, as they form the 'leit-motif' of the world-concert – are nothing but three forms of avijjā, to whose annihilation the whole edifice of Buddhist teachings and psychology is dedicated. According to the overwhelming influence of these positive root-causes, the three corresponding 'negative' root-causes, namely, *greedlessness* (alobha), *hatelessness* (adosa), and *non-delusion* (amoha), are of the greatest importance. They are negative only in terms and in so far as they negate and eliminate the 'original' hetus. But from the standpoint of the path of deliverance, which presupposes a revaluation of all values, they naturally prove to be extremely positive. Therefore we find that adosa is used as a synonym of sympathy (amity) and amoha in the sense of insight or knowledge.

This method, to express positive aims and ideas by negative terms or definitions, shows the Buddha's sense of reality. Positive concepts serve to make us 'grasp' sense-impressions or mental objects by limiting, defining, and differentiating the object in question from others. Reality, however, knows no boundaries, and where it is intended to overcome its opponent, delusion, the greatest of all limitations, there only negative concepts can be adequate. Similarly, in practical life there is no question of opposing or changing the 'world' or of creating something in contrast to it, something entirely new and existing only in some sort of idealistic imagination, but it is simply a question of removing the hindrances which prevent us from seeing reality as it *is*. This may appear as a merely negative occupation to those who cannot see what is to be gained by it. But the truly creative act is nothing but the overcoming of all hindrances, and genius could be said in this sense to consist in a 'preserved naivety'[1] or the unbiassed simplicity of an untrammelled mind. The wise one, that is the saint, is one who has razed to the ground all barriers within himself and who, therefore, has become conscious of reality, takes part in it and is able to influence it. Thus having become a living centre of reality, he is the

[1] 'erhaltene Unbefangenheit,' as Dahlke calls it.

most perfect embodiment of creativeness whose activity does not consist in self-aggrandisement but in the establishment of a harmony which is not only confined to himself but radiates far beyond his individual confines. While those who have not yet attained this purity of mind, bind themselves by their own actions, the holy one liberates himself in his own work.

From the point of view of hetus we can discern two groups (very different in extent) of mental states: those which are conditioned by root-causes and those which are free from them. The consciousness conditioned by root-causes is either dynamic or static. In the first case it presents itself as *active* – either in a wholesome or in an unwholesome manner – in the latter case either as reactive (vipāka), i.e. as a result of actions done in the past (in a former birth) or as non-active, i.e. merely functional. In contrast to the active classes which are always either wholesome or unwholesome the reactive and functional classes are to be regarded as neutral in this sense. The highest classes of consciousness, i.e. those of attained arahatship belong to these neutral, static classes: the holy one is 'beyond good and bad'. Apart from the relativity of these concepts, the value of which changes with each stage of the sacred path, one could say that the one is the 'privation value' of the other, and that thus after the complete annihilation of avijjā all polarity is removed. The static nature of the highest states of mind is also exemplified by the fact that a perfect one is called 'asekha', 'one who is no more striving', in contradistinction to the 'sekha', 'the striving one'. What in the case of others would be regarded as a deficiency, becomes a title of honour to the enlightened ones, while, on the other hand, all those properties, which in the case of ordinary men would be labelled as 'good', are the natural and only possible form of expression of the perfect one. It cannot be said, therefore, that he is entirely passive, neither doing good nor bad, both of which would be equally in his power, nor could it be maintained that he had rooted out the 'bad' portion of human qualities so that only the 'good' ones had been left over, which now on account of the lack of opposition of counter-forces could no more be valued as 'good'. No – the attitude has become a different one, because the habitual prejudices (avijjā) have disappeared, on account of which those hindrances, which from the Buddhist standpoint were designated as unwholesome, cannot make their appearance any more. Thus he has become 'whole', 'complete' (unified within himself), mentally healthy. He has overcome the illness of duality which on account of 'self-delusion' is continually in conflict with reality and creates the notions of 'good' and 'bad'. The problem, therefore, is not how to renounce certain properties, but how to re-establish the balance of powers, whereby nothing is destroyed and nothing new is created. Just as in the case of a balance whose scales hang at different levels, the defect may be remedied by a readjustment of the scale-beam by shifting its centre of gravitation rather than by increasing or decreasing the weight of the scales, similarly the disharmony of the human mind can be removed by shifting the centre of gravitation from the 'ego' to the 'non-ego'.

In connexion with these considerations the use of the terms 'wholesome' and 'unwholesome' for *kusala* and *akusala* will be easily understood. To translate them as 'good' and 'bad', or as 'moral' and 'immoral' would not properly represent the Buddhist point of view. The Buddhist does not recognize the idea of *sin* – just as little as the idea of a god who forbids or commands certain things and against whom one could sin – there is only error, ignorance, delusion, and every thought and act connected with it creates suffering. Consequently the effect of a deed or a thought can only be called 'wholesome' or 'unwholesome' according to its agreement or disagreement with reality, in other words: according to the recognition or non-recognition of reality. Neither the overcoming of greed nor of hatred are sufficient for the attainment of complete liberation (nibbāna). The overcoming of greed will only lead to the utmost frugality and primitivity of life, the conquest of hatred only to tolerance and charity. One can claim that the ascetic as little as the charitable have reached perfection, though they may be far above the level of the average man. Only the overcoming of illusion, of mental narrowness, the attainment of insight and wisdom, in short, enlightenment: this only gives true meaning to detachment and sympathy and transforms them into the world-embracing qualities which are the attributes of the Perfect Ones.

ii. *Distribution of Hetus within the* 121 *Classes of Consciousness*

There are eighteen classes of consciousness *without root-causes* (ahetuka: I.B. 1–18) which, as we have seen, possess a predominantly passive or receptive character and only neutral factors. No karmically active classes are found in this group, but only reactive and non-active ones. The first seven classes of the group are the result of unfavourable, the following eight that of favourable karma. Both results as such are amoral in so far as they cannot exercise any effect upon the path of liberation (as it is obvious with regard to their factors).

Among the types of consciousness *conditioned by root-causes* (sahetuka) two are conditioned by only *one* [unwholesome] root-cause (eka-hetuka): they are the two classes of unwholesome sense-consciousness rooted in delusion. Twenty-two classes are conditioned by *two* root-causes (dvi-hetuka): the eight classes of sense-consciousness, connected with greed and ignorance (Table I, A. a. 1–8), the two following ones (9–10) by hatred and ignorance, and the twelve classes without knowledge (Table II: 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24) by greedlessness (detachment) and hatelessness (sympathy), forty-seven classes are conditioned by *three* [wholesome] root-causes (ti-hetuka): the twelve classes of the last-mentioned group, connected with knowledge (Table II: 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22), furthermore the fifteen classes of the realm of Pure Form (rūpāvacaracittāni), the twelve of the realm of Non-Form (arūpāvacaracittāni, Table III) and the eight supramundane classes (Table IV: (1)–(8)).

iii. *The Three Root-Evils*

Of the three root-evils (lobha, dosa, moha) only hatred and greed are eliminated by the factors of jhāna-consciousness. Ignorance or delusion (moha) is destroyed only in one of its forms (uddhacca). This points to the fact that the consciousness of absorption is not *necessarily* connected with insight, respectively, right views (sammā diṭṭhi), and as we learn from the enumeration of the seven jhāna-factors in the seventh chapter of Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha, also grief (domanassa) is able to become a factor of absorption. By wrong application of concentration or on account of wrong mental presuppositions, absorption may result in a painful and pain-creating state of mind. In the enumeration of hindrances (nīvaraṇāni), in the same chapter, ignorance (avijjā) is mentioned as the sixth hindrance. The rather unexpected presence of domanassa in the first-mentioned group and the unusual inclusion of avijjā among the hindrances is not an accidental coincidence but points at an inner connexion which throws light upon the meaning and definition of jhāna in the canonical texts. The fact that they mention only five hindrances shows that they do not speak of absorption in general but of absorption (jhāna) in the Buddhist sense, i.e. under the antecedent condition of right views (sammā diṭṭhi), in other words, with an attitude which is in accordance with actuality. This attitude, however, is not to be understood as the complete annihilation of ignorance, but rather as a means by which only the grosser forms of avijjā are destroyed – but not avijjā itself – another reason why avijjā has not been mentioned among the conquered hindrances. The faculty which corresponds to this partial or gradual elimination of ignorance is *saddhā*, which may be defined as that inner *confidence* which arises from an intuitive or intellectual insight into the truth of the dhamma and which grows in the course of meditation (not yet, however, in its initial stage, as it is represented by the first jhāna) on account of profound and direct experience, into a state of certainty and knowledge in which the last traces of delusion are removed.

TABLE VII

ĀLAMBAṆA

TABLE VII

I. KĀMĀVACARA-CITTĀNI							II. RŪPĀVACARA-CITTĀNI			III. ARŪPĀVACARA-CITTĀNI			IV. LOKUTTARA		Classes	ĀLAMBANA	
A.	B. AHETUKA			C. SAHETUKA													
a b c	a (vipāka)	b (vipāka)	c	a	b	c	A	B	C	A	B	C	A.	B.			
akusala	akus.	kus.	kriyā	kus.	vipāka	kriyā	kus.	vip.	kriyā	kus.	vip.	kriyā	magga	phala			
	1—7	8—15	16, 18		9—16										25	parittālamban.	
1—12				3, 4 7, 8		19, 20 23, 24									20	lokuttara-vajjita-	sabbālambaṇāni
				1, 2 5, o			5								5	arahatta magga-phala-vajjita-	
			17			17, 18 21, 22			15						6	[sabbālamb.]	
										2, 4	6, 8	10, 12			6	mahaggata-	alambaṇāni
							1—5	6—10	11—15	1, 3	5, 7	9, 11			21	paññatti-	
													(1)—(8)		8	nibbāna-	

6. THE OBJECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

i. *Their Distribution among the* 121 *Classes of Consciousness*

A DIVISION of the classes of consciousness according to their object results in three main groups:

1. The twenty-five classes of lower objects (parittālambaṇāni) which comprise all classes of consciousness without root-causes (ahetuka: I. B. 1–15, 16, 18) with the exception of mind-door-awareness (I. B. 17) and of the reactive classes of wholesome root-conditioned consciousness (I. C. 9–16).

2. The thirty-one classes with all kinds of objects (sabbālambanāṇi).

3. The thirty-five classes of higher objects (mahaggata-paññatti-nibbānālambanāṇi).

(2) In the second main group six classes can have *all* (sabba) objects without exception (i),

five classes all with the exception of the objects of the Path- and the Fruit-consciousness of Arahantship (arahatta-magga-phala-vajjita- sabbālambaṇāni), (ii),

and twenty classes all objects except the supramundane ones (lokuttara-vajjita-sabbālambaṇāni) (iii),

(i) The first of these three sub-groups contains exclusively karmically non-active classes: that of mind-door-awareness (I. B. 17), the four non-active classes of wholesome-root-conditioned consciousness connected with knowledge (ñāṇa-sampayutta: I. C. 17, 18, 21, 22) and the fifth stage of the non-active consciousness of Pure Form (II. C. 15).

(ii) The second sub-group contains exclusively wholesome, active classes, namely the corresponding four classes of kāmaloka consciousness 'connected with knowledge' (I. C. 1, 2, 5, 6) and the fifth stage of karmically wholesome consciousness of Pure Form (II. A. 5).

(iii) The third sub-group consists of twelve unwholesome (I. A. 1–12) and eight of the karmically active and non-active classes conditioned by wholesome root-causes and disconnected from knowledge (I. C. 3, 4, 7, 8 and 19, 20, 23, 24).

(3) Concerning the third main group, the thirty-five classes of higher objects, again three sub-divisions can be discerned:

(i) The objects of the second and fourth stage of arūpa-jhāna ('infinity of consciousness' and 'neither perception nor non-perception') are called 'developed' (mahaggata; i.e. those which have become great, which have been developed).

(ii) The remaining six classes of this kind, namely the three classes of the 'infinity of space' and the three classes of 'no-thing-ness', as well as the fifteen classes of the realm of Pure Form (thus: 21 altogether) have as their

objects 'ideas of representation' or (better still) 'intuitive ideas' (paññattālambaṇāni).

(iii) The object of the eight supramundane classes is nibbāna.

The division of arūpa-objects into 'intuitive' and 'developed' ones, has its reason in the fact that the 'infinity of space' and 'no-thing-ness' are direct experiences, while the following two stages and their objects have been developed from them. The first arūpa-object is the intuitively represented idea (paññatti) of space (ākāsa), which transcends by far the mere conceptual thought. The third arūpa-object is the similarly intensified and vitalized idea of 'no-thing-ness'. In the second and fourth arūpa-jhānas, however, the experience of the previous stage has become the object of consciousness. Thus the first is the object of the second stage, the third that of the fourth stage.

The term paññatti which frequently has been translated by 'concept', shows in this connexion that its meaning is not confined to logical abstractions but includes 'ideas' in the sense of mental pictures (eidē) or symbols of inner experience. This is also supported by the fact that the visible after-image (paṭibhāga-nimitta) of the kasiṇa disks or hypnotic circles (which is one of the means to induce the initial states of the rūpa-jhānas) are classified under the paññatti-objects. It is just the difference between the ordinary discursive state of mind and the consciousness of absorption (jhāna) that the former remains in the bondage of verbal ruminations and conceptual abstractions without going beyond the conventional meaning, the latter consists in the inner realization of an *eidos*, the transformation of an idea into life, into reality. Thinking and reflecting (vitakka-vicāra) are only the preparatory factors, accompanying the initial stage, which disappear after they have served their purpose. Thus meditation grows from a reflective into an intuitive state of mind which has been expressed by various terms, like 'ecstasy', 'rapture', 'trance', 'Schauung', etc., all of them implying a negation of conceptual thought and a transformation into an exalted state of transcendental experience (i.e. transcending the ordinary state of human consciousness). The German word 'Schauung', which denotes a state of profound insight, combined with the faculty of intuitive vision, comparable to the clairvoyant mind of a Seer, in whom ideas take 'plastic' shape, is perhaps the best characterization of jhāna-consciousness.

ii. *Meaning and Classification of Paññatti*

The term Paññatti in its wider sense is explained in the Abhidhammattha-Saṅgaha (Chapter VII) as that which is made known (paññāpiyattā) by terms, names, or symbols, and as that which makes known (paññāpanato). In the first case paññatti is defined as attha-paññatti, the meaning of a symbol, the idea, or notion connected with or conveyed by it. In the second case it appears as sadda-paññatti or nāma-paññatti, the sound, sign, or name by which an object is known or made known. Nāma-paññatti and attha-paññatti condition each other like subject and

object. They are logically inseparable, and, on account of their complexity, to be understood only in connexion with their respective relations.

The position of the jhāna-objects, which had been classified under the term 'paññatti', will be clearer if we throw a glance upon the six degrees of attha-paññatti which are represented by the ideas of:

(1) inorganic, material forms, based on physical laws of nature; examples: 'land', 'mountain';
(2) organized material forms, based on constructive intelligence; examples: 'house', 'chariot';
(3) organic forms, based on the five psycho-physical aggregates (pañca-khandha); examples: 'man', 'individual';
(4) immaterial forms of locality (disā) and time (kāla), based on the revolutions of celestial bodies (like the moon);
(5) immaterial forms of spatial quality (asamphuṭṭhākāra, lit. 'non-contact'); examples: 'pit', 'cave';
(6) immaterial forms of visualization, based on spiritual exercises (bhāvanā, meditation); example: the after-image (paṭibhāga-nimitta) of hypnotic circles (kasiṇa).

The paṭibhāga-nimitta is the third degree of kasiṇa-concentration. In the first stage (parikamma-nimitta) the object of concentration is perceived as an external sense-stimulus, in the second stage (uggaha-nimitta) it is reproduced mentally in all its details, in the third stage a transformed or simplified reflex of the mental image appears. It has been doubted whether this reflex or 'after-image' can be visualized, but authorities on this subject have made it clear that it is so even with such exercises which do not start with visible objects as in the case of meditation based on the contemplation of breath (ānāpāna-sati). 'Commentators have compared the phenomenon of the Ānāpāna-sati "after-image" (paṭibhāga-nimitta) to star-shine, a round jewel or pearl, to a silver girdle-chain, a garland of flowers, a lotus, a column of smoke, a spread-out cloud, a cart-wheel, the full-moon, the sun, etc. The aspect of the phenomenon depends entirely on the ideas and cognizing powers of the practiser: for it is the cognizing faculty that gives rise to these various semblances taken by the "after-image".' – (Dr. Cassius A. Pereira: *Ānāpāna Sati*, p. 34.)

Nāma- or sadda-paññatti, the name or word by which a thing is made known, is also divided into six classes according as a term represents something that (*a*) exists (vijjamāna-paññatti) or (*b*) does not exist (avijjamāna-paññatti); or represents something that does not exist by something that exists ($b + a$); or represents something that exists by something that does not exist ($a + b$); or represents something that exists by something that exists too ($a + a$) or represents something that does not exist by something that likewise does not exist ($b + b$).

Keeping in mind this manifold nature of paññatti we are now able to understand the position of paññatti in the general division of mental objects (dhammālambaṇāni) into three groups or six classes:

(I) two of them are related to the body: (1) the sensitive (pasāda-rūpa)[1] and (2) the subtle (sukhuma-rūpa)[2] bodily qualities;

(II) two are related to (4) the mind (citta) and (5) its functions (cetasika);

(III) and two are of a more abstract nature: paññatti and nibbāna.

While all objects, which are perceived through the senses (pañcālambaṇāni), are under every condition *present* objects (even a past sense-impression can only be imagined as present), paññatti and nibbāna are time-freed (kāla-vimutta) objects. The remaining classes of mental objects are either present, past, or future.

[1] Namely, sense-organs and sense-objects.

[2] Comprising 'the principles of the two sexes, the vital principle, the two media of communication (viññatti), space, certain properties of matter, and the nutritive principle in foods.' See *Yogāvacara Manual*, Part VII, 8; C. A. F. Rhys-Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*,' pp. 207 ff., 172 ff. (Shwe Zan Aung, *Compendium*, p. 121.)

TABLE VIII

THE PSYCHO-COSMIC SYSTEM OF BUDDHISM

ARŪPALOKA	
4	nevasaññā-nāsaññāyatana-bhūmi
3	ākiñcaññāya-tana-bhūmi
2	viññāṇañcāya-tana-bhūmi
	ākāsānañcāya-tana-bhūmi

RŪPALOKA		
5	akaniṭṭhā, sudassī, sudassā, atappā, avihā	suddhāvāsa-bhūmi
4	asañña-sattā, vehapphalā	
3	subha-kiṇhā, appamāna-subhā, paritta-subhā	
2	ābhassarā, appamāṇābhā, parittābhā	
	mahā-brahmā, brahma-purohitā, brahmapārisajjā	brahma-kāyika-bhūmi

KĀMALOKA		
6	cātumma-hārājikā → tāvatiṃsā → yāmā → tusitā → nimmānaratī → paranimmitta-vasavattī	kāma-sugati-bhūmi
5	manussā	kāma-sugati-bhūmi
4	asura-kāyo	apāya-bhūmi
3	petti-visayo	apāya-bhūmi
2	tiracchāna-yoni	apāya-bhūmi
	nirayo	apāya-bhūmi

7. THE PSYCHO-COSMIC SYSTEM OF BUDDHISM

THE only world of which the Buddhist speaks is the conscious universe which can be experienced in the microcosmos of the human mind and which is represented by the various stages of life and realized by innumerable kinds of living beings. If we speak of the 'human world', the 'animal world', the 'plant world', etc., we do not think of different places, different material worlds, and yet we know that we speak of something which is as real or even more real than any material object which we can see and touch. Likewise the Buddhist universe deals with facts, the reality of which does not depend on their materiality (which may or may not exist) but on their psychological truth, the possibility of their experience. All the heavens and hells are within ourselves, as possibilities of our consciousness.

The pyramid (p. 89) in which we demonstrated the parallelism between the higher stages of consciousness and the higher planes of existence, forms only the upper portion of the pyramid of life as conceived in Buddhist psychology.

Just as there are states of life and consciousness which are higher and happier than that of the average human being, similarly there are also sub-human states in which unrestrained desire ('thirst', craving, taṇhā) produces greater bondage and, consequently, greater possibilities of suffering.

Kāmaloka, the realm of sensuous desire, therefore, is divided into six main planes according to their respective degrees of bondage and suffering. They are in ascending order:

(1) the plane of suffering *par excellence* (niraya);[1]
(2) the plane of animals (tiracchāna-yoni);
(3) the plane of unfulfilled desire (of beings in whom the desire outweighs the possibilities of satisfaction)[2] (petti-visaya);
(4) the plane of prevailing antagonism (aversion)[3] (asura-kāya);
(5) the human plane (manussā);
(6) the six planes of higher beings within the sense-world (deva-loka).[4]

[1] 'Purgatory' in popular parlance.

[2] In popular representations they are depicted as 'hungry shadows' who, like Tantalus are never able to satisfy their burning desires.

[3] The asuras are the demonic forces of darkness, the 'anti-gods' (a-sura) as their name indicates, fighting against the forces of light, symbolized by the light-beings, the suras or, devas.

[4] The translation of the term *deva* with 'god' may be justified from the etymological point of view, but it misses the real meaning. The idea of god or of gods suggests the faculties of a world-creator or at least supernatural powers of creation, controlling the destinies of men. Gods are expected to be immortal, to be masters over life and death, and to receive the worship and the prayers of their devotees. The Buddhist 'devas', however, are neither worshipped nor regarded to be eternal, they are mortal like all other living beings and subject to the laws of causation. Though existing under more fortunate circumstances and endowed with a higher form of consciousness, they have no power over man and are bound to their own karma which may lead them again to the human plane. For this reason the devas cannot even be compared to the angels of Christianity.

The four lower planes are called 'the abodes of misery' (apāya-bhūmi), the two higher ones (including the human plane!) 'the abode of fortunate sense-experience' (kāma-sugati-bhūmi).

In the realm of Pure Form (rūpaloka) the lower senses which depend more or less on bodily contact, namely those of touch, taste, and smell, are eliminated; only the mental, visual, and olfactory properties remain. In the realm of Non-Form even these differentiations disappear.


In the measure in which the number of external senses and their physical bases or organs (vatthu)[1] decrease, the intensity of consciousness, i.e. its purity, its light, and its faculty of radiation, increase. This idea is also expressed in the names which characterize the types of beings which constitute the realm of Pure Form: beings of radiant light (ābhassarā), of limited or boundless aura (paritta-, appamāṇa-subhā), limited or infinite radiance (parittābhā, appamāṇābhā), beings of the abodes of purity (suddhāvāsa), described as 'static, serene, beautiful, clear-sighted, supreme' (avihā, atappā, sudassā, sudassī, akaniṭṭhā).

The description of the planes of Non-Form coincides with that of the four stages of Non-Form consciousness, as we have seen. Thus the tendency of unification, which we could observe in the process of individual absorption as well as in the pyramidal structure of the Buddhist psychocosmos, has reached its ultimate stage.

[1] The difference between vatthu and dvāra is that the former is a physiological, the latter a purely psychological term, Pañca-dvāra represents the 'external side' of consciousness, directed towards the sense-organs (vattha), mano-dvāra the 'inner side', forming the boundary line between the subconscious and the conscious, the 'threshold of consciousness'. As soon as the 'stream of becoming' (bhavaṅga-sota) is arrested and rises above its boundaries, mano-dvāra comes into action.

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